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Summary of the contents 
The industrial economics and trade theory literatures of 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition generally assume homogeneity 
of technologies between firms and countries. This assumption clashes 
with the evidence emerging from even a casual observation of the real 
wor ld where industries including those exposed to international 
competition are characterized by persistent efficiency gaps both 
within and across countries. 
This thesis constructs a monopolistically competitive framework 
of non-localized competition where inter-firm and inter-country 
technical heterogeneity is explicitly allowed for and modelled as 
randomly determined and persistent efficiency gaps. 
The effects of inter-firm efficiency gaps on the long-run 
equilibrium of the monopolistic competition model are analyzed. In 
the presence of cost asymmetries free entry leads to the 
endogenization of the level of industry efficiency through a 
competitive selection process whereby more efficient entrants 
displace less efficient incumbents in the industry. Contrary to the 
standard model, entry will not drive profits to zero for intra-
marginal firms and the long-run equilibrium will be characterized by 
a dispersion of efficiencies, market shares and profits. 
The implications of technical heterogeneity for international 
trade have been analyzed by constructing a two country model where an 
efficiency gap between the two competitors takes the form of a 
xvi 
difference in the mean of their efficiency distributions. The results 
stemming from the analysis differ significantly from the predictions 
of the standard homogeneous technology model and cast doubt on the 
widely acknowledged role of trade as a source of industry 
rationalization. Trade is shown to affect efficiency on two levels 
and with respect to both the two countries experience asymmetric 
effects. By unifying the competitive conditions in which firms 
operate, at the industry level trade modifies the efficiency 
structure of the population of firms which surVIve in steady-state. 
At the firm level, it affects the expected scale of production of 
firms. These asymmetric efficiency effects generate a pattern of 
international specialization characterized by asymmetric market 
shares. The welfare effects of trade are also asymmetrically 
distributed between the two countries and circumstances are 
identified in which at least one country experiences a net welfare 
loss from trade. 
1 
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
During the last fifteen years the theory of international trade has 
witnessed developments almost without precedent in its two hundred 
year history of accepted and virtually unchallenged paradigms. Novel 
features of modern international trade have highlighted the limits of 
traditional theoretical frameworks to provide plausible answers to 
emerging issues. Orthodox doctrines, based on perfect competition -
reqUlrmg homogeneous goods produced under convex technologies - have 
been complemented by new ones where imperfect competition, economies 
of scale and differentiated goods play a dominant role. A close 
integration between the trade and the industrial economics literature 
is the common denominator to the proliferation of models produced in 
recent years. This work is no exception to this latest tradition and 
relies - even more heavily than others - on the consonance between 
industrial economics and trade theory. 
t 
1.1. THE CHANGING NATURE OF WORLD TRADE 
International trade IS, increasingly, the object of attention in 
policy and journalistic forums. As IS well documented1, since the 
1950s there has been a significant growth of international trade as a 
percentage of GOP for most industrial and many developing countries. 
Although this growth is to an extent attributable to a recovery to 
the levels prior to the protectionist period between the two World 
1 For a most recent example see Krugman (1995). 
2 
Wars2, its occurrence has lent support to the view that a successful 
trade performance is synonymous with economic prosperity. This has 
clear ly increased the pressure on trade economists to pursue a better 
understanding of the causes and consequences of trade. But the growth 
of world trade per-se would not have been a matter of senous concern 
for international trade theorists if it was not accompanied by 
striking changes In the patterns of international specialization. 
Indeed, these changes have undoubtedly had a role to play in the 
growth of trade volumes itself. The novel features of actual 
international trade flows concern both their commodity and 
geographical composition. 
According to the vision emerging from traditional trade 
theories, trade enables countries to take advantage of their 
differences (in relative efficiencies or In factor endowments). Thus 
trade flows between two countries will be larger the more different 
the two trading partners are. This view was largely consistent with 
the nature of trade which prevailed at least until the First World 
War. Industrial economies would therefore specialize in exporting 
manufactures to less developed countries while their imports would 
mainly consist of raw materials and agricultural goods. Consistently, 
as reported by Krugman (1995), in 1913 75.5% of the United Kingdom's 
exports consisted of manufactures which accounted for only 20.2% of 
its imports. However, as emerges from Tables 1.1. and 1. 2 below, this 
situation no longer holds: manufactures represent the greatest bulk 
of both the major OECD countries' exports and imports3 . 
2 See Krugman, 1995. 
3 In these and in the following tables, the data for Germany only 
include the Federal Republic, i.e. the former "West Germany". 
3 
Table 1.1: Manufacturing trade as a percentage of total trade (1989) 
EC-124 U.S. Japan 
Imports 78.7 85.1 65.3 
Exports 94.2 88.5 99.4 
Source: European Economy 
Table 1.2: Manufacturing trade as a percentage of total trade (1992) 
Germany France Italy U.K. EC-12 
Imports 75.99 78.82 67.82 77.07 74.67 
Exports 90.03 80.86 88.74 81.87 81.86 
Source: EUROSTAT External Trade Statistical Yearbook, 1993. 
Furthermore, the geographical composition of some GECD countries' 
trade indicates that the majority of the latter occurs within the 
GECD group. Tables 1. 3 and 1. 4 show for the major European countries 
the geographical structure of exports and imports respectively. 
Clearly, trade with other GECD economies accounts for about 80% of 
these European countries' trade. Furthermore, a significant 
proportion of these countries' manufacturing trade takes place with 
other GEeD countries. Table 1.5 gives the percentage of the four 
major European countries' manufacturing trade which takes place 
within the European Union (EC-12). 
4 These are Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, West Germany, and 
the United Kingdom. 
4 
Table 1.3: EC exports by region, 1991 (7. of total exports) 
Export of Germany France ItaLy U.K. EC-12 
.. . ... _ ...... -....... _ ... _._ ..... _ .....•......... _----
To 
Germany - 20.7 21.0 13.7 14.5 
France 13.1 - 15.2 11.0 11.2 
ItaLy 9.1 11.1 - 5.8 7.2 
U.K. 7.6 8.9 6.7 - 7.4 
Tot.Intra-EC 53.6 63.6 59.0 56.3 61.6 
Other Europe 17.9 7.4 11.6 9.4 11.4 
OECD 
USA 6.3 6.0 6.9 11.0 6.4 
Japan 2.5 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 
R.of W. 19.7 21.0 20.3 21.1 18.6 
Source: European Economy, Annual report, 1993. 
Table 1.4: EC imports by region, 1991 (7. of total exports) 
Imports of Germany France ItaLy U.K. EC-12 
.. _-.. _-.-.-... --.. --.. --.--.-_._-.................... --_._ ... _--
From 
Germany - 20.7 20.9 14.7 14.3 
France 12.2 - 14.2 9.2 9.6 
ItaLy 9.2 11.0 - 5.4 6.8 
U.K. 6.4 7.6 5.7 - 6.5 
Tot.Intra-EC 54.5 64.2 57.7 50.1 58.6 
Other Europe 14.9 7.3 10.9 11.8 10.4 
OECD 
USA 6.1 8.3 5.6 12.5 7.7 
Japan 5.3 2.9 2.4 5.7 4.3 
R.of W. 19.2 17.3 23.4 19.9 19.0 
Source: European Economy, Annual report, 1993. 
Table 1.5: Intra-EC manuf. trade as a 7. of total manuf. trade (1991) 
Germany France Italy U.K. EC-12 
Imports 55.11 69.19 66.80 51.63 62.11 
Exports 52.24 61.49 58.29 51.54 58.98 
Source: Eurostat External Trade Statistical Yearbook, 1993. 
5 
80th facts highlighted so far seem to be at odds with the predictions 
of the traditional theory based on comparative advantages. These are 
In fact countries whose economic similarity, as described by 
aggregate measures such as per capita GOP as well as their industrial 
structure, is such that virtually very little trade should be 
expected to take place between them on the basis of orthodox models. 
As documented by Dollar and Wolff (1993), an increasing degree of 
convergence has occurred between OECD countries' levels of per capita 
income during the post Second World War period. This convergence at 
the aggregate level is also associated with a similar structure of 
their economic activity, with manufacturing output representing a 
similar proportion of these countries' GOP. Also, as illustrated by 
Table 1. 6 for the four major European Union countries, the structure 
of employment by broad economic sectors is not significantly 
diff erent amongst them. 
Table 1.6: Structural composition of employment (7. of tot.) 
Germany France Italy 
1980 1989 1980 1989 1980 1989 1980 
1 5.4 4.9 8.6 6.4 13.6 9.9 2.5 
2 33.0 30.0 24.6 20.2 27.0 21.9 27.5 
3 8.2 6.9 8.5 7.2 8.0 6.9 6.5 
4 33.8 36.7 35.2 39.8 34.0 42.2 40.5 
5 17.9 19.9 21.9 25.4 16.5 18.2 20.0 
l:Agricultural, Forestry and Fishery Products; 2:Manufactured 
Products; 3:BuHding and Construction; 4:Market Services; 
5:Non-Market Services. 
Source: European Economy. 
U.K. 
1989 
2.1 
20.5 
7.1 
48.6 
20.1 
The fact that manufactures are the major component of industrial 
production for OECD countries IS not at odds with the orthodox trade 
literature. However, the fact that these countries despite their 
6 
high degree of similarity - mainly trade in manufactures with each 
other is obviously difficult to reconcile with the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin and Ricardian frameworks which do not provide any 
rationale for trade flows between very similar countries and predict 
instead that the volume of trade between any two economies should be 
inversely related to their degree of similarity. 
Another, more worrying, feature of real world trade for 
theoretical economists is represented by the evidence on the 
composition of trade flows which is also not consistent with the 
predictions of the standard models. As has been extensively 
documented in the literature5 , the great bulk of trade occurring 
between industrial countries in particular is intra-industry trade, 
that is it consists of the simultaneous importing and exporting of 
goods with similar factor intensities and produced within the same 
industry. Early empirical studies showed that all processes of 
regional integration after the Second World World (e.g. the formation 
of the European Community in 1958 or the U. S. -Canada auto pact in 
1965) were followed by a balanced increase in export and imports 
within the same three-digit industrial categories. Balassa (1966) was 
amongst the first to attract attention to this type of exchange when 
studying the growth of trade in manufactures after the formation of 
the European Common Market. Later, Grubel and Lloyd (1975) were the 
first to carefully document the existence of intra-industry trade. 
A significant amount of work has been done in this area 
providing ample evidence to support the view that intra-industry 
5 See for instance Balassa (1966), Grubel (1967), and Grubel and 
Lloyd (1975). 
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trade is an important phenomenon which affects the majority of trade 
in industrial products between industrialized 
.and newly 
industrialized economies. A common measure of intra-industry trade is 
the Grubel and Lloyd index6 , given by 
(1.1) 
where I ITj is the degree of intra-industry trade for a country j, and 
X ji and Mji are the country's exports and imports of commodity i 
respecti vely. Clearly, o ~ lIT ~ 1. If there is complete 
specialization, then one of Xw Mji is zero and hence I IT = 0, that 
IS there is no intra-industry trade. If lIT = 1, all trade is intra-
industry. Table 1. 7 shows the degree of intra-industry trade for some 
countries and some broad commodity groups. 
Table 1.7: lIT by commodity and country, 1990 
Country Germany U.K. U.S. Japan 
.. _ ...... -_ ...... __ ................. -_ ................... --.--- ----_ ............... __ .. _ ........... -.-.-...•........ 
Commodity 
Chemica~s 0.758 0.899 0.75 0.990 
Specia~ Industr.Machinery 0.456 0.897 0.918 0.355 
Computers 0.747 0.953 0.998 0.390 
Automobiles 0.587 0.623 0.375 0.260 
C~othing 0.521 0.607 0.173 0.002 
Precision Instruments 0.716 0.916 0.677 0.704 
Source: U.N. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. 
Obviously, this type of trade cannot be easily be explained by 
traditional trade theories. Recent developments in the theory of 
6 Most studies adopt this index. For a critical assessment of this 
index see Greenaway and Milner (1989). 
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international trade, starting with the work of Krugman (1979a, 1980, 
and 1981) Lancaster (1979, 1980) and Helpman (1981) have provided 
alternative explanations of the patterns of international 
specializa tion. This literature relies heavily on the industrial 
economics literature. Models based on imperfectly competitive market 
structures, utility functions which reward product diversity, and 
increasing returns to scale technologies have established a rationale 
for the empirical evidence. Thus, if there are internal economies of 
scale, countries will be able to produce only a relatively small sub-
set of differentiated models of a good at relatively low unit costs. 
If the produced variants of the good are however sufficiently 
diversified, consumers' love of variety will generate intra-industry 
trade. As has been observed, it is undoubtedly true that the rise in 
intra-industry trade also depends on the changing nature of 
production in manufacturing activities. Not only do these make use of 
more differentiated inputs (another significant component of intra-
industry trade), but the production process itself is increasingly 
being "de-integrated", Le. its different stages take place in 
different countries. The increasing degree of segmentation of the 
production process to take advantage of local comparative 
advantages - into different phases located in different countries has 
certainly contributed to the large increase in the volume of intra-
industry trade 7 . 
7 On the empirical front, several studies have attempted to 
establish the basic determinants of intra-industry trade. We shall 
not survey this vast literature here. See Pagoulatos and Sorensen 
(1975), Loertscher and Wolter (1980), Caves (1981), Toh (1982), 
Bergstrand (1983), Havrylyshyn and Civan (1983), Balassa (1986) 
and Greenaway and Milner (1989) amongst others. 
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As is evident from Table 1. 7, intra-industry trade varies across 
commodities. Thus, products which are more subject to differentiation 
and scale economies show higher degrees of intra-industry trade than 
less differentiated commodities whose production is not subject to 
significant economies of scale. So, for instance, technological 
differentiation and economies of scale are likely to be important 
factors for chemicals, computers, industrial machinery and precision 
instruments which show, In Table 1. 7, relatively high values of the 
I IT index. Clothing is in general characterized by lower degrees of 
two way trade, thus suggesting a possible dominant role in this 
sector of comparative advantages. However, note that the index is 
higher for the U. K. and Germany, possibly reflecting the importance 
of cross border trade in fashion within the European Union. This 
points to another factor which emerges from these data, that is the 
variability of the degree of intra-industry trade across countries 
within the same industries which reflects geographical as well as 
historical reasons. Also, an aggregation problem exists in that when 
the intra-industry trade indexes are calculated for broad commodity 
groups they tend to overestimate the degree of intra-industry trade 
which reduces as the commodity categorization becomes more 
disaggregated. 
1.2. DIFFERENT DEGREES OF INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE PENETRATION 
In general, theoretical models of intra-industry trade have 
focused on the existence of this two-way trade. In particular the 
earlier contributions in the literature have been concerned with 
providing an explanation of why two way trade within the same 
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industry occurs between similar countries. The resulting models, 
particularly those built within the monopolistically. competitive 
framework, have pushed to the limit the similarity between countries 
and have opted for an assumption of identicality of demand structures 
and production technologies. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the 
assumed existence of increasing returns and the utility functions 
rewarding product diversity, these models could indeed account for 
trade between identical economies. The fact that the pattern of 
intra-industry trade reflected the existence and persistence of high 
degrees of specialization did not play a central role amongst the 
factors driving the theory. 
As can be seen from Table 1. 7, even at a very high level of 
aggregation, the I IT index always suggests some degree of inequality 
between import and export flows. At a more disaggregated level this 
is even more evident. Table 1. 8 proposes bilateral I IT indexes for 
the four major European Union countries in a few sub-product groups 
at the sixth-digit level of disaggregation. As the table illustrates, 
there is a high variability in the bilateral reciprocal degrees of 
intra-industry trade penetration and the I IT indexes are often very 
small. The extent of this is clearly affected by the bilateral nature 
of these indexes. The fact that intra-industry trade between any two 
countries is not balanced does not mean that in the aggregate these 
countries do not have a balanced trade in that industry. However even 
the very aggregated level of Table 1. 7 - which by its very nature 
tends to overestimate the degree of intra-industry trade - shows that 
the two way trade is often far from being balanced. These data seem 
to suggest the existence of patterns of specialization which shape 
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the structure of trade flows. 
Table 1.8: Bilateral lIT indexes, 1991 
Household 
Electrical U.K. France Germany 
Refrigerators 
France 0.171 -
Germany 0.595 0.068 -
Italy 0.000 0.603 0.04 
Ki tchen/Household 
articles of 
stainless steel 
France 0.611 -
Germany 0.779 0.953 -
Italy 0.163 0.164 0.630 
Electro-Thermic 
Hair dryers 
France 0.967 -
Germany 0.549 0.162 -
Italy 0.057 0.362 0.423 
Source: EUROSTAT Analytical Tables of Foreign Trade - NIMEXE 
Imperfect competition and product differentiation, while 
explaining the existence of intra-industry trade, are not sufficient 
per se to capture the different degrees of reciprocal trade 
penetration which show the extent to which specialization still 
exists amongst industrial economies. 
Clearly, the assumption of symmetric trading countries leads to 
the prediction that the free-trade market is symmetrically shared 
between them. A notable exception to the symmetric market share 
result is Krugman (1980) where the presence of transport costs 
ensures that firms hold different shares m their domestic and 
foreign markets. Venables (1987) also obtains a similar result by 
allowing for both the presence of transport costs and asymmetric 
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preferences where products from different countries have different 
weights in consumers' utility functions. Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
offer a key contribution to this literature by constructing a model, 
set in a Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin framework, which incorporates 
factor endowments alongside increasing returns to scale and 
horizontal product differentiation. Their model thus generates both 
intra and inter-industry trade with the Heckscher-Ohlin component 
determining the pattern of inter-industry trade and with intra-
industry trade being determined on the basis of the other factors, 
namely decreasing average costs and product differentiation. Also, 
the existence of differences in factor endowments affect the pattern 
of lIT, with one country being net exporter of the differentiated 
good, thus leading to an asymmetric division of the integrated 
differentiated market. These models clearly represent a big step 
towards reality. 
1.3. TECHNOLOGY AS AN ASYMMETRY GENERATING FACTOR 
As was discussed in Section 1. 2, there are models of trade 
within the monopolistically competitive framework which generate 
asymmetric market shares in the intra-industry trade industries. The 
factor leading to these results are transport costs or the marriage 
between an Heckscher-Ohlin framework and a monopolistically 
competitive one. Note, however, that these models do not relax the 
assumption of identicality of countries within the intra-industry 
trade sector. In other words, the source of market share asymmetries 
lies outside the intra-industry trade sector itself. There are 
however reasons to express dissatisfaction with the current state of 
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the art. 
Even a casual observation of real world industries points 
towards the existence of a high degree of specialization between 
industrial countries, despite their very similar aggregate 
characteristics, such as per-capita GDP or per-capita industrial 
output. Dollar and Wolff (1993), analyzing 13 OECD countries whose 
manufacturing data has been disaggregated into 28 industries, note 
that despite the increase In the degree of aggregate convergence 
occurred in the post Second World War period, the sUb-industries in 
which each country exports are quite different. As they stress, the 
export patterns of these countries are strikingly different when 
examined at a disaggregated level. This is clearly consistent with 
the different degrees of reciprocal intra-industry trade penetration 
noted above. 
Dollar, Wolff and Baumol (1988) found a considerable variation 
across industrial countries In the value added per employee. 
Consistently, Dollar and Wolff (1993) find that while the aggregate 
labour productivity of industrial countries has converged to US 
levels, the degree of convergence is highly heterogeneous across 
industries. So, while at the aggregate level the gap between low 
productivity and high productivity countries has been shrinking (and 
the relative capital intensity of their manufacturing production has 
been converging), a leadership structure in total factor productivity 
(TFP) can easily be identified at a more disaggregated - industry or 
sub-industry - level. They state: "convergence of aggregate Labor and 
totaL factor productivity has resuLted as countries improved their 
reLative productivity in industries that differed from country to 
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country." (Dollar and Wolff, 1993, p. 149). This leads to an 
aggregate productivity convergence which is higher than that in 
individual industries. "A further resuLt of this development, 
documented in this chapter, is that the trade patterns of the 
industriaL countries are not converging or becoming more similar. 
This result is consistent with our concLusion that speciaLization has 
continued at the industry LeveL in the advanced industrial 
countries." (Dollar and Wolff, 1993, p. 149). Thus, different 
countries had their strongest convergence in different industries. 
That is, despite leading to a great deal of convergence in the 
average TFP of the economy, this has generated different patterns of 
production and export specialization. 
It is plausible to think that a crucial role in determining the 
differences in TFP at the industry level documented by Dollar and 
Wolff (1993) is played by technology. As strongly and convincingly 
argued by the relatively recent evolutionary literature, technology 
is by its very nature firm and country-specific. The work of 
Rosenberg (1982), Nelson and Winter (1982), Dosi (1988) and Dosi et 
aL (1988) stresses how technology - which is embodied in people and 
organizations reflects specific, local, and only partially 
appropriable knowledge. Such a view of technology "can account for 
the continuous existence of technoLogy gaps between firms and between 
countries" (Soete, 1990, p.ll). Also, the "reLativeLy ordered, 
cumuLative and irreversibLe pattern of technical change" (Soete, 
1990, p.ll) reflects the cumulative nature of technical knowledge, 
hence explaining the persistence over time of both these gaps and the 
structure of leadership positions of countries in international 
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markets. As a result, the international intersectoral composition of 
countries' trade can be explained essentially by technology .gaps. 
Although the localized nature of technical knowledge has widely 
been disregarded in the mainstream industrial economics and trade 
literature, extensive empirical work has documented the firm-specific 
nature of technology. A number of studies suggest that a wide range 
of firm and plant efficiencies coexist and persist even in industries 
with competitive national and international markets. Taussing (1919) 
showed that a wide variation of costs existed within American 
industries. Within industry dispersion of companies by profit margins 
was also documented by Coates (1927) for British industries. More 
recently, Caves (1991) finds, for the U.S., Canada, Japan, Australia 
and South Korea, a considerable variation of technical inefficiencies 
across firms both between countries within the same industry and 
between industries8 . Hart and Shipman (1992) find within industry 
dispersion of labour productivity and show that this dispersion 
differs significantly between the U.K. and Germany. 
1.4. COMPETITIVE SELECTION AND TRADE: AN OVERVIEW 
The central idea of this thesis is that patterns of 
international specializa tion are influenced by an asymmetric 
distribution between firms and between countries of technological and 
organizational capabilities. Even when employing the same broadly 
defined technology firms use different types of knowledge which is, 
to an extent, firm and country-specific, because it is the product of 
8 For a recent survey of the extensive empirical literature lf1 the 
area see Green et aL. (1991). 
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past experience and reflects institutional and historical factors. 
These features of technology determine patterns of international 
exchange between similar countries which, although characterized by 
intra-industry trade, reflect persistent country specific domains in 
some productions (Porter, 1993) and can in principle explain the 
different degrees of intra-industry trade penetration empirically 
observed. Thus, dispersion will emerge within an industry in 
productivity levels, profit rates, firm size and export performance. 
This will obviously have a repercussion on the composition and volume 
of trade. In fact, this distribution of firms' efficiency will 
overlap (determine and being determined by) with the country 
comparative advantage. As argued by Abd-el-Rahman (1991) firms 
operating within the same industry are distinguished by specific 
competitive advantages and disadvantages but "against a background of 
coLLective comparative advantages" related to the industry and 
country in which they operate. 
The firm and country-specific nature of technology has not 
played a central role in either the industrial economics or the 
international trade literature. In particular, within their 
Chamberlinian monopolistic competition strands, these two areas of 
the literature have not taken account of inter-firm differences in 
technology. Trade theory has also generally disregarded inter-country 
efficiency gaps within the imperfectly competitive industry. 
The cost of the assumption of technical homogeneity is 
significant and not limited to the positive implications of the 
analysis. In fact not only does the symmetry hypothesis generate a 
failure to capture an important aspect of the pattern of 
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specialization, but also has important implications as to the gaInS 
from trade. Models of monopolistic competition generally support the 
view that trade benefits symmetrically all partner countries. On one 
hand, the increased competition leads to a rationalization of the 
industry and generates efficiency gains. On the other hand, In an 
environment characterized by a taste for variety, trade increases 
consumer welfare via an increase m the number of goods available for 
consumption. 
The recent debate about the effects of the implementation of the 
Single European Market has centred around the role of trade in 
increasing competition In most industries thus leading to the need 
for firms previously protected by trade barriers to pursue - in order 
to survive - efficiency improvements. The same line of arguments has 
led commentators to predict the effects of trade on the competitive 
selection process within industries, whereby only the more efficient 
firms would manage to survive at the expense of less efficient ones. 
Most of the new theoretical literature on imperfect competition, 
however, cannot deal with this aspect because of the assumed 
technical homogeneity between firms. Despite the centrality of 
industrial structure in determining the patterns of trade, this 
literature does not allow one to analyze some of the most important 
effects of trade on market structure itself, i.e. its effects on the 
competitive selection process within industries. 
1.4.1. The aims of the thesis 
On the basis of the above considerations, the main aims of this 
work are the following: 
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(0 To construct a monopolistically competitive framework capable of 
taking into account inter-firm and inter-country differences lil 
efficiency. 
(2) To analyze the role of inter-firm efficiency gaps in determining 
the long-run equilibrium nature of the monopolistic competition 
model of Chamberlinian tradition. 
(3) To examine the role of inter-firm and inter-country efficiency 
gaps in determining trade patterns and in affecting the welfare 
effects of trade. 
(4) To analyze the impact of trade liberalization on the competitive 
selection processes of industries characterized by different 
levels of efficiency. 
Clearly the focus of this work is not merely on international trade 
issues, a significant emphasis being placed on the closed economy 
monopolistic competition model. 
1.4.2. Modelling strategy and main results 
The monopolistic competition strand of the literature within 
which the analysis has been carried is the representative consumer 
framework of non-localized competition. Generally, this type of 
models assume firms' technical homogeneity9. Within a partial 
equilibrium framework of analysis, we develop a standard Dixit-
Stiglitz (1977) type model of monopolistic competition to allow for 
technical heterogeneity amongst firms. As in Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), all consumers are assumed to be identical in tastes and 
9 The few exceptions to symmetry 
differentiation literature are 
Hotellian tradition. 
which can be found in the product 
provided by address models of 
19 
income and no explicit representation is offered of the product 
space. 
The modelling of technology is kept as simple as possible. The 
central assumption is the existence of a distribution of firms' 
efficiency within the industry. Hence, inter-firm technical 
asymmetries take the form of firm-specific marginal production costs 
generated by a random process. The distribution is exogenously given, 
as if describing a historically determined state of technology. 
Market structure is determined endogenously as the outcome of a 
process of competitive selection whereby more efficient entrants 
displace less efficient incumbents. The competitive process is shown 
to lead to the simultaneous determination of both the number of firms 
in the industry and the minimum level of efficiency required to 
survive, i.e. the industry efficiency cut-off point. 
No technical progress is assumed to take place in the model and 
inter-firm efficiency gaps are given, persist over time, and are not 
affected by knowledge spill-overs and/or by imitation processes. As 
has been powerfully stressed, "the evoLutionary pattern of anyone 
industry wiLL be characterised by both mechanisms of 'Darwinian' 
seLection and 'Lamarkian' Learning/adaptation/imitation" processes 
(Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990, p.116). However, despite our awareness 
that in real world industries "Lamarkian" dynamic forces are bound to 
interact and affect the competitive selection process itself, we 
choose to confine our analysis to the former. By focussing on the 
"Darwinian" selection between firms with given different 
efficiencies, our model allows to highlight important features of 
competition in a monopolistically competitive market. The results of 
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the analysis differ significantly from those stemming from the 
standard homogeneous firms model. In particular, 
(1) The assumption of firm-specific costs leads to the endogenization 
of the steady-state level of the industry technical efficiency. 
The latter will tUrn out to be a function of the parameters which 
determine the toughness of price competition. The result is the 
emergence of a relationship between industry efficiency, 
concentration and profitability which is not always consistent 
with that stemming from the standard version of the model. 
(2) The asymmetry of costs, together with the uncertainty as to the 
efficiency potential entrants will obtain, imply the long-run 
persistence of positive profits for intra-marginal firms. 
(3) The steady-state will be characterized by a spectrum of 
quantities, prices and profit rates. 
The modified monopolistic competition model is subsequently used 
to analyze trade between two similar but not identical countries. On 
the demand side of the model the assumption of symmetry is retained. 
Hence the two countries' consumers are identical in every respect. On 
the supply side, both countries' industries are characterized by 
heterogeneous firms, where an efficiency gap exists between the two 
industries. The latter is assumed to consists of a given difference 
in the mean of the two distributions of marginal costs. This 
efficiency gap IS meant to reflect historically determined country-
specific states of technology. Clearly, one could argue that trade 
flows are likely to generate knowledge spill-overs between countries 
which ought to reduce, to an extent, country differences in 
efficiency. Here, however, we lay the emphasis on the effects on 
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trade performance of the existence of persistent efficiency gaps 
between firms and countries. 
Our model allows to illustrate the important phenomenon that, by 
unifying the efficiency conditions in which firms from different 
countries have to operate, trade liberalization changes the nature of 
the competitive selection process of national industries. By 
focussing on the competitive selection effects of trade, we shall 
show how the latter influences the (steady-state) state of technology 
even in the absence of convergence mechanisms (such as knowledge 
spill-overs and imitation) and asymmetry creating forces (such as 
firm-specific innovation). 
The results stemming from this framework challenge the 
predictions of the standard monopolistic trade model in a number of 
ways. In particular, 
(0 The integrated market is not symmetrically shared between 
countries, with the more efficient country supplying a bigger 
number and larger quantities of varieties than the less efficient 
one. Thus, the model provides a rationale - stemming from factors 
within the monopolistically competitive industry - for different 
degrees of intra-industry trade penetration. 
(2) If competition is very selective, the less efficient country's 
industry may be unable to survive foreign competition and the 
more efficient country will serve the whole of the integrated 
market. 
(3) Two types of efficiency effects of trade are identified, one at 
the industry and one at the firm level. With respect to both, 
trade affects the two countries asymmetrically. In particular, at 
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both levels, one of the two countries will experience an adverse 
efficiency effect. Thus, the results of the analysis cast doubt 
on the standard prediction that trade, via competition, leads to 
generalized efficiency gains. 
(4) Welfare gains are not symmetrically spread across countries and 
circumstances are identified in which at least one of the two 
countries experiences a net welfare loss as a result of trade. 
Despite the significant normative implications of the results of this 
work, we do not carry out here any policy analysis. This task lies 
beyond the the scope of this thesis and is left for future research. 
1.4.2. An outline of the thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 2 surveys the (closed economy) monopolistic competition 
literature. Particular emphasis is put on critically assessing the 
features of the representative consumer non-localized competition 
strand of the literature. 
The main part of Chapter 3 is devoted to developing the 
heterogeneous firms monopolistic competition model, to analyze its 
steady-state features and to compare its predictions to those 
stemming from the homogeneous firm case. 
Chapter 4 surveys the relevant trade literature. Chapter 5 is a 
transitory chapter, in which an autarkic inter-country comparison 1S 
carried out in order to highlight the market structure implications 
for the less efficient country of its efficiency disadvantage. The 
main aim of the chapter is to provide a useful benchmark for the 
subsequent analysis of the effects of trade on market structure. 
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The trade model is developed in Chapter 6 where the efficiency 
effects of trade are analyzed and their positive and welfare 
implications are highlighted. 
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and identifies some areas for 
future research. 
Finally, some of the results obtained throughout the thesis are 
supported by simulation methods. The choice of numerical evaluations, 
in addition to being dictated by the analytical intractability of 
some of the relationships, has been made in order to illustrate 
graphically the behavior of the variables for plausible ranges of 
parameters values. 
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Chapter 2 
HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION: 
A SURVEY 
"These three elements variety among individual 
preferences, potential variety among products, and 
economies of scale - are aU present in the consumer-
products sector of advanced industrial societies." 
Lancaster, 1979 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relevance of the 
phenomenon of product differentiation to the industrial economics 
literature. Given the extent of the field, and given the more specific 
aims of this study, the analysis will be limited to what is generally 
referred to as horizontal product differentiation. That is, we shall 
not concern ourselves with the vertical product differentiation 
literature. 
In general, products differ on the basis of the characteristics 
they possess. Some of these characteristics generate objective 
differences between the varieties of the good under consideration. In 
this case consumers can be expected to have homogeneous preferences as 
to the consumption of which variety generates the highest utility. 
Different varieties can be ranked in terms of their level of quality 
and all consumers would agree on the ranking. Consumption choices will 
then be determined by other aspects, such as the level of income. It 
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follows that the coexistence in the market of low and high quality 
products rests on price differences such that the a priori 
attractiveness of a superior quality is compensated by the lower price 
of an inferior one. This is what is meant by vertical product 
differentiation. 
Horizontal product differentiation, instead, is rooted in taste 
differences. There are goods which have the same intrinsic quality 
level, and yet can be distinguished by consumers on the basis of other 
characteristics they possess. In this case there is no natural ranking 
of the varieties of the good. Other things being equal, consumption 
choices are made on the basis of preference structures which reflect 
the way in which consumers subjectively perceive and value these 
characteristics!. ) 
2.2. HORIZONTAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AND PREFERENCES 
Horizontal product differentiation is a major feature of real 
world markets and its full appreciation is essential to the 
understanding of the way economies operate. It is obvious that the 
origin of its existence lies in the great diversity of consumers' 
tastes. As stressed by Lancaster" individual variations in tastes 
and preferences are real and substantial in the sense that individuals 
consider themselves to be better off (or have a higher welfare) when 
they have a product which exactly fits their view of the ideal design 
for that class of products than when they do not" (Lancaster, 1979, 
5) The idiosyncratic nature of consumers' tastes is reflected in p. . 
Cremer and Thisse (1991) show that address models a la Hotelling 
are a special case of a vertical differentiation model. 
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the behaviour of producers who pursue forms of product 
differentiation. Indeed, even when products are very close substitutes 
and no substantial objective differences exist between them, producers 
intentionally engage in activities aimed at enhancing what consumers 
subjectively perceive as differences amongst goods and sellers. The 
extent of this phenomenon will vary over time and across countries and 
will be larger the higher, and the more evenly distributed, is income. 
Clearly, where basic needs are met, more intangible features of 
commodi ties satisfying needs related to (or induced by) fashion, 
status, etc. - become important and determine consumption and choice. 
As stressed by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, " ... there are two 
LeveLs of taste diversity. IndividuaLs may want to consume different 
products on different occasions, expressing a preference for varieties 
over time (e.g., not eating the same dish at the same restaurant every 
night). IndividuaLs may aLso have idiosyncratic tastes about their 
most preferred variants (e.g., beer drinkers and cigarette smokers 
often stick to brands they Like best). Thus we view the popuLation as 
a whoLe as heterogeneous, and this intra- and inter-individuaL 
heterogeneity generates a demand for product diversity in the 
aggregate." (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992, p.l). It is not 
difficult to imagine an idealized world where the number of 
individuals corresponds to the number of varieties, with each 
individual consuming a variety which differs in some respects from the 
ones most preferred by others. Technology, however, constraints the 
number of producible varieties. The existence of increasing returns to 
scale in production and in all other activities related to product 
specification is such that each firm needs to serve a sufficiently 
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large portion of the market. Hence, the market will support a number 
of varieties which is smaller than the ideal one. 
\ The literature on horizontal product differentiation has 
generated different approaches to the modelling of this phenomenon. A 
first classification can be made with respect to whether consumers' 
preferences are heterogeneous or homogeneous. Models based on the 
assumption of heterogeneous preferences across consumers are referred 
to as address or characteristics approach to horizontal product 
differentiation. Models which assume preference homogeneity across 
consumers generally fall into the so called representative consumer 
approach. Note that the representative consumer framework is often 
referred to as Chamberlinian.) However, we think that the implications 
of this adjective go beyond the type of consumer preferences modelling 
strategy adopted. Whilst it is true that the representative consumer 
approach owes much of its development to Chamberlin's work, and 
despite the fact that Chamber linian models are frequently 
characterized by the representative consumer assumption, many 
contributions make the hypothesis of heterogeneous consumers. In fact, 
in determining whether a model is Chamberlinian or not, the hypothesis 
about the nature of competition is more important than the distinction 
between homogeneous and heterogeneous tastes. Instead, the crucial 
distinction is between localized and non-localized competition. As we 
shall see, (a fundamental hypothesis of Chamberlinian models is the 
symmetry of preferences which implies the absence of neighbouring 
effects between goods, so that firms do not have any dil~ect 
competitors but compete with all others simultaneously. This is a case 
of non-localized competition. Whilst the symmetry hypothesis is more 
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common in representative consumer models, it is not inconsistent with 
the assumption of preference heterogeneity which characterizes address 
models. Hence, although representative consumer models are in general 
Chamberlinian, it is easy to find examples in the literature of 
address or characteristics models which also fall into this category2. 
These issues will be discussed more extensively later. 
2.2.1. Heterogeneous preferences 
In this sub-section we shall examine the main features of 
theoretical models based on heterogeneous preferences. The literature 
developed within this framework is extremely vast and our survey does 
not intend to be exhaustive. Rather, we shall try to highlight the 
main theoretical issues related to these contributions in order to 
relate them to the other body of literature based on homogeneous 
preferences. 
2.2.1.1. The address or characteristic approach 
The address approach (or characteristic approach) to product 
differentiation has developed along the lines set out by Hotelling's 
seminal work (1929). Central to this class of models is the hypothesis 
that consumers have heterogeneous preference structures whereby each 
individual has an ideal variety which differs in some characteristics 
from the 
individuals 
ideal variety 
and variants 
of 
of 
other consumers.) It follows 
a good can be described by 
that both 
particular 
locations (points) in the characteristic space. This idea builds on 
the work of Lancaster (1966, 1971, 1979, 1991a) who suggested that a 
2 See, for example, Hart (1985a, b). 
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good can be seen as a bundle of characteristics. A commodity is not 
valued per se, but for the attributes it embodies, which form the 
basis of consumers preferences. , 
/ 
Let M be the number of characteristics of a horizontally 
differentiated good, with [RM being the characteristic space. Hence, 
each existing and ideal variety of the good can be described by a 
point belonging to [RM. Assume that there are N (N)2) currently 
produced varieties. Each variety i of the differentiated good can then 
be described by a vector qi =( q~, ... ,q~) whose elements indicate the 
"quantity" of each characteristic it possesses and which determines 
the point at which the variety i is located, i.e. its address in the 
characteristic space. Hence, the N varieties are located at 
ql' ... , qi , ... , qN' with qi ~qj for all i, j=l, ... ,N and i~ j. 
,If consumers' preferences are defined over the characteristic 
space, each individual will be located at the point corresponding to 
his/her ideal variety.) Frequently, in this literature, each individual 
buys only one variant of the good; furthermore, in many models it is 
assumed that only one unit of the chosen variety is purchased. This 
implies that buyers are partitioned in sales areas which do not 
overlap3. For simplicity, in the analysis that follows we shall retain 
both of these assumptions. 
Consider a population of Z consumers, each located at the point 
corresponding to his/her ideal variety q, where 
\.Varieties which are close to an individual's ideal one will be valued 
more than varieties which are at a more distant location4 . Note that 
3 See Phlips and Thisse, 1982. 
4 Here we are implicitly assummg that - at least at the individual 
level - preferences are asymmetric. As we shall see, this does not 
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an individual's ideal product specification mayor may not be produced 
and hence may not be available for consumption. Also, even if the 
ideal variety is amongst the existing ones, a consumer may find that 
it is sold at too high a price and thus prefer a cheaper neighbouring 
variety. Hence, consumer's choice will represent a compromise between 
his/her preferences, reflected in the set of characteristics defining 
the ideal product specification, and the availability and/or the price 
of each good. The chosen variant will be the one which yields the 
greatest utility, i.e. the variety whose specification is closest to 
the ideal one. 
The utility of a consumer purchasing a variety i will be 
inversely related to the distance in the characteristic space between 
the location of his/her ideal variety and that of variety i. The 
larger is this distance, the higher is the disutility cost incurred by 
the consumer from not buying q'. It follows that the further away is a 
brand from a consumer's ideal location (i. e. set of characteristics) 
the lower will be the degree of substitutability between the two 
varieties. Within a geographical analogy, the disutility attributable 
to not consuming one's ideally preferred good can be seen as a 
transport cost, with an individual's geographical location being 
interpretable as his/her product specification5 . 
Let us define the Euclidean distance between the consumer's ideal 
prevent models developed in this framework to assume symmetric 
preferences at the aggregate level. 
5 Lederer and Hurter (1986), MacLeod, Norman 
Greenhut, Norman and Hung (1987) and Anderson 
provide analyses of how the spatial model can 
model of product location in characteristic space. 
and Thisse (1985), 
and de Palma (1988) 
be interpreted as a 
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variety and a variety i as di=(qi-q), from which follows that the 
square of the Euclidean distance between the locations of the two 
M 
goods In the characteristic space will be L (q~ _~k)2 = d~ d
1
. We can 
k=l 
now define the indirect utility of a consumer whose ideal bundle of 
characteristics is q but who purchases qi as6 
(2.1) 
where a is a positive constant. Vi is given by 
V. = A + 'Y. - p. 1 0 1 1 (2.2) 
where A is a measure of nominal income, '0 i is a scalar which 
represents a quality index of variety i and Pi is the price of variety 
i. If the only difference amongst consumers is in their tastes, Vi is 
equal for all and can be seen as representing the observable 
(objective) features of the good. Instead, the second term of equation 
(2.1), despite having the same functional form across consumers, is 
individual specific in that it IS evaluated at individual locations q 
in the characteristic space and represents the disutility cost to the 
consumer from not purchasing his/her ideal variety. 
Given that each consumer is generally assumed to purchase only 
one single unit of a single variety of the differentiated commodity, 
individual behaviour in not consistent with traditional consumer 
theory based on continuous and convex preferences. Indeed, the 
assumption of only one variant of the good being purchased implies 
that consumers are "at corner soLutions with respect to most goods in 
6 This specification of the utility function has been recently used 
is several models. See Eaton and Wooders (1985) and Anderson, de 
Palma and Thisse (1989) amongst others. 
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the group" (Archibald, Eaton and Lipsey, 1986). This discontinuity in 
consumer behaviour is reflected in discontinuous individual demands. 
Nevertheless, continuous aggregate demand functions for each variety 
of the good can still be obtained. As suggested by Hotelling himself, 
aggregate demand functions can be derived by assuming a given taste 
distribution m the characteristic space of the population of 
heterogeneous consumers 7 . Following Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
(1989), we assume that the Z consumers are distributed in IRM according 
to a continuous and strictly positive density function f( q), where 
A Al AM J A A 
q' =( q , ... , q ) and f( q)dq=Z. The market space of a variety 
IRM 
i can 
then be defined as 
(2.3) 
which corresponds to the set of types of consumers for which variant i 
is weakly preferred to all others. Given equations (2.1) and (2.2), 
the market space for variety i can be re-written as 
(2.4) 
From the definition of market space in (2.5), the demand for a variety 
i can then be defined as the mass of consumers in l's market space, 
that is 
(2.5) 
which corresponds to the mass of consumers in the market segment of 
7 Hotelling assumed consumers to be continuously and uniformly 
distributed over a bounded interval. 
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variety i. 
2.2.1.2. Discrete choice models 
An alternative way of dealing with the aggregation problem of 
heterogeneous consumers is offered by the so called discrete choice 
models, constructed within probabilistic frameworks. Two alternative 
formulations are possible. A first one assumes that consumers' 
preferences are not deterministic, and the random nature of the model 
stems from an individual behaviour which is intrinsically stochastic8 . 
Alternatively, it is possible to assume that whilst the individual 
consumer has well defined deterministic preferences, the firm does not 
have all the necessary information to model them precisely. 
The central assumption of the latter type of models is the non-
observability by firms of all the variables which determine consumers' 
choices. This approach has been more popular with economists because 
individual choices do not need to be stochastic and could result from 
a deterministic utility function which reflects preferences satisfying 
the axioms of completeness, reflexivity and transitivity of 
neoclassical consumer theory. As a result, the hypothesis of 
rationality at the individual level can be retained. Firms are only 
assumed to know the taste distribution over the consumers' space, but 
they cannot directly observe the idiosyncratic taste parameters. Thus, 
from the firm's point of view, utility is a random variable and each 
firm can forecast the aggregate demand for its product by attributing 
probabilities to the event of each consumer choosing that particular 
8 These are briefly 
Thisse (1992c). 
discussed in Anderson, de Palma and 
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variety. Product characteristics and price are the factors the firm 
can manipulate to affect the choice probabilities and hence the demand 
for its product. 
As before, let there be Z individuals each with a deterministic 
utility function. However, assume that the firm producing one of the 
varieties of the product does not know the manner in which differences 
amongst varieties are perceived and valued by consumers whose tastes 
are idiosyncratic. The firm only knows with certainty those factors 
which are perceived in the same way by all potential customers which 
we represent by means of Vi in equation (2.2) above. Given its 
imperfect knowledge of the utility function of the individual, the 
best course of action for the firm is to model the individual specific 
component of the preference structure as stochastic. Hence, the firm 
will view consumer utility as consisting of two components, one 
defined over observable characteristics and the other basically a 
stochastic residual which reflects the unobservable idiosyncratic 
tastes. Following Anderson and de Palma (1992), the conditional 
utility function ascribed to the individual consumer by firms over 
each of the N variants is 
(2.6) 
where w is a positive parameter and I-Li ~ LLd.(O,l). Note that w 
reflects the degree of subjective taste heterogeneity til the 
population. Hence, the larger is w, the larger will be the role of 
product differentiation i. e. non-price competition factors in 
determining consumers' choice. Consequently, the larger is w, the less 
responsive will demand turn out to be to price changes. Also, given 
that I-L\ has been normalized to have zero mean, the element l'i can be 
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seen as the expected evaluation of variety i by the Z consumers. 
Within this framework, the firm will only be able. to model the 
probability that a given individual will purchase its product. This 
will be given by the probability that the individual consumer will 
weakly prefer. variety i to all other existing varieties, that is 
~ 
CPi = Pr (U i = max U) = Pr (Vi + WJ.1i ~ Vj + WJ.1j) (2.7) 
where i,j=l,,,.,N. Note that the specification used for the random 
utility in (2.6) is additive and linear in prices, mcome and the 
random term. Hence, equations (2.6) and (2.7) define a linear random 
utility model (LRUM). If the choices of the Z individuals are 
independent, and are governed by the same probability distribution, 
then the expected demand for variety i will be given by 
(2.8) 
where i=l,,,.,N. 
There are several ways of specifying the distribution of the 
random variable J.1i' in order to determine the choice probability. The 
simplest case is to assume that the random term is uniformly 
distributed. Alternatively, J.1i may be assumed to be normally 
distributed as in the probit model. The formulation which has received 
most attention in the product differentiation literature, however, 
assumes that the random term is logistically distributed, given the 
tractability advantage of the logistic distribution over the normal 
one (see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992a,bL For example. the 
random utility in (2.6) is applied to the multinomial logit model, 
where III 1S LLd. (0, (J'2) according to the double exponential 
distribution 
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F(b) = Pr(fl;:Sb) = exp - [exp 
where - 112 W = w 6 /n, b is a positive constant and I/J is 
constant9 . Given (2.9), the following choice probability is derived 
CPi = 
exp [Vi/w] 
~=lexp [V/w] 
(2.9) 
Euler's 
(2.10) 
Note that w gives the standard deviation of taste heterogeneity over 
-
the population of consumers. Note that the larger is w, the greater 
will be the importance of taste heterogeneity in determining choice 
-
probabilities. As w - 00, CPi - (lIN), and the importance of objective 
differences in pnces and qualities becomes completely irrelevant. 
Instead, w = 0 corresponds to the homogeneous good case where 
objective differences are the only determinants of consumers' choice. 
It follows, from equations (2.8) and (2.10), that the expected 
aggregate demand for variety i is 
exp [V/w] 
~=lexp [V/w] 
2.2.1.3. The address approach as a discrete choice model 
(2.11) 
The address and the discrete choice models described above do not 
necessarily provide two alternative ways of dealing with the 
derivation of aggregate demands from individual heterogeneous demand 
9 See Manski and McFadden (1981) and Anderson, de Palma and 
Thisse (1992a, b, c) for the full derivation and properties of the 
logit model. The logit model was first used by de Palma et al. 
(1985) in a model of f.o. b. pncmg. See also Anderson and de 
Palma (1987, 1988) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (l988a. 
1988b, 1989, 1992a). 
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functions. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse in a series of papers 
identify the circumstances under which the two models. yield demand 
systems with identical characteristics lO . 
It 1S not difficult to see the strong similarities between the 
two models. A deterministic version of the discrete choice model can 
be obtained by re-writing equation (2.6) as 
U. = V. + wei' I I (2.13) 
where the random term has been substituted by an element from a vector 
which describes deterministic tastes and 
contains consumers' evaluations of the disutility associated with the 
N varieties. Each consumer will then be associated with a vector of 
evaluations. 
By summing the densities of all points with the same evaluation 
vectors one can obtain a density function for e. Note that if e i has 
the same density function as I-li - given by equation (2.9) - then in 
the deterministic case, aggregate demand for variety i will be 
exp [V/w] 
~=lexp [V/w] 
(2.13) 
whose similarity with (2.11) is evident. Clearly, the consumer density 
function here plays the same role as the probability density function 
In the logit model. 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992a, c) show that a density 
10 This is 
possibility 
framework 
behaviour 
an interesting theoretical development 
to represent probabilistic models in a 
allows one to explain the randomness 
by referring to the incompleteness 
information. 
because the 
deterministic 
of consumer 
of firm's 
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function f( q) can be derived such that the demand equation (2.5) in 
the address model is consistent with the one in (2.10) obtained from 
the logit model. The authors demonstrate that for the two approaches 
to be reconciled the dimension of the characteristic space must be 
large enough compared to the number of existing varieties. If the 
characteristic space 1S sufficiently large, the linear random utility 
model satisfies the following properties (see Anderson, de Palma and 
Thisse, 1992c, for proofs): 
I) 
II) 
acp i 
aPj 
~ 0 for all i,j=l, ... N, Hence, the varieties of the 
differentiated product are weak gross substitutes. 
for all i,j=l, ... N, j:t:i, which reflects the equality 
of the cross-price derivatives. 
III) CPi depends only on price differences. 
IV) 
implies that all consumers choose variety i with certainty when 
it becomes infinitely attractive in terms of its objective 
utility, while the measured utility of the other varieties 
remains finite. 
It can be proved that a sufficient condition for weak 
substitutabilityll 1S that the set (Q1, ... ,QNJ must contain (N-l) 
independent points, which implies that the characteristic space should 
be sufficiently large. More precisely, a sufficient condition for weak 
substitutability is that M=N-112. This 1S consistent with the 
11 As we shall see, weak gross substitutability is a basic feature of 
models of product differentiation characterized by localized 
competition. 
12 For several specific models, as for instance the multinomial logit 
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suggestion by Archibald and Rosenbluth (1975) , that if the 
characteristic space is large enough each variety is not subject to 
neighbouring effects. We shall return to this point shortly, because 
of its implications for the nature of competition between firms. 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992c) demonstrate13 that 
1) Any system of choice probabilities derived from a discrete choice 
model of a LRUM form satisfies the above properties. 
2) Any system of expected demands which satisfies the above 
properties can also derived from a system of choice probabilities 
of the LRUM form. 
3) A given location of the N varieties can be found in the 
characteristic space such that the demand system resulting from 
" the address approach satisfies I)-IV) above. Hence, 
4) The logit demand functions can be generated from the consumer 
utility function in (2.1). 
To summarize, the Z statistically independent consumers of the 
discrete choice model specialize their consumption activity on one 
single variety of the horizontally differentiated good and, in the 
logit formulation, they also buy one single unit of the good. Firms do 
not have full knowledge of the idiosyncratic taste parameters and thus 
estimate the demand function for their product by constructing choice 
model, varieties are strong gross substitutes, i.e. 
i, j = 1, ... ,N, i~ j. A necessary condition for 
substitutability is that the number of varieties does not 
the number of characteristics by more than one, i.e. (M~N-1). 
strong 
exceed 
13 We do not provide proof for these results here because it would go 
beyond the aim of this study. See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse 
(1992c) for details. 
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probabilities. In the address model there is a continuum of consumers , 
each with a preferred variety and with a subjective disutility from 
not getting it. In the logit model, taste heterogeneity is measured by 
-
the standard deviation w of the random variable Ili and in the address 
model it is measured by the parameter a in the deterministic utility 
-
function (equation (2.1)). As w - 00, a - 00, and as w - 0, a - O. In 
the former case, consumers tend to buy their ideal variety regardless 
of the objective characteristic of the good, such as prices. In the 
latter no role is played by product differentiation and all consumers, 
in both models, will purchase the cheapest variety. This case would 
coincide with the homogeneous good case. 
As we shall see, the relationship highlighted here between the 
address model and the discrete choice model will turn out to be a 
useful one in determining the conditions under which the address model 
and the representative consumer model which is analyzed below yield 
the same predictions. 
2.2.2. The representative consumer approach 
The representative consumer approach to product differentiation 
1S based on the idea that aggregate preferences for diversity are 
embodied in the utility of a representative agent. Hence, the system 
of demand equations for the different varieties of the horizontally 
differentiated good is derived from the maximization of a 
representative consumer's utility function. Preferences are defined 
over the set of all possible goods and consumers can be seen as having 
a taste for varieties captured by some parameter in the utility 
function. The most commonly used utility function in this type of 
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models is the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) proposed by 
Spence (1976) and by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
There are some significant differences between the address and 
the representative consumer approaches to the modelling of tastes 
diversity. First, and contrary to the former, in the latter the 
consumer's utility function represents the aggregate preferences of 
the overall consumer sector. The product space is not explicitly 
modelled and all the utility function does is to capture aggregate 
preference for diversity. The implication of this is that demand is 
not obtained, as in the address model, via aggregation of individual 
demands on the basis of a distribution of preferences. A second major 
difference is that in the representative consumer approach, consumers 
purchase a combination of all available varieties, whereas taste 
heterogeneity implies that the choice will consist of a subset (often 
containing only one element) of different brands. As we shall see, 
these two points are amongst the major sources of criticism to the 
representative consumer approachl4. In the remaining of this sub-
section, we shall examine the main features of the representative 
consumer approach and consider the circumstances under which this 
approach can be reconciled with the characteristic approach based on 
tastes heterogeneity. 
2.2.2.1. The "love for variety" model 
The representative consumer model we choose to analyze is the 
14 Pettengill (1979) and Archibald, Eaton and Lipsey (1986), amongst 
others have argued that this class of models cannot capture the 
features of a population of consumers characterized by 
heterogeneous tastes and purchasing a few or - more often - only 
one variety of the good. 
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constant elasticity of substitution (CES) in the version proposed by 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), given its widespread application in the 
industrial economic literature as well as in many other fields of 
economics. The direct utility function of the representative consumer 
is given by 
(2.14) 
where O<a<l. Let us, for simplicity, consider the following monotonic 
transformation of (2.14) 
s 
U = Do D (2.15) 
where U_-(CJ l)l/(l-a) d 1(1)' .. u. an s=a -a 1S pos1t1ve. Do is the quantity 
consumed of the numeraire good, and D is a sub-utility function given 
by 
N lip 
(2.16) 
i=l 
where i=l, ... ,N, P is the parameter which captures love for variety, 
and Di are the quantities consumed of each of the N varieties of the 
'"' differentiated good. Finally, we set O<p<l, I the reason for which will 
become clear later. The larger is p the closer substitutes are goods 
for one 
} 
another. The sub-utility function D in equation (2.16) is 
separable with convex indifference curves and has the well known 
implication that preferences are symmetric, i.e. each variety competes 
with all others and there are no neighbouring effects. Note that D can 
be interpreted as a quantity index - over the existing varieties - of 
the consumption of the differentiated good. 
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The problem of the representative consumer can be seen as a two-
stage budgeting procedure. The first stage will determine the 
allocation of a given income over the numeraire and the differentiated 
good. Hence the consumer will maximize (2.15) subject to a budget 
constraint 
Y = D + PD o (2.17 ) 
where the price of the numeraire has been normalized to unity, Y is 
income (measured in terms of the homogeneous good), and P is a price 
index for the differentiated good defined as 
(P-l)/P 
P = (2.18) 
i=l 
The first order conditions for the first stage utility maximization 
yield 
D 1 Y = 1+5 P 
(2.19) 
and 
Do 
5 Y = 1+5 
(2.20) 
In the second stage the representative consumer will allocate D 
over the existing N varieties. This will require to maximize (2.16) 
N 
subject to PD= L PiDi, where P and D are given by equations (2.18) and 
i=l 
(2.19) respectively. The solution to the second stage utility 
maximization is given by a system of demand equations, one for each of 
the N varieties of the differentiated good. The demand for variety i 
will then be 
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[
p ] l/(p-O 
D. = D i 
1 -P 
which, given equations (2.18) and (2.19), can be rewritten as 
l+s ~ pf!/(P-ll 
j=l J 
(2.21) 
(2.22) 
The demand function m (2.20) states that for any given total 
consumption of the differentiated good, the demand for each variety i 
depends on its relative price. Note that 
(2.23) 
from which CJ'=ll(l-p) is, in Chamberlin's terminology, the price 
elasticity of the dd curve, i.e. the curve relating the demand for 
each variety to its own pnce with all the other prices held constant. 
Also, given that equation (2.21) implies that for i:t: j 
(2.24) 
it follows that 
(2.25) 
Hence, CJ' also corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties. It is then obvious that when p=l, CJ'=OO, i.e. there is 
perfect substitutability between varieties as in the case of a 
perfectly homogeneous good. Also, p=O, and hence CJ'=1, would rule out 
the possibility of some Di being zero, given that it would describe a 
situation where varieties are very distinct and are consumed in fixed 
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proportions 15. It follows that as falls the degree of 
substitutability between varieties becomes smaller. 
Finally, let 
(2.26) 
be the share of the market served by each variety i 16 , which becomes 
(2.27 ) 
Equation (2.27) clearly states that market shares are only a function 
of prices (and of the differentiation parameter) and are independent 
of income. We shall shortly discuss the implications of this point for 
market structure. 
Pettengill (1979) criticizes the Dixit-Stiglitz model on the 
ground that the real world is characterized by consumers who do not 
consume "a bit of every variety" but often purchase only one variety 
of the differentiated good. This point is also made by Archibald, 
Eaton and Lipsey (1986) who argue that "if we take the notion of a 
representative consumer LiteraLLy, then we ignore an important an 
obvious source of product diversity, diversity in consumers' tastes". 
As stressed by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) however, if the proper 
aggregation conditions are fulfilled, the sub-utility function D in 
equation (2.17) can be seen as the scaled verSlOn of the 
15 See the original paper by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) for further 
discussion of these issues. 
16 Given the assumed heterogeneity amongst varieties, the definition 
of market share adopted here is in terms of value rather than 
quantity. 
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representative consumer's utility. This implies that, within this 
framework, product diversity can either be interpreted as different 
consumers using different varieties or as each consumer purchasing a 
diversified bundle of varieties. Hence, in their reply to Pettengil's 
paper, Dixit and Stiglitz (1979b) argue that a representative consumer 
who purchases all varieties is not inconsistent with individual 
consumers who specialize their consumption activity over one (or very 
few) variety. 
However, Archibald, Eaton and Lipsey (1986) cast doubt on the 
possibility of finding a way to aggregate the preferences of 
individual consumers so as to obtain a representative consumer utility 
function which is consistent with the Dixit-Stiglitz one. They note 
that if "we regard the utiLity function as an aggregate preference 
reLation, we are forced to ask what the impLied restrictions on 
individuaL's preferences are". These authors suggest that the address 
or characteristic approach is preferable to the representative 
consumer model in that it allows for the explicit modelling of 
idiosyncratic individual behaviours. Moreover, they argue that it is 
not possible to find a "specification of the demand primitives in the 
address branch which couLd be aggregated to yieLd weLL-behaved 
preferences of a representative consumer". 
Perloff and Salop (1985) attempt to synthesize, within a 
probabilistic choice framework, the characteristic approach with that 
of the constant elasticity of substitution representative consumer. In 
their model, individuals who face mutually exclusive choices are 
assumed to maximize a stochastic utility function. The (positive) 
probability defined on each choice and associated to each individual 
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IS used to aggregate individual behaviour and to obtain a 
representative consumer preference structure which is Chamberlinian in 
that it satisfies the symmetry condition. Archibald, Eaton and Lipsey, 
however, regard this attempt as an unsatisfactory way of reconciling 
the representative consumer model with the - supposedly superior -
address one. They base their criticism on the fact that whilst Perloff 
and Salop do manage to capture the address branch phenomenon, they 
imply that the characteristic space is consumer specific and not, as 
one would expect, common to all consumers. 
This theoretical debate has led to a considerable body of 
literature being generated in recent years. In the next two sub-
sections we shall analyze how these different approaches can be 
reconciled. 
2.2.2.2. The representative consumer model as a discrete choice model 
Despite the fact that the analogy between the address and the 
discrete choice models is intuitively easier to grasp than that 
between the latter and the representative consumer model, it is 
possible to identify circumstances under which the representative 
consumer model can be reconciled with a discrete choice model. The 
most convincing contributions in this area are those stemming from the 
work of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989, 1992a,c). Following a 
similar line of argument as the one we discussed with respect to the 
relationship between the address approach and the discrete choice 
model, these authors demonstrate that there exists a discrete choice 
model from which the constant elasticity of substitution can be 
derived. Assume there to be a number Z of identical and independent 
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consumers, each with income I=¥ /Z and purchasing one or more units of 
only one variety of the differentiated good. Let tbe conditional 
utility of an individual consumer purchasing a variety i be 
~ 
Ui = LnXi + s LnXo + J.li (2.28) 
were J.li is a random variable with zero mean and Xo and Xi are the 
individual consumption of the numeraire and of variety i of the 
differentiated good respectively. The budget constraint of the 
consumer in this context will be 
(2.29) 
Now, maXimiZing (2.28) subject to (2.29) yields the individual demand 
equations 
Xi 
1 I 
= --l+s Pi 
(2.30) 
and 
Xo 
s I = l+s 
(2.31) 
These two equations can be substituted into equation (2.28) to obtain 
u. = (1+s) LnI - LnP. + s Ln( s) - (1+s) Ln(1+s) + J.l·1 
I I 
(2.32) 
Hence, the probability that a consumer selects variety i will be 
cpo = Pr{U.~U., 
I 1 J J,i = 1, ... ,N, It:iJ. Assuming that I-li ~ Li.d.(0,<T
2
) 
and has the double exponential distribution given by equation (2.9), 
then the probability of a consumer choosing variety i will be given by 
= (2.33) 
~ p~lIW 
j =1 J 
49 
where G = ((1+s) LnI - (1+s) Ln(1+s) + s Lns)17. As a result, the 
expected demand for variety i over the population of Z. consumers is 
given by 
z 
- -- -----
Pi 1+s 
~ p~l/W 
j=l J 
(2.34) 
Analogously, the expected aggregate demand for the numeraire will be 
s 
= 1+s I Z (2.35) 
The similarity between the expected demand equations in (2.34) and 
(2.35) and those stemming from the constant elasticity of substitution 
model in equations (2.20) and (2.18) is obvious. In particular, by 
substituting aggregate income Y = Z I into equations (2.34) and (2.35) 
we obtain 
1 
Pi 1+s 
and 
't. p~l/W 
j =1 J 
= 
= s Y 
1+s 
Y 
1+s 
p~{1+W)/W 
1 (2.36) 
(2.37 ) 
Equation (2.37) is clearly identical to equation (2.18) and equation 
(2.36) is identical to equation (2.20) for W = (1-p)lp. Hence, the CES 
preferences can be generated from a population of individuals with 
idiosyncratic tastes who make discrete choices of varieties. 
More generally, the constant elasticity of substitution demand 
17 For proof see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (l992c)." 
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system of equation (2.36) satisfies the properties I-IV of the linear 
random utility model discussed In sub-section 2.1. 3. In particular, 
from equation (2.22) it is obvious that 
aD. 
1>0 
ap. ' 
J 
i.e. the gross 
substitute property holds, for all prices. Also the (N-l) cross-price 
elasticities are identical for all varieties. Furthermore, from 
equation (2.24) it is obvious that the Dixit-Stiglitz model also 
satisfies the property of the linear utility model that the ratio 
between any two demands is independent of both the number of varieties 
and the prices for all other varieties. Finally, given the similarity 
between the two models, W - 00 corresponds to p - 0 in the 
representative consumer model, where the same amount will be spent on 
-
each variety of the differentiated good. In turn, W - 0 corresponds to 
p - 1, and all consumer will purchase the cheaper good. 
2.2.3. The address and the representative consumer models reconciled 
The analysis carried out in sub -section 2.1. 3 showed that the 
address approach can be reconciled with a probabilistic choice model 
if 1) the characteristic space is sufficiently large relative to the 
number of existing varieties, i.e. it has a dimension M~N-1 (ensuring 
strong substitutability), and 2) there are (N-l) independent points in 
the characteristic space. 
Following the work of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, we also 
showed in sub-section 2.2.2. that the logit model generates a system 
of demand equations which are consistent with those obtained from the 
representative consumer model. Therefore, by transitivity, a 
reconciliation between the address model and the representative 
consumer model can be found and the link between the two models can be 
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provided by the choice probability system consistent with the linear 
random utility model. For the proof of this result, which. we omit, the 
interested reader may refer to the original contributions of these 
authors. 
As we have already stressed these recent theoretical developments 
have important implications with respect to the debate about the 
relative merits of these models. The identification of circumstances 
under which the address and the representative consumer approaches 
yield equivalent demand systems weakeans the theoretical soundness of 
arguments pointing at the superiority of one approach over the other. 
The choice of which model to adopt will to a great extent remain a 
matter of convenience and will be determined by the more general aims 
of the study. For instance, if the explicit modelling of the product 
space is relevant - as, for example, in models of product selection -
then the analysis may be more profitably set in an address or 
characteristic framework. 
2.3. THE NATURE OF COMPETITION 
Two major approaches can be identified In the literature on 
product differentiation with respect to the way they deal with 
competition. These are the Chamberlinian and the Kaldorian approaches. 
The difference between them depends on whether preferences are assumed 
to be symmetric or not. 
2.3.1. Chamberlinian models of non-localized competition 
The Chamberlin ian approach assumes that preferences are 
symmetric. The implication of this hypothesis is that, from the 
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consumer's point of view, there are no neighbouring effects amongst 
varieties. This, in turn, implies that firms which specialize m the 
production of the different variants of the differentiated good do not 
have any direct competitor, but compete with all other firms in the 
industry. As a result, competition is said to be non-localized. Hence, 
if a new firm introduces a new variety in the market, it will subtract 
"small" shares of the market from each existing incumbent. More 
generally, if a firm changes its price, the effects of this action 
will spread equally to all other firms. It also follows that if the 
number of firms is large, then the impact of a firm's action on its 
competitors will be negligible. 
The symmetry hypothesis is, as we have already mentioned, the 
discriminating factor as to whether a model is to be defined 
Chamberlinian or not. Hart (l985a, b) m a series of papers entitled 
"in the spirit of Chamberlin" stresses that a truly Chamberlinian 
model of product differentiation ought to be characterized by a number 
of firms sufficiently large so as to ensure that "each firm is 
negligibLe, in the sense that it can ignore its impact on, and hence 
reaction from, other firms"18. It may be argued, however, that the 
largeness of the number of firms is not sufficient, in a 
differentiated product framework, to ensure the absence of inter-firm 
impacts and feedbacks. Strategic interaction amongst firms can be 
ruled out if there are no neighbouring effects between firms producing 
differentiated varieties. In general, the large number of firms may be 
a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the absence of 
18 Hart (1985a). Hart mentioned another important point, namely the 
elimination of long run profit by entry, on which we shall return 
at length in this work. 
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neighbouring effects. In homogeneous good markets, with perfect 
information and no transaction costs, the symmetry condition holds by 
definition. Hence, the largeness of the number of firms is sufficient 
to ensure the absence of strategic interaction. In a differentiated 
product market the absence of strategic interaction is ruled out 
either via the symmetry of preferences or by the fact that the number 
of characteristics is large enough compared to the number of 
varieties. This latter point, first noticed by Archibald and 
Rosenbluth (1975) and later developed by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
in a series of contributions, implies that a Chamberlinian model does 
not require to be based on symmetric individual preferences but on 
symmetric aggregate demand functions. As we saw, when the number of 
characteristics is large, there is a correspondence between the 
address and the representative consumer model. Hence, there are models 
which are consistent with symmetric aggregate demand functions despite 
the absence of a specifically symmetric preference structure. 
Non-localized competition has been obtained in the literature in 
several ways. In a first class of models, which build on the work of 
Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), symmetry stems from the 
form of the utility function of the representative consumer. For 
example, in the Dixit-Stiglitz model described in sub-section 2.2.1., 
varieties enter the additively separable sub-utility function (2.16) 
with the same functional form (D\), thus ensuring symmetry of the 
representative consumer utility function and of the resulting demand 
equations. Non-localized competition also stems from models which are 
not developed within the representative consumer framework. Perloff 
and Salop (1985) use a linear random utility model in which each 
S4 
consumer buys one unit of a chosen. variety. Sattinger (1984) develops 
an additive random utility model which allows for the. consumer to 
purchase a variable amount of the chosen good. In both cases, the 
individual conditional demands are independent of the realization of 
the random term. The expected aggregate demand for each variety i is 
of the form E(D) = X/Pi) Z 1\ where Xi(P i ) is the individual demand. 
Clearly, Xi and 1\ are separable. This result stems from the fact that 
in both models the random term in the consumer's utility function, 
which as In equation (2.6) describes the intensity of tastes' 
heterogeneity, is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed. It follows that the observation of the realization of the 
random variable for a particular variety does not convey any 
information as to the consumer's evaluation of other varieties. As a 
result, there are no neighbouring effects between varieties. Hart 
(1985) provides a generalizations of Sattinger's model where 
consumers' preferences are only defined over a sub-set of brands. It 
follows that consumers can be seen as having heterogeneous preferences 
and a density function can be defined which describes the number of 
consumers who have a taste for any particular variety. Hart assumes 
that for each consumer any combination of the varieties in his/her 
subset is equally desirable, so that neighbouring effects are ruled 
out amongst varieties. Similar results are also obtained by Dierckere 
Recently, von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) has developed a 
location model of monopolistic competition which allows for multi-firm 
19 In the models by Hart and Dierkere, however, individual demands 
are a function of the realization of the random term. Hence, the 
fraction of income spent on the chosen variety is not homogeneous 
across consumers. 
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competition by locating producers at the corners of a 
"muLtidimensionaL pyramid" with consumers uniformly distributed along 
the edges of the pyramid. 
2.3.2. Kaldorian models of localized competition 
The symmetry hypothesis has been criticized by Kaldor (1935) who 
pointed out that "any particuLar producer wiLL aLways be faced with 
rivaLs who are nearer to him, and others who are 'further off". 
Kaldor continued by suggesting that each producer will be able to 
subjectively rank his rivals on the basis of the extent to which their 
price decisions affect his own demand. Kaldor's contribution is at the 
basis of a class of models characterized by localized competition, 
whereby each firm competes only with those firms which are closer to 
it either geographically or in the characteristic space. The non-
symmetry assumption is generally associated with address models of 
product differentiation, with consumers located in the product space 
at their ideal address and purchasing one unit of the good which gives 
them the highest indirect utility20. For instance, consider a situation 
where the N varieties of the differentiated product are uniformly 
distributed around a circle with circumference L. LIN will then be the 
distance between any two successive varieties. Let consumers' ideal 
locations q be uniformly distributed along the circle, with density 
Z/ L. In this framework, each variety i competes directly only with 
other two varieties, namely i-l and i+l. The market segment Si held by 
20 See Salop (1979) for a typical example in this tradition. piven 
each individual's ideal location, Salop assumes linear disutility 
(or transportation) costs. In Capozza and Van Order (1978) each 
individual can buy more than one unit of the chosen variety. 
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a variety i is given by the arc of the product circle whose extremes 
are represented by the locations of those consum~rs who are 
indifferent between variety i-l and i and between i and i+l. This 
means that for any given price structure, if a consumer whose address 
is at q chooses to buy variety i, then all consumers whose location 
lies between q and qi will find that variety i allows them to reach 
the highest indirect utility. As a result, whatever the price 
structure in the industry, a given variety will not be gross 
substitute for more than two other varieties. The demand for each 
brand can be determined as the product between the length of the 
segment Si and consumer density and will turn out to be a function of 
the variety's own price and of the prices of the two neighbouring 
varieties. It follows that, whilst in the case of non-localized 
competition all varieties are gross SUbstitute, when competition is 
localized gross substitutability holds only for neighbouring varieties 
which compete directly21. 
Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992c) show that the Kaldorian 
model can be associated with a linear random utility model by 
representing the transport cost of the consumer in the former by a 
vector of evaluations corresponding to a "set of real izations of the 
random variable in the probability model". This enables them to 
compare the localized competition model to the non-localized one. 
Within a probabilistic framework, it emerges that while in the non-
, 
localized competition model a La Perloff and Salop (1985) consumer's 
choice can only be predicted on the basis of the observation of the 
21 Swann (1993) provides a framework for identifying competitors 
networks. 
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realization of all random variables, in the localized competition 
model a La Salop consumer's behaviour can be predicted on the basis of 
the realization of at most two random variables. 
Recently, Deneckere and Rothschild (1992) have built on these 
results to develop a linear random utility model of demand of which 
both the Chamberlinian symmetric model and the localized competition 
version of the address model are special cases. Individuals are 
assumed to have different rankings over alternative products, but they 
derive the same utility from goods which occupy the same position in 
their respective rankings, hence "consumers have the same kind of 
cardinaL preferences but their ordinaL preferences differ". The number 
of types of consumers is supposed to be equal to the number of 
distinct permutations of rankings of the number (NP) of potential 
varieties and the mass of consumers with the same ranking is the same 
for all possible rankings. Assuming the existence of a continuum of 
consumers, Deneckere and Rothschild derive the demand for a variety i 
by determining the fraction of consumers with preferences of type i. 
The non-localized competition case can be analyzed in this framework 
by noting that the complete ranking of a consumer can only be known if 
his/her evaluations for all potential products are known. Hence, by 
selecting a consumer at random there will be a probability 1/ N P! of 
the consumer belonging to a particular type. In the localized 
competition case, instead, the type to which a consumer belongs can be 
determined once his/her' most preferred variety is known. In this case 
the number of possible ranking will be NP• Deneckere and Rothschild 
analyze both situations on a circle framework by means of an iterative 
procedure whereby the number of both potential varieties NP and 
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consumers is doubled each time, while the number of actual varieties N 
is held constant. As the number of iterations goes to. infinity, both 
potential varieties and consumers tend to fill the whole circle and 
thus the localized competition model converges to the non-localized 
competition one characterized by a uniform distribution around the 
circle, as in Per loff and Salop (1985). 
2.4. TASTE FOR DIFFERENCES AND ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
If taste heterogeneity is associated with a situation 
characterized by the existence of economies of scale in production, 
then the number of varieties produced will be small in comparison to 
the number of consumer types. In the absence of economies of scale, 
one could envisage - as suggested by Eaton and Lipsey (1977) - a 
"back-yard capitaLism", with all individuals producing their own 
ideal variety. Instead, there IS a scope for specialization in 
production as a result of which the market is unlikely to support the 
number of varieties consistent with the complete consumers' taste 
range. This has two important consequences. First, there exists a 
trade-off between the realization of potential scale economies and 
consumer preferences. Second, firms have some degrees of monopoly 
power. These two aspects are analyzed below. 
2.4.1. Market equilibrium and social optima 
On social welfare terms, a commodity should be produced if the 
difference between gross surplus (sales revenue plus consumer 
surplus) it generates and the total cost of producing it is positive. 
Firms, however, produce as long as profits are non·-negative, hence 
59 
this welfare criterion may not be satisfied. Indeed, the existence of 
increasing returns to scale In production implies that the 
equilibrium number of varieties may differ from the socially optimal 
number of brands. Spence (1976) shows that market equilibrium may not 
sustain the optimal number of varieties and "too many, too few or the 
wrong products" may be produced hence adding to the, traditionally 
recognized, welfare cost of imperfect competition, i.e. the 
inequality between price and marginal cost. The reason for this lies 
in the existence of a trade-off between efficiency and varieties 
which characterizes differentiated product markets in presence of 
potential scale economies whose realization requires that quantities 
as large as possible are produced. However, love for variety implies 
that ceteris paribus the larger the number of firms, the higher is 
the level of utility attainable by consumers. 
In Spence (1976) single product firms who could perfectly price 
discriminate, i.e. charge each consumer a different price, would 
produce the socially optimum number of varieties, because a new 
entrant would capture the exact increase of consumer surplus. In the 
absence of perfect price discrimination, revenues do not capture 
consumer surplus and even when the social value of the product is 
positive they may not be sufficiently high to cover production costs. 
In this sense, too few products may be produced. However, another 
force is at play. The introduction of a new product by a new firm 
reduces incumbents' demands and profits. If these effects are not 
taken into account by the new entrant, a new product may be 
introduced which does not generate a social benefit. In this sense, 
the market outcome may be characterized by too many products. 
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Economists since Chamberlin's work have actually argued that too 
many varieties are produced at sub-optimal scales, but theoretical 
results have not always supported this VIew. Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977) compare market outcomes to first and second best social 
optima. They show that for the constant elasticity utility function 
the market equilibrium is identical to the constrained social 
optimum. When compared to the unconstrained social optimum, market 
equilibrium is shown to generate the same output but a smaller number 
of varieties than socially desirable. Hence, their findings go 
against the widespread idea that i) the market under-exploits 
economies of scale, and ii) there is an excessive production of 
varieties. Note that when considering a variable elasticity, Dixit 
and Stiglitz do not find unambiguous results but suggest that "there 
is a presumption that the market soLution wouLd be characterized by 
too few firms". Sattinger's (1984) model, characterized by consumers' 
specialization in consumption, also leads to the provision of two 
many or two few products in equilibrium. Hart (1985b) confirms this 
indeterminacy within a framework where the representative consumer 
hypothesis has been relaxed. Yarrow (1985) attempts to quantify, with 
a constant elasticity of substitution utility function, the welfare 
loss stemming from the market outcome consisting of the wrong number 
of products. He shows that this loss IS relatively small, the reason 
being that if the market is large the cost involved In producing 
below the optimum scale of production IS small. The welfare loss may 
be of a different magnitude if the market is small. 
In the address model a La Salop (1979) the circular market is 
characterized by too large a number of varieties, but this result is 
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rather model specific, because it crucially depends on the 
distribution of consumers on the circle. Within a spatial model, 
Capozza and Van Order (1980) argue that given that the symmetric-
zero-profit equilibrium is characterized by too many varieties, an 
equilibrium where firms earn pure profits may be better from a social 
welfare point of VieW. In a model where potential entrants take the 
location of incumbents as fixed, Eaton and Wooders (1985) confirm the 
result of an over-production of varieties for a production technology 
characterized by a constant marginal cost. 
These results are confirmed by Denecker and Rothschild (1992) 
who find that non-localized competition yields approximately the 
socially optimal number of brands when the fixed cost is sufficiently 
small compared to the size of the market, whereas localized 
competition generates an overproduction of varieties. They explain 
these findings by arguing that competition is higher when it is non-
localized than when it is localized. 
2.4.2. Taste heterogeneity and monopoly power 
The existence of heterogeneous tastes has two important 
implications: 1) firms producing differentiated commodities have a 
certain degree of monopoly power, and 2) the market can sustain 
different prices. 
Clearly, consumers are prepared to pay more for those varieties 
which are closer to their ideal one. To a great extent, the closeness 
of the existing brands to consumers' ideal product specifications 
depends on how many of the potentially producible varieties are 
actually supplied. This, in turn, depends on the extent to which 
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potential economies of scale exist in production. Consumers are 
willing to pay a premium for varieties closer to their ideal one and 
price making firms will not lose all their customers if they slightly 
increase their price. This is because price is not the only variable 
affecting consumers' choice, the decisive role being played by the 
subjective way in which differences between varieties are perceived 
and valued. Hence, a price differential between any two varieties 
does not necessarily imply that all demand is channeled towards the 
cheapest one (as m a homogeneous good market with perfect 
information and no transaction costs). Changes in relative prices, 
however, may generate a revision of consumption selections. This is 
more likely to happen the smaller is the number of varieties produced 
and available for consumption relative to the ideal ones. As a 
result, the smaller is the number of varieties, the more important is 
the price element in determining the evolution of market shares. This 
argument can be effectively illustrated within Lancaster's framework 
and, relying on the result obtained by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
(1989), it can also be easily generalized to encompass the 
representative consumer approach. Thus, the consumer chooses the 
variety, amongst those on offer on the market, that is closest to its 
ideal one. Swann (1993) defines a territory, analogous to the market 
space of the address approach, for each variety as the set of 
consumers who derive maximum surplus - from a moneymetric utility 
function, linear in the product's characteristics from the 
consumption of that variety. The smaller is the number of varieties, 
the smaller will be the chance that the consumer finds its ideally 
preferred one, and the higher' the likelihood that his/her choice will 
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be falling at the boundaries of the territory. When the price of a 
good changes, the consumers who are likely to modify their choice are 
those closer to the boundaries of the territory. If the price of a 
product increases, the territory of the product will shrink, due to 
some boundary consumers revising their choice. The ideal consumer 
will be the last deserting the product. Conversely, if the price of a 
variety falls, its territory will expand. Some consumers will move 
form one boundary area to another. However, only those consumers for 
whom the change in price is worth (in terms of utility) the shift to 
a less preferred variety will revise their choice22 . In the aggregate, 
for any change in the price structure of the market, there will be a 
re-distribution of demand across varieties. 
It is important to notice at this point that the theoretical 
literature on product differentiation does not do justice to the two 
facts stemming from taste heterogeneity we have discussed in this 
sub-section. Indeed, the great majority of models are built on 
assumptions which lead to the elimination of price differentials 
between varieties. Furthermore, the implications of monopoly power 
for profits are somewhat limited to the short-run equilibrium. These 
two issues will be analyzed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6 respectively. 
2.5. EQUILIBRIUM PRICES 
Having discussed the relationship between prices and consumer 
behaviour, we now turn our attention to the determination of prices. 
The major source of difference between models of horizontal 
22 Swann (1992) uses this to offer a method of identifying asymmetric 
competitor networks. 
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product differentiation IS In the hypotheses underlying the 
specification of consumer preferences. As a result, the generality of 
these models IS characterized by very similar supply sides which are 
developed on a few common assumptions. First, there exists some form 
of economies of scale in production which generate an incentive to 
specialization so that firms produce one single variety of the good. 
It follows that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the 
number of varieties and the number of price-maker firms in the 
industry. Second, firms are generally players of a non-cooperative 
game. Given these hypotheses, let 
(2.38) 
be the total cost function of a firm i, where Ki is the fixed 
production cost, (3j is the marginal cost and Qj is output. Each firm 
offers the quantity Qj that is demanded at the price it sets, i.e. the 
market for each variety is characterized by the equilibrium condition 
Qj=D j 23. As a result, the profit of firm i will be 
(2.39) 
A price equilibrium will then be represented by a vector of prices 
* * * * * * P -(P P P P) such that Pl' maximizes TI·I conditional on 
- l' 2'···' i'···' N 
j=l, ... ,N, j:t=i. 
As stressed by Waterson (1990) models of horizontal product 
differentiation are mostly based on a perfectly symmetric framework on 
the supply side whereby all firms are "the same but equa[". Hence, if 
23 What follows is a general analysis, hence we use Di to represent 
demand for the differentiated product regardless of the particular 
model used to derive it. Note that in the equations which follow 
the expected demand E[ D1J stemming from a probabilistic framework 
could be used instead. 
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firms all have the same costs, equation (2.39) can be rewritten as 
follows 
(2.40) 
It follows that the optimal price strategy will result in a symmetric 
• • 
equilibrium in prices, with Pi =P j for all i:t: j. This also implies that 
quantities, profits and hence market shares are identical across 
In Salop's (1986) version of the Hotelling model, for instance, 
all varieties (and hence firms) are located equidistantly around the 
circle representing the consumer spectrum of tastes. Hence, all firms 
will find it optimal to charge the same price P=Pi for all i thus 
generating a symmetric price equilibrium. 
Chamberlinian models, characterized by non-localized competition, 
always assume that firms are homogeneous in their costs. Consider the 
demand function resulting from the Dixit-Stiglitz model of equation 
(2.21). The first order condition for the maximization of the profit 
function In (2.40), where Pi is the firm's choice variable, is given 
by 
(2.41) 
which implies that Pi=P j for all i:t: j. Clearly, the symmetry m 
equilibrium prices implies symmetry in equilibrium demands, i.e. D.=D· 1 J 
for all i:t:j. 
Although, as we saw, a differentiated product market can sustain 
an asymmetric equilibrium structure of prices, few exceptions to 
symmetry can be found in the product differentiation literature, 
24 This is true if no asymmetries are generated on the demand side of 
the model as - for instance - in Pasco a (1993). 
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because there are few exceptions to the hypothesis of identical firms 
on the cost side. Furthermore, models generating asymmetric equilibria 
have mainly been developed within the address framework of Hotellian 
tradition. For example, Neven (1986) allows for a non-uniform 
customers distribution in a duopoly, and Waterson (1990) assumes 
asymmetric costs of serving consumers with different locations on the 
taste spectrum. 
Other examples of asymmetric equilibria can be found In that 
strand of the address literature which builds on the idea that 
relocation is costly. The symmetric localized competition literature 
implies that as new firms enter the industry incumbents can relocate 
without incurring In any costs with a resulting new symmetric 
equilibrium being generated. However, as suggested by Capozza and Van 
Order (1980) it may be more plausible to assume that firms will not 
find it costlessly to relocate, i.e. to alter the specification of 
their product, as new firms producing new varieties enter the market. 
It follows that a new entrant will have to locate in a niche of the 
market and will be able to attract customers only from two (in the 
circle model) other firms. But this implies that the profit of the 
newcomer will be below that of the incumbent. This has two 
consequences. First, the symmetry of equilibrium will not be ensured. 
Second, incumbents' profits will not be a precise indication of the 
profit opportunities of the industry; as a result, entry may stop 
before profits are driven to zer025 . 
In the Chamberlin ian tradition, but outside the representative 
25 We shall return on this point in Section 6, where the importance 
of relocation costs in preserving long-run profits is discussed. 
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consumer framework a La Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), asymmetric prices 
can be found in Hart (1985a) but they are exogenously given and do not 
stem from different costs. Pascoa (1993) reformulates Hart's model as 
a non-atomic Bertrand game where an asymmetric equilibrium results 
from asymmetric demand functions. In von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) firms 
with different costs are shown to generate an asymmetric equilibrium 
structure of prices, quantities and profits in an address model which 
allows for non-localized competition. 
Within the representative consumer framework, the determination 
of equilibrium variables presents significant computational 
difficulties when different production costs are allowed for, as 
stressed by von Ungern-Stenberg (1991), and the hypothesis of firms 
technical homogeneity is generally retained. 
2.6. THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY 
A major distinction in these models is between the short-run and 
the long-run. The short-run is defined as the situation where the 
number of firms (N) is fixed. In the long-run new firms are free to 
enter the market. Two theoretical issues can be related to entry. The 
first addresses the question of whether the monopolistic competition 
model converges to perfect competition. The second is related to the 
effects of entry on long-run profits. 
We do not intend to deal with the first issue extensively. As 
mentioned ear lier, Hart (1985a, b) argues that two of the fundamental 
hypotheses which characterize a model as being Chamberlinian are that 
each firm should be negligible relative to the market to ignore inter-
firm impacts and that free entry should not be limited by set-up 
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costs. Models which relax either of these assumptions are 
intrinsically oligopolistic and not monopolistically competitive. 
However, these two features also characterize perfect competition and 
a theoretical issue arises as to whether circumstances can be 
identified under which the long-run equilibrium will be perfectly 
competitive or monopolistically competitive, with price equal to or 
greater than marginal cost respectively26. 
This issue has been analyzed by several authors, who first 
formulate models of monopolistic competition and then analyze the 
impacts on the imperfectly competitive equilibria of a reduction of 
set up costs and/or a reduction of firms' size relative to the market. 
Kaldor (1935) and Robinson (1934) argue that indeed the equilibrium 
does converge to perfect competition when many firms, small compared 
to market size, operate in the market. Capozza and Van Order (1982) 
argue that free entry and perfect information do not generate 
perfectly competitive equilibria, as long as consumers tastes are 
heterogeneous and there are fixed costs of developing new products. 
Hart (1985a,b) conclude that perfect competition can be obtained in 
the limit when consumers have a taste for all potential brands and 
when the valuation they place on each of these is finite. Furthermore 
he shows that this conclusion can be reached even without an 
infinitely large number of firms in the market, the critical factor 
being the infinitely large number of potential brands. He shows that 
with his model where consumers have preferences defined over a subset 
26 This issue is obviously related to the so called "Folk Theorem" 
for competitive markets, stating that if firms are small relative 
to the market then the market solution is approximately 
competitive (see Novshek, 1980). 
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of brands, there is no convergence to the perfectly competitive 
equilibrium. Perloff and Salop (1985) argue that under certain 
conditions the equilibrium converges to a perfectly competitive one, 
but this result would not emerge from a situation where some consumers 
place an infinitely large value on product diversity. De Palma et al. 
(1985) find that if firms are price makers and there is a sufficient 
degree of taste heterogeneity between consumers, equilibrium prices 
decrease but do not reach perfectly competitive levels. The reason is 
that under these circumstances products provided by the new firms are 
different enough from the existing ones to ensure that some monopoly 
power for each firm is preserved. 
2.6.1. Entry and the elimination of long-run profits 
A more significant issue stemming from the horizontal product 
differentiation literature concerns the effects of free entry on 
profits. In the majority of these models the long-run is characterized 
only by normal profits being earned: if there were positive profits 
new firms would attempt entry into the market. Obviously, in steady-
state no firm has an incentive to exit, hence no firm is incurring a 
loss. 
Consider, as an example of models set in the Chamber linian 
tradition, the short-run of the Dixit-Stiglitz model with a fixed 
number of homogeneous firms. Clearly, equation (2.41) indicates the 
existence of a constant markup, with price and marginal cost being 
multiplicatively related. As () increases, the equilibrium value of P 
reduces. This has a clear intuitive explanation. Given the 
relationship between the elasticity of substitution () and the 
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parameter capturing love for variety p, it is obvious that as (J' 
increases (and so does p) varieties become closer substitutes because 
preferences become less and less different or idiosyncratic. As a 
result, consumers are prepared to pay less and less for their 
preferred commodities or for a higher diversification of their 
consumption bundle. In equation (2.41) price is independent of the 
number of firms. However, all equilibrium prices are identical, i.e. 
Pi=P j for all i* j. Hence, the price index of equation (2.18) can be 
rewritten as 
(2.42) 
which enables us to analyze the effects of market structure on 
equilibrium prices. As entry occurs and the number of firms in the 
industry increases, other things being equal, the equilibrium price 
falls. Intuitively, if N gets very large, consumers will find more and 
more varieties amongst which to spread their consumption or, given the 
equivalence results amongst models, will be more likely to find a 
product specification which is closer to their ideal one. Hence, price 
competition becomes more intense as new firms enter the industry, thus 
explaining why price is higher in the short-run than in the long-run 
equilibrium. Also, note that for any given N, comparative static 
increses of (J' would reduce P, thus reflecting an increase in the 
fierceness of price competition27 . 
In the standard version of the Chamberlinian model, as long as 
there are positive profits, new firms will enter the market each 
subtracting some demand from incumbents and causing their market to 
27 Recall that (J' also represents the price elasticity· of demand for 
the individual variety. 
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shrink and their price and profit to fall. Entry will continue until 
,profit is driven to zero. By substituting equation (2.22), (2.41) and 
(2.42) into the profit function in equation (2.40) and solving for N 
yields the steady-state number of firms, that is 
(2.43) 
Clear ly, N is uniquely determined and is increasing in the income 
spent on the differentiated good. Moreover, as (J"' increases the steady-
, 
state number of firms falls. ( larger elasticity of substitution 
between varieties, and a lower love for variety, is reflected in a 
smaller range of varieties being produced) 
Qualitatively similar results are found in the non-localized 
competition models by Sattinger (1984) and Perloff and Salop (1985). 
Profits will also be driven to zero within a localized 
competition framework characterized by symmetric equilibrium where the 
short-run equilibrium price is higher the higher is the degree of 
monopoly power enjoyed by firms. The latter will be affected by 
factors such as the parameter expressing the disutility cost, the 
circumference of the circle L and the number of firms (assumed to be 
fixed in the short-run)' Clearly, if consumers are uniformly 
distributed around the circle and firms are equispaced around it, then 
the larger IS L the more distant will firms be from each other. 
Similarly, for a glven L, the larger is the number of firms the closer 
to each other they will be located and the easier will be for 
consumers to switch from one good to another. Finally, other things 
being equal, the higher is the disutility or, within a spatial 
analogous, the transport cost - the more loyal will consumers be to 
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the chosen variety28. As m the Chamberlinian model, the existence of 
positive profits in the short-run will attract entry .. The distance 
between firms will reduce and with it the market share held by each 
product will shrink. It follows that price and profits will fall 
because, as the circle becomes more crowded, each consumer will find 
it easier to find product specifications closer to his/her ideal one. 
Entry will continue until in the long-run only normal profits will be 
earned. 
2.6.2. The persistence of profits 
A central element of the majority of horizontal product 
differentiation models is the tangency between the long-run average 
cost curve and the downward sloping average revenue curve. Very few 
exceptions exist m the literature to the imposition of the zero-
profit condition. Nevertheless, this hypothesis has not been immune 
from criticisms. 
A first argument against the imposition of the zero-profit 
condition can be traced back to Kaldor (1935) and is built on the 
existence of economies of scale and indivisibilities in production. 
Even if the existence of positive profits does attract entry, there is 
no reason why the latter should stop when pure profits are zero. 
Following this line of analysis, some contributions have established 
the persistence of profits in the long-run, but mainly within 
Hotelling type models. In particular, the existence of relocation 
costs has been used to explain a long-run equilibrium characterized by 
28 If the disutility parameter were nil, and/or if L=O, then this case 
would fall into the homogeneous case and all firms would charge the 
price which equals the marginal cost. 
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a structure of different and non-zero profit rates. Eaton and Lipsey 
(1978) build on Kaldor's argument within a spatial model where fixed 
capital is immobile and the set up costs are at least partially sunk. 
The resulting heavy relocation costs, together with the localized 
nature of competition, generate the persistence of long-run pure 
profits which will not be eliminated by either price competition or 
entry. If there are relocation costs and competition IS localized, 
large incumbents' profits may not represent a sufficient incentive to 
enter, because entrants do no expect to achieve the same levels of 
sales and profits as incumbents. Thus, not only will entry affect 
demand and profits of incumbents asymmetrically, even if the short-run 
equilibrium is symmetric, but it may stop before the elimination of 
supernormal profits. Capozza and Van Order (1980) support these 
results by showing the plausibility of positive profits and multiple 
equilibria stemming from the existence of indivisibility and capital 
immobilities. Furthermore, they show that capital mobility and a large 
size of the market relative to the indivisible unit of capital can 
undermine Kaldor's argument for the persistence of profits. Eaton and 
Wooders (1985) show the importance of prohibitive relocation costs in 
preserving long-run profits, where entry is disincentived by the fact 
that the new firm will have to locate at equal distance between two 
existing firms and this may trigger a detrimental price response from 
them. 
A second criticism to the imposition of the zero-profit condition 
1S related to the work of Demsetz (1964) who emphasizes that product 
differentiation is inconsistent with free entry. If the entrant 
produces a new and different brand, it does not, by· definition, enter 
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the production of pre-existing brands, given that the existence of 
laws and trade marks protecting imitative entry. He states: "entry via 
a different brand or product variety anaLytically is no different than 
entry into the eLectricity market to compete with naturaL gas. Product 
differentiation undermines the Logic of using "free entry" to deduce 
the familiar zero-profit Chamberlin ian equilibrium", and goes on to 
argue that the zero-profit condition is a "hidden assumption, and one 
which is difficuLt to reconcile with product differentiation". Capozza 
and Van Order (1982) criticize Demsetz's argument on the basis of 
Lancaster's idea that a good is worth for the characteristics it 
possesses. Hence, they argue that trade marks cannot be viewed as 
effective barriers to entry because "the reLevant market is not the 
market for a specific brand but rather the market for products with 
similar characteristics", and characteristics are difficult to patent. 
However, they conclude that free entry does not necessarily imply the 
elimination of profits and they suggest that "some modification of 
textbook account on the subject is needed". 
An interesting model is offered by Waterson (1990) where firms 
first chose location and then set prices. Assuming that locational 
costs are sunk and that some consumers are easier to serve than 
others, he explains the origin of different firms' efficiencies. Cost 
advantages are shown to persist over time (due to the existence of 
sunk costs) and to generate long-run equilibria which are asymmetric 
in prices, market shares and positive profit rates. 
Brand proliferation has also been identified in the literature as 
an entry deterrence strategy, obviously within address models, where 
the product space could be explicitly modelled (see Neven, Matutes, 
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Corstjens (1988) as an example). Bonanno (1987) and Neven (1987) show 
how entry can be deterred by locating a brand strategically rather 
than introducing new ones. Again this is a theoretical development 
occurred within the localized competition approach. 
Whilst within the localized competition framework there are 
models which show how significant pure profits can survive in 
equilibrium, within the Chamberlinian setting the zero-profit long-run 
equilibrium 1S the norm. Entry affects profits of incumbents 
symmetrically because new firms are not required to occupy niches 
between any particular pair of existing firms. Hence, entry will 
generate the elimination of long-run profits. As mentioned earlier, 
Hart (1985a,b), within a Chamberlinian framework which does not rely 
on the representative consumer, explicitly disagrees with the view 
that a truly Chamberlinian model 1S consistent with positive profits 
and claims that it is one in which "free entry leads to zero-profit of 
operating firms", despite the fact that equilibrium price exceeds 
marginal cost. Hence, models in which the existence of set-up costs 
limits rational entry will violate the "spirit of Chamberlin" by 
generating the persistence of profits and by restricting market 
structure to a limited number of non-negligible firms. Thus, Hart 
imposes the zero-profit condition. A notable exception is offered by 
Pascoa (1993) who reformulates Hart's model as a non-atomic Bertrand 
game where an asymmetric spectrum of equilibrium profits results from 
asymmetric demand functions. In Pascoa's model only marginal firms are 
very close to making zero profits whereas all non-marginal firms may 
earn significant profits. 
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2.7. CONCLUSIONS: THE NEED FOR FUR THER THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The literature on monopolistic competition and horizontal product 
differentiation is constantly evolving. However, the majority of the 
innovative elements have mainly been confined to the address branch of 
the theory. The strand of the literature based on the representative 
consumer has remained anchored to very simplifying and limiting 
assumptions. The results obtained by Anderson, de Palma and Thisse 
(1989, 1992a,c) m relating the two bodies of literature would seem to 
suggest that the consequences of these limitations are not too 
extreme. However, as argued by these authors, there still is a role to 
be played by the original individual models and their synthesis does 
not need to be seen as a substitute for these. And in fact m many 
areas outside the industrial organization literature the discrete 
choice model has not yet made its appearance and the two approaches m 
their original formulations are used instead. As we shall see later in 
greater detail, trade theory has made a significant use of the 
monopolistic competition model of product differentiation and very 
often in its representative consumer formulation. Indeed, the 
representative consumer framework, in particular as modelled by Dixit 
and Stiglitz, is greatly appealing in every situation ln which an 
explicit specification of the product space is not essential. In its 
simplicity, the model is extremely tractable. Tractability problems, 
however, arise if the symmetric cost structure is relaxed and firms 
are allowed to have different costs. As von Ungern-Sternberg (1992) 
states, "among the main advantages of the 'representative consumer' 
models is the fact that it allows for multi-firm competition. The 
disadvantage is that it is usually quite difficult to compute firms' 
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equilibrium profits. These problems become insurmountable when one 
aLLows for firms with different costsll • 
Pascoa (1993) points out that Chamberlin himself (1937) argues 
that under product differentiation there is no free-entry (in the sub-
market occupied by each variety) and firms may enjoy positive profits 
even if they are negligible in size. He writes: lithe well known 
diagram illustrating a Chamberlin ian equilibrium at the tangency of 
demand and cost curve was regarded by Chamberl in as a mere expository 
device, valid only in the special case when all firms face the same 
demand curve". Not only did Chamberlin stress the fact that 
supernormal profits may not be eliminated by entry, but he also 
reckoned that firms operating in the differentiated product market 
need not to be identical. Instead, heterogeneity is bound to exist 
amongst firms producing in a differentiated product industry. 
In address models and discrete choice models with localized 
competition where the product space can be explicitly represented, 
differences amongst firms and the exi~tence of price differentials can 
result from the choice of product specification by firms. In a 
framework where the product space is not modelled, heterogeneity can 
be introduced either by assuming asymmetric utility functions as in 
Pascoa (1994) or by allowing for different costs. Indeed, as Stigler 
(1949) suggests, heterogeneity amongst firms 1S likely to manifest 
itself in non-uniform costs. However, in most of Chamberlin's analysis 
and m the subsequent monopolistic competition literature (see Hart 
1985a,b) firms are assumed to be identical for sake of simplicity. As 
a result, a symmetric equilibrium in prices and firms' market shares 
is obtained and in the long-run positive profits are eliminated by 
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entry. 
In the next chapter, we shall concentrate on these two related 
issues: the need to model firms as having heterogeneous technologies 
and the non-plausibility of the imposition of the zero-profit 
condition. 
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Chapter 3 
A CHAMBERLIN IAN MODEL OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
WITH FIRM-SPECIFIC COSTS 1 
"The picture of [product] diversity and unsystematism 
aLso makes it very likeLy, if the group contains 
severaL firms, that the products be heterogeneous 
from the technoLogicaL viewpoint." 
Stigler, 1949 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the main features of real world industries is 
heterogeneity amongst competing firms. This heterogeneity stems from 
several factors, technological differences and product specifications 
being the most obvious ones. Even when products are very close 
substitutes and no substantial objective differences exist between 
them, producers intentionally engage in activities aimed at enhancing 
what consumers subjectively perceive as differences amongst goods and 
sellers, i.e. they pursue forms of product differentiation. Also, 
even when firms employ the same broadly defined technology to produce 
similar products, they adopt different production techniques and 
business strategies. This implies that technology is, to some extent, 
firm-specific. Thus, within a given technological paradigm firms 
using the same input combinations show differences in their 
production functions (see Dosi et al., 1988). This IS because 
knowledge (and learning) are embodied in people and organizations and 
firms in the same industry do not have full access to the same 
1 Some parts of this Chapter appear in Montagna (1995a). 
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technical knowledge. Firm-specific knowledge (and firm-specific 
technical progress) imply firm-specific economic performance (and 
firm-specific forms of process and product innovation). Thus, markets 
consist of firms which produce different goods with different levels 
of technical efficiency and achieve different profitabilities and 
market shares. 
These asymmetries amongst competitors appear to persist over 
time and are not automatically eliminated by competitive forces 
and/or entry. The source of this persistence, as pointed out by Dosi 
et al. (1988), lies not only in imperfect and asymmetric information, 
but in the fact that companies are characterized by different 
knowledge prior to information processing so that learning and 
imitation are not sufficient to eliminate gaps. Thus, firms til an 
industry can be seen as being spread along a ray reflecting different 
levels of technical efficiency and types of market performance. 
Studies in the recent evolutionary tradition stress the 
importance of firm-specific organizational routines and the fact that 
technology is characterized by varying degrees of appropriability. 
These factors are used to explain a firm's economic performance 
within an analytical framework which predominantly builds on the role 
of history in shaping technical gaps between firms (see, amongst 
others, Nelson and Winters, 1982, and Dosi et aI, 1988). However, in 
general, issues relating to the source - and even existence of 
heterogeneity amongst firms have traditionally occupied a relatively 
minor position in the more orthodox economic literature. Only 
recently has theoretical work on industrial market structure produced 
a number of studies which focus attention on the origin and 
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persistence of differences amongst firms operating in the same 
market. Some contributions stress the role of information asymmetries 
amongst competitors in generating persistent differences in firms' 
performances. For instance, Demsetz (1973) ascribes the existence of 
technological differences between firms to the fact that competitors 
may lack the knowledge to imitate the technology of the most 
successful firms in the industry. 
More recently, Jovanovic (1982) develops a model of industry 
evolution where firms' costs are subject to random influences. The 
industry is perfectly competitive, with homogeneous output and an 
infinite number of firms. Firms, are subject to productivity shocks 
which are drawn from a distribution with unknown mean but known 
variance. The mean is firm-specific and firms learn about their cost 
efficiency over time, as they operate in the industry. As a result of 
the cost differences, low cost firms grow and survive while high cost 
ones shrink and are forced to exit the industry. In the model 
developed by Lippman and Rumelt (1982) atomistic price taking firms 
are subject to firm-specific shocks which however do not change 
through time. All uncertainty, due to the ambiguity as to how 
efficiencies are obtained ("uncertain imitabHity"), is resolved 
after entry. Another model of competitive selection with price-taking 
firms is provided by Hopenhayn (1992). An interesting feature of 
these models is that, despite their perfectly competitive framework, 
free-entry does bring about neither the elimination nor the 
equalization of supernormal profits in the long-run industry 
equilibrium. Due to asymmetries in costs, competition leads to the 
selection of the more efficient firms which survive at the expense of 
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the less efficient ones. So, in Lippman and Rumelt (1982) uncertain 
imitability and stable inter-firm cost differences lead to limited 
entry and to stable inter-firm diff erences In profitability 
associated with steady-state supernormal profits. Jovanovic (1982) 
finds a positive correlation between firms' efficiency, concentration 
and profitability with the steady-state being characterized by a 
dispersion of positive profit rates. Persistence and heterogeneity of 
profit margins characterizing the long-run industry equilibrium in 
perfectly competitive models also results - for example in Lippman et 
al. (1991) - from demand uncertainty. These studies are carried out 
within a perfectly competitive framework, where goods are homogeneous 
and firms face the same market price. 
Within the Chamberlinian tradition, Chamberlin himself was 
also concerned with the relevance of modeling technical differences 
between firms. In his original work (1933), he stresses that 
heterogeneity is bound to exist amongst the firms producing different 
varieties of a differentiated product. The market for each variety is 
characterized by unique conditions so that the industry consists of a 
network of related, but to some extent isolated, markets. As a 
result, the market is likely to exhibit a heterogeneity of prices and 
wide output and profit ranges. However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, in most of Chamberlin's analysis firms are assumed to be 
identical "for sake of simplicity" and this assumption is generally 
followed by the subsequent monopolistic competition literature2 . 
Analytical tractability is certainly one of the reasons behind the 
uniformity assumption. As stressed by von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) 
2 See Beath and Katsoulacos (1991) and Hart 0985a, b). 
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allowing for different costs introduces remarkable computational 
difficulties3 . However, it is possible to envisage other more 
deeply rooted - motivations, related to the dominant vision of the 
Chamberlinian model. For instance, the uniformity hypothesis can be 
seen as a device functional to the need to impose the zero profit 
condition. As recognized by Stigler (1949), allowing for cost and/or 
demand diversity may be "devastating: there may be monopoLy profits 
throughout the group at equiLibrium". Hence, uniformity of costs and 
demand across firms has been maintained as one of the basic 
assumptions of models within the Chamberlinian tradition and the main 
implication of this is that a symmetric equilibrium in prices and 
firms' market shares is obtained. 
This chapter develops a representative consumer model of 
horizontal product differentiation which, whilst retaining the 
uniformity assumption on the demand side4 , allows for technical 
diversity amongst firms. The analysis, set in a partial equilibrium 
framework and based on closed form equations, offers a particular 
extension of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model. As in the latter, all 
consumers are assumed to be identical in tastes and income and no 
explicit representation is offered of the product space. Production 
costs, however, are firm-specific. Technical differences between 
firms are assumed to be generated by a random process. No form of 
technical progress is incorporated into the model, the emphasis only 
being on the existence of persistent efficiency gaps between firms. 
3 See von Ungern-Sternberg (1991) who suggests an alternative model 
of multi-firm competition. 
4 See Pascoa (1993) as an example of asymmetries m demand. 
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These gaps are fixed and not eliminated by competition and/or entry; 
instead, they are originated once and for all at the moment of entry, 
as if reflecting an element of historical accident determining the 
efficiency of a firm which shapes its future development and 
performance. Market structure is determined endogenously via entry 
and exit of firms into the industry. The results of the exercise show 
that the hypothesis of firms' technical heterogeneity significantly 
affects the prediction of the standard monopolistic competition 
model. In particular, the hypothesis of inter-firm cost heterogeneity 
allows for the endogenization of the steady-state level of technical 
efficiency of the industry which will turn out to be a function of 
the parameters which determine the extent of price competition. As in 
the models of competitive selection mentioned above, the hypothesis 
of asymmetric firms leads to an enhancement of the industry 
productive efficiency via competition. A relationship between 
industry efficiency, concentration and profitability will emerge 
which is not always consistent with that stemming from the 
homogeneous firms monopolistic competition model. Furthermore, cost 
asymmetries together with the uncertainty as to the efficiency 
potential entrants will obtain imply that entry does neither 
eliminate nor equalize long-run profits5 . Instead, the steady-state 
IS characterized by a spectrum of quantities, prices and profit 
rates. 
5 As emphasized in Chapter 2, this is result is not common in the 
Chamberlinian strand of the product differentiation literature, 
although the persistence of profits in the long-run has recently 
been obtained by by Pasco a (1993) by means of asymmetric demands. 
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3.2. THE MODEL 
We carry out a partial equilibrium analysis, based on closed 
form equations, of an industry in which products are horizontally 
differentiated. The demand side of the model relies on the 
representative consumer approach. On the supply side, firms 
specialize in the production of one single variety of the 
differentiated good, given a production technology characterized by 
decreasing average costs. 
3.2.1. The representative consumer 
When products are horizontally differentiated, consumers' 
choice does not only depend on price but on all those elements - such 
as product specification concerning the basis on which it is 
possible to distinguish between goods. As a result, In the general 
case, the firm's choice is a price/quality mix. Price adjustment 
could In fact be a relatively unimportant phase of the whole 
competitive process with non-price factors being more important than 
price in determining the way in which consumers are paired with 
sellers. 
This model, however, only focuses on the pnce decision of the 
firm. Given that the emphasis is on the nature of the competitive 
process between firms with different production costs, we shall not 
offer any explicit representation of the product space and a given 
quality structure will be assumed to exist in the industry. Consumers 
are assumed to be identical in tastes and income and the model is 
based on the representative cflnsumer approach. Preferences are 
characterized by the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) utility function, which 
86 
expresses love for variety, namely 
N 
U = L D/CJ- ll / CJ (3.1) 
i=1 
where - as discussed in the previous Chapter - N is the number of 
existing varieties, Di is the consumption of variety i and CJ>l is the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties. This utility function 
implies that preferences are symmetric, so that neighbouring effects 
between varieties are ruled out and firms do not have any direct 
competitors. Although this is a strong simplification, it can be 
justified, as in Archibald and Rosenbluth (1975), by arguing that 
neighbouring effects are not likely to be significant if the 
dimension of the characteristics space IS large. Assuming that the 
proper aggregation conditions are fulfilled, this utility function 
can also be seen as the scaled version of the representative consumer 
utility (see Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). Product diversity can then be 
interpreted either as different consumers using different varieties 
or as diversification on the part of each consumer. 
The representative consumer's budget constraint is given by 
(3.2) 
i=1 
where Pi is the price of variety i, D is the total consumption of the 
differentiated good, and the price index P is defined as follows 
11(I-CJ) 
N 
P 1 L l-CJ = Pi N (3.3) 
i=1 
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Note that the price index adopted here6 is different from the one 
often used In this literature and given by equation· (2.18). The 
choice of price index is discussed in Appendix 3.1. 
The representative consumer will maximize (3.1) subject to the 
budget constraint (3.2). The solution to this optimization problem 
leads to the following demand function for each variety i 
(3.4) 
Equation (3.4) says that for any given overall consumption of the 
differentiated good and a given number of available varieties, the 
demand for each existing variety i depends on its relative price. 
Note that (j represents both the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties and the own price elasticity of each variety, when P is 
regarded as fixed. 
Given the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis, it is not 
essential to specify the process through which D is determined. For 
simplicity we shall assume that the industry's aggregate demand is 
given by 
(3.5) 
where A is a positive constant reflecting a scaled measure of nominal 
income and 1) is the price elasticity of demand. This hypothesis 
relates the total expenditure on the horizontally differentiated good 
to a measure of nominal income which, as in Hart (l985a) and Pascoa 
(1993), is not affected by producers' profits, given the partial 
6 This price index is commonly used in micro-founded macroeconomic 
models. See, for instance, Weitzman (1985) and Startz (1989) for 
a use of this specification within monopolistically competitive 
frameworks. 
88 
equilibrium framework. For behavioural plausibility, however, we 
assume that T)<(J". That IS, the price elasticity of demand for the 
differentiated commodity as a whole is smaller than that for the 
individual variety. Thus, by substituting (3.5) into (3.4), the 
demand function for each variety can be rewritten as 
(3.6) 
It may be relevant at this point to anticipate that the cost 
structure of the industry affects demand both via the industry price 
index P and via N since, as we shall show, the number of varieties N 
depends at any moment m time on the factors determining the industry 
price structure. 
Using equation (3.6), expenditure on variety i of the 
differentiated product is given by 
A (J"-T) 1-(J" 
= N P Pi (3.7) 
and its market share, m terms of value, is 
1 (J"-l 1-(J" 
= N P Pi (3.8) 
Thus, the market share of each variety depends on the number of 
varieties and on the respective relative pnce. Equation (3.8) 
reflects a major feature of the demand for horizontally 
differentiated goods, namely that the price factor affects consumer's 
choice but does not uniquely determine it. As pointed out by 
Chamberlin, the decisive role is played by the preference structure 
of the individual which reflects the way in which differences between 
varieties are perceived and valued. It follows that the existence of 
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a price differential between any two varieties does not necessarily 
imply that all demand is channeled towards the cheapest· one. Ceteris 
paribus, changes in relative prices may generate revisions of 
consumers' consumption selections. Thus, the structure of demand in a 
differentiated product market can sustain differences in prices 
amongst varieties. Hence, given that the main implication of tastes 
heterogeneity is that consumers are prepared to pay more for 
varieties they like better, tastes heterogeneity can be seen as the 
source of market power. However, as stressed before, in the 
monopolistic competition literature differences in prices are 
generally ruled out a priori, because firms are assumed to be 
identical, with identical cost structures. 
3.2.2. The production technology 
Technology is regarded as the only source of difference 
amongst firms. A very simple specification of technology is adopted. 
Similar to what is usually assumed in this literature, for a 
representative firm i the total cost function is given by 
(3.9) 
where C i denotes the total cost, (3i is the marginal cost, Qi is the 
level of output and K is the fixed production cost. Given the 
presence of a fixed production cost, equation (3.9) reflects the 
existence of static increasing returns to scale in production. Hence, 
it can plausibly be assumed that each firm has an incentive to 
specialize in the production of one single variety of the 
differentiated product. As a result, there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between the number of varieties available for 
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consumption and the number of firms in the market 7 . 
As in the literature surveyed in Chapter 2, the fixed cost K 
is assumed to be identical across firms. However, the marginal cost 
is here assumed to be firm-specific and will represent the source of 
firms' heterogeneity. The higher the value of (3, the lower is the 
firm's efficiency. Each firm in the industry is paired with a value 
of (3 randomly drawn from a continuous uniform distribution, described 
in Figure 1 below, defined over the interval [1-0, 1+0], with 0<0<1. 
Note that 0 defines the width of the distribution and represents the 
degree of technical heterogeneity amongst firms. For 0=0, this model 
collapses into the standard one where the different varieties of the 
good are produced at the same cost by technically homogeneous firms. 
1-0 1 1+0 
Figure 3.1 The marginal cost distribution 
3.3. MARKET EQUILIBRIUM: THE NO-ENTRY CASE 
In this section, the possibility of entry of new firms into 
the industry is ruled out. The industry is assumed to consist of a 
group of firms already paired with given values of (3. Given the 
production technology, the profit function of firm L is 
(3.10) 
The existence of equilibrium in the (sub)market for each variety 
7 Note that the one-to-one correspondence between number of firms and 
varieties implies that, for any given N, equation· (3.8) represents 
the market share held by firm i. 
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implies 
(3.11) 
Assuming that firms engage m a Bertrand game, with Pi as the firm's 
choice variable, the optimization problem of the representative firm 
is to maximize the profit function in (3.10) which, given equations 
(3.6) and (3.11), can be rewritten as 
(3.12) 
The monopolistic competition literature implicitly assumes that the 
firm believes that changes m its own price do not affect the 
industry price index, i.e. (BP / BPi)=O. This hypothesis is retained 
here. Accordingly, the number of firms characterizing any given 
market structure will be assumed to be large enough to induce each 
firm to believe it will not significantly affect the price index. 
Thus, the solution to the firm's optimization problem will be given 
by the following price rule which - given Bertrand conjectures - will 
define the Nash equilibrium 
( 3.13) 
Hence, the price of each variety is proportional to the marginal cost 
of producing it. Given that there is a distribution of firms over the 
range of the parameter (3, equation (3.13) suggests that there will 
exist a corresponding distribution of different prices. The 
differentiated nature of the product implies that this spectrum of 
prices will be sustained by demand. Thus, the market will be 
characterized by an asymmetric equilibrium with a structure of 
equilibrium prices, one for each variety. Correspondingly, an 
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equilibrium dispersion of quantities demanded exists and is given by 
( 3.14) 
These generate an equilibrium spectrum of profits, distributed 
according to the values of (3 associated with firms in the market, as 
follows 
(3.15) 
(J-l -(J 
where cP=( (J-l) (J . Thus, lower values of (3 will correspond to lower 
prices and to higher quantities and profit margins. The distribution 
of the values of the parameter (3 across firms determines the 
differences in their market performance which is reflected in their 
market share, 
Si 
1 (J-l [~r~ l-(J = -p (3i N (J-1 
l-(J 
(3i ( 3.16) = L N (3~-(J 
i=l 1 
which, given equation (3.3), can be obtained from equations (3.8) and 
(3.13) and suggests that the smaller the firm's own parameter 
relative to the industry's average, the bigger will be the firm's 
market share. 
Finally, it should be noticed that the larger the number of 
firms in the industry, the sma11er wi11 be, ceteris paribus, the 
output and the profit of each firm. Thus, given the fact that N 
affects profitability, we must assume that for a given N a11 firms 
operating ill the industry must find it economica11y efficient to 
produce. This profitability condition can be expressed as 
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(3.17 ) 
• In general, for any given N=N, there will be a level of efficiency 
• • • • (3=(3 such that TT i((3 ,N )=0. Thus, (3 will be the industry efficiency 
cut-off -point, which determines the minimum level of efficiency 
• compatible with non~negative profits for any given N. Those firms 
• 
whose (3i=(3 are defined as marginal firms; the remaining intra-
• 
marginal firms have (3i<(3 and whose TT?O. See Figure 2 below . 
• 1-0 1 (3 1+0 
Figure 3.2 The efficiency cut-off point 
The simple exerCise carried out in this section explicitly 
models an insight contained in the original work by Chamberlin and 
captures an important feature of the real world, namely the existence 
of differences between firms operating in the same industry. We have 
shown that profits are positive for all firms but the marginal ones 
and that there is a spectrum of profits and prices characterizing the 
(asymmetric) equilibrium. This analysis, however, consists of what is 
traditionally referred to as the short-run or small group version of 
the monopolistic competition model where the number of firms in the 
industry is assumed to be given and constant. What happens if entry 
into the industry IS allowed for? This is examined in the next 
section. 
3.4. ENTRY AND COMPETITIVE SELECTION 
In this section market structure is determined endogenously via 
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entry and exit of firms into the industry. According to the 
traditional version of monopolistic competition model the entry 
process leads to the elimination of supernormal profits. We shall 
argue here that due to the existence of persistent differences in 
technical efficiencies between firms and to the uncertainty 
surrounding the size of the marginal cost of potential entrants, 
rational entry will come to a halt before the elimination and/or the 
equalization of supernormal profits. Thus, this framework offers one 
of the possible theoretical explanations for Kaldor's (1935) 
conjecture that there is no a priori reason why entry should stop 
right at the point at which all profit is eliminated. 
Allowing for entry and exit changes the nature of the model, 
making it intrinsically dynamic. However, a number of behavioural 
assumptions will be made which allow one to retain the static 
features of the model. 
3.4.1. The exit decision 
Incumbents will be assumed to form static expectations about the 
future structure of the market and take the number of firms operating 
in the industry as constant over time. As a result, the firm's 
optimization problem remains a static one. This also explains the 
lack of time subscripts in the analysis that follows. 
From the discussion carried out in the previous sections, it is 
clear that the industry will be characterized at any moment in time 
by a certain number of operating firms and by an associated minimum 
• • level of efficiency, Nand (3 respectively. The profitability 
condition defined in equation (3.17) above now becomes the stay-in-
9S 
the-market condition on which the exit decision is based. Firms will 
continue to operate In the market as long as their profit 1S non-
negative. 
3.4.2. The entry decision 
Entry into the industry 1S modeled on the basis of the following 
assumptions. First, consistently with what is commonly assumed in the 
monopolistic competition literature, there exists a very large group 
of potential entrants. That is, there is no limit to the number of 
potential varieties of the differentiated good which can be produced. 
Second, all prospective entrants face the same ex-ante uncertainty as 
to the level of technical efficiency they will have. All uncertainty, 
however, disappears once the value of its marginal cost ((3) is 
revealed to the firm. Third, (3 is drawn from the random distribution 
only after an entry cost has been paid for. Fourth, the entry cost 
will be assumed to consist of the fixed production cost (K) of the 
first period. The implication of this hypothesis is the absence of 
any sunk cost associated with entry for any firm whose entry attempt 
succeeds. K, instead, will be a sunk cost for those firms whose entry 
attempt fails. The success of entry will be determined by the 
position of the entrant's (3 with respect to the industry's cut-off 
• point (3, at the time of entry. Entry will be successful for those 
• firms whose (3i~(3 at the time of entry. If the draw from the 
• distribution is such that (3i>(3, the firm will withdraw, thus 
forfeiting the amount of the first period's fixed production cost. We 
shall also assume that those firms whose entry attempt fails will not 
re-attempt to enter the market. This hypothesis is meant to rule out 
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the possibility of there being at any moment in time firms in the 
industry with the economic burden of sunk costs from previous entry 
attempts8 . Finally, at any moment in time, the number of firms in the 
market is assumed to be sufficiently large for each potential entrant 
to think it will not significantly affect market structure and, 
through it, the magnitude of the efficiency cut-off -point. This 
hypothesis also allows us to treat the number of firms as a 
continuous variable, thus ruling out the integer problem. 
Each entrant will base its entry attempt on the following 
condition 
1+0 
VE = J TI((3,N*) [((3) d(3 ~ 0 
1-0 
(3.18) 
* where VE is the expected profit of the potential entrant, rr((3,N ) is 
as in equation (3.15) and [((3)=1/(20) is the density function of the 
random variable (3. Note that, given that (3is are drawn independently, 
the expected profit of the potential entrant is the same for all 
firms attempting entry at the same time. Firms will have an incentive 
in trying to enter the industry as long as the expected profit of 
entry is non-negative. As entry takes place, the demand for each 
variety will ceteris paribus fall. The resulting reduction in revenue 
will force the marginal firms to exit, hence increasing the average 
efficiency of the industry and lowering the industry price index (P). 
The fall in P will raise each firm's demand and induce entry through 
an increase in the expected profit of a potential entrant (VE). Thus, 
8 The role of this assumption will become clear later, when we 
analyze the welfare implications of this model. 
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a complex entry and exit dynamics sets in as one allows for market 
structure to be determined endogenously. 
3.4.3. The steady-state 
Entry, however, will not continue indefinitely, but it will come 
to a halt when the expected profit of an additional entrant becomes 
negative. The free-entry industry equilibrium occurs when entry stops 
and hence market structure no longer changes because no firm has an 
incentive to attempt entry and no incumbent is forced to leave the 
market. Indicating the steady-state variables with a double asterisk, 
** ** Nand (3 will be the number of firms and the minimum efficiency 
level characterizing the long-run equilibrium market structure. At 
these values, the expected profit of any potential entrant is zero 
and marginal firms will be making zero profits. Hence the two 
conditions defining the steady-state are 
(3.19 ) 
and 
** ** 
TI( N ,(3 ) cpA CJ'-11 **1-CJ' 0 = P (3 - K = 
** 
(3.20) 
N 
** ** 
which can be shown to determine Nand (3 Solving (3.19) yields 
the steady-state number of firms 
.* 1 cpA **CJ'-11 1 [ (1+0) H _ (1-0) 2-<r] ( 3.21) N = 20 K P 2-CJ' 
•• •• 
where, from equation (3.3), P can be seen to depend on (3 as 
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follows 
1 1 
[)·r~ •• 1-(J •• (3 •• (J p = ( (J-l) N J (3~-(J d(3 ( 3.22) 
•• {3 -1+0 1-0 
which, in turn, becomes 
1 
•• p (3.23) 
Clearly, the steady-state price index reflects the industry' level of 
efficiency. Finally, substituting (3.21) into (3.20) and solving for 
•• {3 gives the steady-state industry cut-off point 
•• (3 (3.24) 
•• It can be proved that 1-0<(3 <1 holds for all (J>1 and 0<0<1. Note 
that (3 is distributed with a unit mean. Thus, a sufficient condition 
for entry to take place is that a potential entrant's expected 
• 
efficiency ought not to fall below the minimum efficiency ((3) 
required to be profitable given market conditions. 
Note that the significance of equation (3.24) is that it gives 
the endogenously determined level of steady-state efficiency of the 
industry. In fact in this model, the steady-state industry efficiency 
stems from the entry and exit process and, as will be discussed more 
extensively later, is the result of competition between firms. 
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3.5. COST HETEROGENEITY AND EFFICIENCY 
This section brings out the most significant implications of the 
hypothesis of firm-specific costs for the steady-state features of 
the monopolistic competition model. Given the tedious nature of some 
of the expressions, numerical methods are employed to analyze their 
comparative static properties. The following parameters intervals 
have been analyzed: 8=(0.05, 0.1, ... ,0.95), 0'=(1.1, 1.3, ... ,6.1), 
T/=(O.l, 0.3, ... ,1.5)9. 
3.5.1. The persistence of profits 
For any given values of 8 and 0', the steady-state industry will 
be characterized by a spectrum of efficiencies defined over the 
** interval [1-8,(3 ]. Thus, surviving firms are distributed uniformly 
with density function 
g((3) = 1 (3.25) 
** (3 -1+8 
Proposition 3.1: Technical asymmetry among firms and uncertainty 
as to prospective entrants' efficiencies imply that entry does 
neither eliminate nor equalize long-run profits. 
The persistence of supernormal profits can be illustrated by the 
expected surplus profit of a surviving firm, that is 
9 Clearly, T/<O' has always been imposed in all cases considered. 
** R 
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** (3 
** 
= J rr((3,N ) g((3) d(3 
1-0 
qJA P **(J-T) 
= K ** N 
(3 **2-(J -(1-0 /-(J 1 
** - 1 
(2-(J) ((3 -1+0) 
( 3.26) 
which, given ** the steady state value of N from equation (3.21), 
yields 
** 
R 
(3 **2-(J - (1-0/-(J 
(1+0/-(J - (1-0/-(J 
(3.27 ) 
Equation (3.27) indicates that the expected surplus profit in steady-
** 
state IS positive for all 0<0<1 and (J>l (R IS plotted in Figure 
3.3). Thus, in contrast to the traditional version of the 
monopolistic competition model, entry does not eliminate long-run 
profit. Instead, the steady-state will be characterized by a 
dispersion of prices, quantities and positive profit rates which will 
** be distributed over the interval [1-0, (3 J, with the more efficient 
firms having higher profits. Let us define a firm i's steady-state 
profit margm (M i ) as the ratio between its surplus profits and its 
revenue; from equations (3.13) to (3.15) we obtain 
-1 
= (J K ** (J **T)-(J [ 1 
(J-I 
A N (J 1 P 
** ** 
(3.28) 
Note that given that rr((3 )=0, Mi((3 )=0. Also, given equations 
(3.21) and (3.24)10 
10 Note that given equations (3.21) and (3.24), equation (3.28) can 
-Ie ** (J-I) be written as M i((3i)=(J 1-((3/(3) . 
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K·· (J •• T)-(J 
[ ] 
(J-l 
A N (J 1 P 
(3.29) 
•• Thus, M/{3 ) and M i (1-o) determine the minimum and the maximum 
values assumed by the profit margins of firms in the industry steady-
state. In fact, 
(3.30) 
which IS negative for any values of (J and o. Hence, Mi is 
monotonically decreasing m {3i which means that higher efficiency 
firms will enjoy higher profit margins. As is clear from equation 
(3.8), given that Si IS also decreasing in {3i' more efficient firms 
will enjoy larger market shares in terms of value. 
3.5.2. Competition and endogenous efficiency 
As was mentioned, one of the most significant implications of 
allowing for cost heterogeneity in the monopolistic competition model 
IS the endogenization of efficiency. The idea that competition 
fosters efficiency is widespread in the literature, but no unique 
interpretation of the underlying mechanism linking the two emerges 
from it. In a static sense, competition IS supposed to benefit 
efficiency via its role m reducing the price-cost margin and, 
through it, monopoly power. Note that in this context competition 
does not affect technical efficiency. Technical efficiency is 
explicitly dealt with by two other strands of the literature. A first 
approach underlines the role of competition in generating incentives 
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to innovatell . Another channel is provided by the existence of inter-
firm cost differences In whose presence competition selects efficient 
production organizations which will survive and prosper at the 
expense of less efficient ones. Thus, competition affects the average 
technical efficiency of the industry. 
The steady-state market structure, •• •• described by (3 and N 
depends on ~ and o. 
Proposition 3.2: A higher degree of heterogeneity amongst firms 
(0) and a larger price elasticity of demand for the individual 
variety (~) lead to a higher minimum efficiency required to 
survive in the steady-state, and to a higher average industry 
efficiency. 
•• As can be seen from Figure 3.4, (3 is a decreasing function of both 
** o and ~. In turn, the lower is (3 the higher is the average 
efficiency of the industry. The impact of ~ and (5 on the efficiency 
cut-off point can be intuitively explained by considering that these 
parameters can be interpreted as the main determinants of the 
toughness of price competition12. The size of cr reflects the 
importance of price relative to non-price competition, with higher 
values of ~ implying higher substitutability between varieties and 
hence a less significant role of product specification in determining 
consumer's choice. As the extent to which competition relies on price 
performance rises, firms will have to be more efficient in order to 
be profitable. Moreover, ceteris paribus, price competition will be 
11 This and other strands of the literature are surveyed by Vickers 
(1995). 
12 This concept is used here In a fashion similar to that adopted by 
Sutton (1992). 
103 
more fierce the larger is the efficiency gap between the most and the 
least efficient firms (determined by the size of 0). Clearly, given 
the entry and exit process whereby more efficient entrants displace 
less efficient incumbents, the higher is the variability in technical 
efficiencies, the more efficient will be the average firm surviving 
the industry dynamics and operating in the steady-stateI3 . Thus, the 
larger are (J' and 0 the more efficient will firms have to be in order 
to survive. Clearly, given the uniform distribution, there will be a 
monotonic relationship between the efficiency of the marginal firms 
and the average industry efficiency. Thus, as price competition 
becomes tougher and the industry efficiency cut-off point falls, the 
average industry efficiency increases. 
Although we have underlined that both of these parameters 
contribute to the determination of the extent of price competition in 
the market, it IS worth bearing in mind that they play separate 
** roles. Even though the steady state efficiency ({3 ) is negatively 
related to both, their effects on other variables characterizing the 
steady-state market structure will not always be of the same nature. 
A first evidence of this emerges if we examine how comparative static 
changes of these parameters affect the variety of types of technology 
characterizing the steady-state of the industry. Denoting the number 
** ** of types of technology in steady-state by Z ={3 -1+0, it is clear 
** tha t - for any given value of 0 - as (J' increases Z becomes smaller, 
13 Within a duopoly by Wathieu (1993) finds a negative relationship 
between inter-firm cost gaps and industry efficiency and argues 
that productivity gaps weaken competition. However, it is worth 
noticing that Wathieu's model does not allow for the endogenous 
determination of the industry steady-state efficiency. These 
points are discussed in Montagna (1995b). 
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--given that (d{3 /dCJ' )<0. As a result, as price competition becomes 
tougher because of larger values of CJ', the heterogeneity of 
technology characterizing the steady-state reduces. The effect of 
changes in the degree of technical heterogeneity (0), however, are 
--more complex. In fact, for any given CJ', as 0 increases both (3 and 
(1-0) become smaller, i.e. they both move leftwards on the marginal 
cost distribution. Hence, the net effect on the width of the 
distribution of an increase in 0 will depend on the relative size of 
--the changes in its two limiting values. The variable Z has been 
numerically evaluated over the usual parameters intervals. The 
findings do not suggest a monotonic behaviour. As is illustrated in 
Figure 3.5, variability of firm's technologies mcreases up to 
certain values of 0 after which subsequent increases of the degree of 
technical heterogeneity 
variability. The value of 
smaller the larger is the 
.-
out. Clearly, dZ >0 if do 
will reduce 
0 at which 
value of CJ' at 
d(1-o) > d{3 ** 
do do 
the steady-state technical 
_. 
dZ becomes negative do are 
which the analysis is carried 
•• For Z to be negatively 
related to 0, the fall in the magnitude of the efficiency cut-off 
point must dominate the change in the inferior limit of the 
distribution. This will be more likely to happen the tougher IS price 
•• 
competition, i.e. the larger is CJ' given that while (3 falls with CJ', 
(1-0) is not affected by it. 
These conclusions are supported by the variance (V) of marginal 
cost in steady-state 
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** (3 
V((3i) = f 0i -£[(3i]) 2 g((3) d(3 
1-0 
** 3((3 -1+0) [ 
2 
(3**2 - (1-0/ 
•• 2((3 -1+0) 
(3.31) 
•• whose behaviour with respect to (J' and 0 reflects that of Z (see 
Figure 3.6). Thus, if price competition as determined by (J' - is 
sufficiently tough, the larger is 0 the smaller will be the steady-
state degree of firms' technical heterogeneity. Therefore, for 
sufficiently tough price competition the steady-state degree of 
homogeneity of the surviving firms in terms of technical efficiency 
is directly related to the pre-steady-state degree of heterogeneity, 
defined by the magnitude of the parameter o. If (J' is sufficiently 
large, the greater is the difference amongst firms the closer will be 
the steady-state degree of uniformity in technology to the symmetric 
equilibrium of the standard uniform cost model. 
As long as there is a degree of heterogeneity amongst surviving 
firms, the steady-state will be characterized by a spectrum of profit 
rates along with a structure of quantities and market shares. Given 
that the variability of technical efficiencies varies with (J' and 0, 
it is interesting at this point to analyze how comparative static 
changes of these parameters affect the steady-state variability of 
prices, quantities and market shares. 
The variance of prices 
.* (3 
V( Pi )= f (P i-£[ Pi]) 2 g((3)d(3. This yields 
1-0 
will be glven by 
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2 
(3 **3 - (1-oy3 
= 
(3 **2 - (1-0/ 
** 3((3 -1+0) 
(3.32) 
** 2((3 -1+0) 
from which it 15 evident that V(P1) = [ir~lrV(i3). Obviously, for any 
value of <J', V(P 1) is a monotonic transformation of V((3j), hence its 
behaviour with respect to 0 is identical to that of V((3). Numerical 
evaluation of (3.32) shows that the behaviour of steady-state price 
variability with respect to <J' also reflects that of V((3), with 
prices becoming more homogeneous as, for any given degree of 
technical heterogeneity, <J' falls. 
The variance of quantities produced will be given by 
** (3 
V( D j ) = J (Di - E[ Di]) 2 g((3) d(3 
1-0 
(3 **1-2<J' _(1_0/-2<J' 
= 
** ** 
( 3.33) 
(1-2<J')((3 -1+0) (1-<J' )( (3 -1+0) 
As is illustrated in Figure 3.7, for given values of 0, the 
variability of firms output increases in <J'. Recalling that V( P) 
falls with <J', this outcome reflects the fact that as price becomes 
more important in determining consumer's choice (because varieties 
become closer substitutes for one another), smaller differences m 
price between varieties generates larger differences in the 
quantities produced and sold. For given values of the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties, the variability of steady-state 
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output levels is positively related to o. 
Finally, we examine the variability of steady-state market 
shares in terms of value. From equation (3.8), the expected market 
share in terms of value14 of a surviving firm is given by 
** (3 
J 
PiDl 
E(S1.) = g(f~) d Q ** fJ t.J 
1-0 P D 
1 
** N 
** 
which, gIven P from equation (3.23), implies 
£(S) = 1 
** N 
The variance of steady-state market shares IS given by 
** (3 
V(Si) = J (Si - £[Si1) 2 g((3) d(3 
1-0 
which on substitution yields 
P **0'-1 
V(S) 
= [).]2 _( 2_-_0'_l_( 3_*_* -_1_+0_)_~_*_*3_-2_0' ___ (_1-_0_)3_-_20'_L 1 
~ "2-0' - (1-0/-0' r (3-20' 1 
(3.34) 
(3.35) 
(3.36) 
(3.37 ) 
Our numerical evaluations of veSt) indicate that market share 
variability in steady-state is affected by comparative static changes 
in 0 and/or 0' in the same way as output variability (see Figure 3.8). 
14 We adopt a value definition of market share because of the 
heterogeneous nature of the product. 
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That is, veSt) is a monotonically increasing function of both (J' and 
o. As before, these results reflect the fact that as price 
competition becomes fiercer small differences in price between 
varieties generate large differences in market shares. Hence, the 
industry will be characterized by a higher degree of concentration of 
demand on the relatively cheaper varieties. 
3.6. ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
The previous section showed that comparative static increases in 
the toughness of price competition lead to a higher average 
•• 
efficiency reflected by lower values of (3 This, in turn, will 
correspond to lower values of the steady-state industry price index 
•• (P ), as is clear from equation (3.23). Furthermore, 
Proposition 3.3: An mcrease in the toughness of price 
competition, and in the industry average efficiency, leads to i) 
an increase in market concentration and ii) an increase in the 
industry average profitability. 
The two points of the proposition will be discussed below In turn. 
3.6.1. Market concentration 
It is generally agreed that the two relevant aspects of industry 
structure which should be captured by a measure of concentration are 
the number of firms and their size inequality. Clearly, other things 
equal, the number of firms 1S inversely related to concentration. 
However, when firms differ In size, the number of firms in an 
industry becomes an ambiguous measure of concentration and the other 
factor, size variability, has to be taken into account. Normally, 
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concentration will be directly related to variability. A few problems 
have emerged in the literature which relate to (i) the measurement of 
variability, (ii) the measurement of size, and (iii) the way of 
combining size variability with firm numbers. The literature has not 
provided any unique answer to these issues. Amongst the units to 
measure size, market share is the most popular. If the product is 
homogeneous, market shares will be expressed In real terms, i.e. 
N 
Si = Qi/Q (where Q = [Qi). If products are differentiated, as in our 
i=l 
case, market shares will be expressed In terms of value, as in 
equation (3.B). Obviously, if all costs were the same, Si=Sj for all 
** and S.=(1/N ) 1 for all i. Hence, there will be an inverse 
relationship between market share and number of firms. If costs 
differ, however, there will be some variability in market shares. 
This is clearly the case in the present context characterized by a 
distribution of marginal costs, where, as shown by equation C 3.16), 
the market share held by one firm depends on the relative size of the 
firm's marginal cost. 
Although there is no consensus as to the best way of combining 
size variability and firm numbers15 given that, as stressed by 
Jaquemin (1987), all indexes involve some "vaLue judgment", general 
agreement exists on the properties that a concentration index should 
have. If rg=rgCS1, ••• ,SN) is a concentration index then, if the 
function rg is symmetric and strictly convex, certain desirable 
15 We shall not enter here the details of this debate, because it 
would be beyond the aims of this work. Instead we refer, amongst 
others, to Encaoua and Jaquemin (1980), Schmalensee (1982) and 
Jaquemin (1987). 
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properties will be satisfied. In particular, for any given number of 
firms, "the measure of concentration takes its minimum value when the 
firms have equal shares" and if firms are identical "the measure of 
concentration must not increase with an increase in the number of 
firms" (Encaoua and Jaquemin 1980). 
An index of concentration which satisfies these properties is 
the Herfindhal's index (H) that is 
N 
H = LS~ (3.38) 
i=l 
In frameworks, as in the present one, in which firms differ only in 
their marginal cost and act non-cooperatively, the Herfindhal's index 
is considered to be a sensible concentration measure (see 
Schmalensee, 1982). Note that In the index, market shares are weighed 
according to a weight function which gives more importance to the 
biggest firms 16 . The range of variation of the index is [lIN, 11. Its 
lower value, liN, results when firms are homogeneous with respect to 
their market shares. Following Jaquemin (1986), we can write the 
Herfindhal's index of concentration as 
1 
H = N V(S) + N (3.39) 
so as to distinguish the two factors that the index ought to reflect, 
namely number of firms and size variability. Clearly, the latter is 
measured by the variance of market shares. In this work we shall 
adopt this measure of concentration. 
16 The opposite happens, for instance, with the entrSlPY index which 
reduces the importance of the biggest firms. See Jaquemin (1987) 
for a discussion of alternative measures. 
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As the average efficiency in the industry increases, a smaller 
number of firms will survive in steady-state. --In fact, N is 
decreasing m both 0 and (j (N •• is plotted in Figure 3.9). As a 
•• 
result, the ratio l/N increases as industry efficiency Increases 
which suggests the occurrence of an increase in concentration. Also, 
•• 
recall that ECS t)=l/N Hence, as the average industry efficiency 
increases, a smaller number of firms holding (on average) larger 
market shares survive in the industry. 
From equation (3.37) we know that as market efficiency increases 
and as the number of firms falls market share variability 
increases. Hence, as price competition becomes tougher, the number of 
firms surviving m the industry falls, the steady-state expected 
market share of a firm increases, and the gaps In market shares 
widens. Clearly, comparative static changes in (j and/or 0 affect 
firms' number and size inequality in a consistent fashion indicating 
that a tougher price competition leads to a higher industry's average 
efficiency and to a higher concentration. This can be verified by 
substituting equation (3.37) into equation (3.39) to obtain the 
Herfindhal's index, that is 
.-H 1 
(2-fY;> (fl" -1+0) ~ **3-2fY - (J-o )3-2fY 1 
[fl**2-fY - (J-o;>-fY r (3-2fY) ( 3.40) = --N 
The index has been evaluated within the usual parameters intervals 17 . 
The results, illustrated In Figure 3.10, confirm that as price 
competition becomes tougher industry concentration increases. 
17 Note that H is not defined for (j=1.5. 
112 
3.6.2. Profitability 
As stated by the proposition, the higher is the average industry 
efficiency the higher is the expected profit of a surviving firm. 
From equation (3.27), it is obvious that the extent of equilibrium 
surplus profits is dependent on the state of technology 0, the 
elasticity of substitution between varieties (I, and the fixed 
production cost K. Other things being equal, the higher is the fixed 
production cost, the higher will have to be the average efficiency of 
firms which manage to survive and thus the larger will be the average 
profit margin of the industry in steady-state. As was shown in 
Figure 3.3, an increase in the degree of heterogeneity amongst firms 
would generate an increase in the steady-state level of supernormal 
profits. The graph shows clearly that expected supernormal profits 
diminish as 0 becomes very small. In the limit, if 0=0, i.e. if firms 
were identical, entry would eliminate positive profit. This 1S in 
line with the traditional version of the monopolistic competition 
model which turns out to be a special case of the model developed 
here. Finally, for a given 0, the steady-state expected profit will 
be larger the larger 1S (I. Similarly, the expected profit margin18 , 
defined as 
•• 
•• M = 
(3 
J 
•• TI/(3,N ) 
PiDi 
g((3) d(3 (3.41) 
1-0 
is also monotonically increasing in 0, as can be seen from 
Figure 3.11. 
18 Note the difference between the expected profit margin in equation 
(3.41) below and the steady-state profit margin of any firm i 
given by equation (3.28). 
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The dispersion of profits at the industry level is also related 
to the toughness of price competition. The variance of the steady-
state profits is given by 
•• (3 
V(TI l ) = f (TIi - EfTIil)2 g((3) d(3 
1-8 
(3.42) 
which has been numerically evaluated for the usual parameter 
intervals. The results, plotted in Figure 3.12, show that profit 
inequality increases as price competition becomes tougher. 
Thus, competition between firms with different costs leads to a 
steady-state level of efficiency which is higher the tougher is 
competition. A direct relationship emerges between efficiency, 
industry concentration and profitability19. 
3.6.3. Market SIze, aggregate demand and concentration 
This section will briefly analyze the impact on market structure 
of the exogenous factors affecting aggregate demand, namely the price 
elasticity 1) and the measure of nominal income A. 
•• First, note that the efficiency cut-off point (3 IS invariant 
with respect to 1). From equation (3.40) it is then evident that the 
impact of comparative static changes of 1) on market concentration can 
be fully analyzed by focusing on the behaviour of the steady-state 
number of firms. From equation (3.21), we get 
•• dN 
d1) 
•• •• 
= (-LnP )N ( 3.43) 
19 A survey of the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
concentration and profitability and concentration and market size 
can be found in Schmalensee (1989). 
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•• *. .* 
Clearly, dN >0 
d1) if 
** P <1, dN 
d1) = 0 
*. if P =1 and dN <0 
dT/ 
** if P >1. 
Intuitively, the relationship between the steady-state number of 
firms and the price elasticity of demand can be appreciated by 
considering the reI a tionshi p between the demand for the 
differentiated good as whole (D) and 1). From equation (3.5), we get 
dD 
dT/ 
*. 
= (-LnP )D; hence, dD 
dT/ t 0 if p •• {; 1. 
** It follows that if P <1, an increase in T/ will Increase 
aggregate demand and this will lead, in turn, to an increase in the 
number of firms the market can sustain. Clearly, for a given price 
index, as D increases the market can sustain more varieties. If, 
.* instead, P >1, a ceteris paribus increase In the price elasticity of 
demand T/ will reduce aggregate demand and the number of firms in the 
*. .* industry will fall. Given that {3 (and consequently P ) is 
independent of T/, a change in T/, leading to a change in D, will 
basically correspond to a change in the extent of the market: 
concentration will increase (fall) if f1T/ leads to a fall (increase) 
•• in D, with the sign of f1D depending on whether P is greater or 
smaller than one. This, in turn, will depend on the size of (J" and o. 
The smaller are these parameters, the lower IS the steady-state 
efficiency, and the higher will the pnce index be. Indeed, our 
numerical evaluations suggest that for sufficiently small values of 
the parameters which determine the toughness of price competition, 
•• P >1. Therefore, the relationship between the steady-state number of 
firms and the price elasticity T/ is not monotonic. 
Finally, note that a ceteris paribus increase in A will generate 
an increase in market size. If we define the latter by total sales, 
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Le. P ** D = AP **1-1) it is obvious that as A increases market size 
increases2o . This, in turn, would Increase the number of firms 
sustained by the market, as can be seen from equation (3.21). Hence, 
as market size increases, concentration ceteris paribus falls. 
3.7. THE EVOLUTION OF INDUSTRY 
As discussed in sub -section 3.4.3., a complex entry and exit 
dynamics takes place as the industry moves to its steady-state 
situation. We now try to assess more precisely the nature of this 
evolution by defining an hypothetical "original state" of the 
industry and compare it to the steady-state. To this end, we modify 
the exogenous market structure model of Section 3.3 to incorporate 
the following assumptions. 1) Incumbents' efficiencies are uniformly 
distributed over the whole interval [1-0, 1+01; and 2) marginal firms 
are those whose marginal cost is given by (1+0). In other words, at 
the beginning of the industry's history the efficiency cut-off point 
corresponds to the upper limit of the distribution describing the 
* state of technology, Le. [3 =(1+0). The zero profit condition 
defining the marginal firms will be 
TT(1+o) (3.44) 
where the superscript b IS used to refer to the variables which 
characterize the beginning of the industry. Solving equation (3.44) 
for N b yields 
(3.45 ) 
** **1-1) 
20 Note that 1)=1 implies P D=AP =A. 
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where the price index will be 
1 
~br~(~~l) 1+0 1-<T pb N b J (3~-(J d(3 = 20 
1-0 
1 [ ][-~ <T (1+0/-0' -(1-0/-<T (3.46) = (<T-l) (2-<T) 20 
A potential entrant would find this situation attractive and would 
attempt to enter the industry. In order to see this, let us consider 
the expected profit of entry when the industry structure is described 
by the above equations, that is 
1+0 [ ] E b J (j)A pb(<T-Tl) (31-<T - K V (N ) = - i 
Nb 
1-0 
1 
20 d(3 (3.47 ) 
which, given equations (3.45) and (3.46) yields 
( 3.48) 
which will be positive if 
[
(1+0/-<T - (1+0/-<T u+o)<T-l] >1. It can be 
20 (2-<T) 
shown that this condition always holds for all values of <T and 0 
•• 
within the intervals of interest. Hence, if (3 =1+0 the expected 
profit of entry is positive and there will be an incentive for firms 
to enter the industry. Furthermore, note that the expected value of 
entl'y IS positively related to both <T and 0, hence the tougher is 
price competition the stronger will be the incentive to enter the 
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industry when it is at its initial market structure. 
As a result, the entry and exit process discussed in this 
chapter will set in. Ceteris paribus, entry will reduce incumbents' 
revenue and the marginal firms will be forced to exit with the 
efficiency cut-off point moving leftwards on the distribution. The 
resulting reduction in the industry price index will increase demand 
and - trough it - the expected profit of potential entrants. New 
entry will take place with more efficient entrants displacing less 
efficient (marginal) incumbents. Consistently with this analysis, by 
b •• 
comparing equation (3.46) to equation (3.23) it is clear that P >P 
always holds (see Figure 3.13). Furthermore, from Figure 3.14, where 
•• b 
we have plotted the ratio (N IN) against <5 for several values of (), 
one can see that b •• N <N , with the difference between the two 
increasing in both () and <5. Hence, as the industry evolves towards 
its steady-state market structure the number of firms increases and 
the price index falls. Relative to its original situation, the 
industry steady-state will be characterized by a lower dispersion of 
efficiencies, prices and market shares. These points can be proved by 
comparing V((3i)' V( Pi)' V(Si) from equations (3.31) (3.32) and (3.37) 
to their corresponding values at the beginning of the industry, 
respectively given by 
( 3.49) 
V(p.)= [~] 2 V((3.) 
1 ()-1 I (3.50) 
and 
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1+0 
V(S~) = J[Sb b )2 1 E[Sil 20 d(3 
1-0 
= [~br (2-rY l 20 [(J+Ol-2rY - (J-ol-2rY J - 1 (3.51) [(J+ol-rY - (J-ol-<T r (3-2rY) 
Our numerical evaluations illustrated in Figures 3.15, 3.16, and 
3.17 - suggest that variability of marginal cost, prices and market 
shares is lower in the steady-state than at the beginning of the 
industry. This, together with the fact that the number of firms will 
increase, is reflected by a lower steady-state degree of 
concentration. Using equation (3.51) to determine the Herfindhal' s 
index, we get 
(3.52) 
** H As shown In Figure 3.18 where the ratio is plotted, concentration 
Hb 
is higher in the original situation of the industry. 
The above analysis suggests that there will be a net increase in 
the industry number of firms as a result of the entry and exit 
process; in other words, the entry flow will be larger than that 
represented by the displaced less efficient firms which will be 
forced to exit. 
Finally, given equation (3.45) the expected profit of a firm at 
the beginning of the industry's history (Rb) will be given by 
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(3.53) 
Comparing equation (3.53) with equation (3.27) shows R ** <Rb to hold 
for all values of the relevant parameters (see Figure 3.19). 
Therefore, the evolution of the industry seems to be consistent 
with what is generally supported by the literature, with entry 
reducing (but not eliminating) profits and the steady-state being 
characterized by a larger number of firms. 
3.8. HETEROGENEOUS VERSUS HOMOGENEOUS EQUILIBRIUM 
The aim of this section is to further highlight the implications 
of the assumption of heterogeneous technology by comparing the model 
developed so far to one characterized by homogeneous costs. For 
clarity of exposition the subscripts s (symmetric) and a (asymmetric) 
will henceforth be used to refer to the homogeneous and heterogeneous 
firms industries respectively. 
The industry with homogeneous firms is assumed to be identical 
to the one analyzed in the previous sections in every respect but in 
the hypothesis concerning the marginal cost [3, which is the same for 
all firms, i.e. [3si=[3s for all i. Thus, firms in the two industries 
will face the same demand structure, the same type of technology and 
the same fixed cost K (for which no industry subscript will be used). 
It follows that even in the homogeneous case each firm will 
specialize in the production of one single variety of the 
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differentiated good. 
Hence, the demand function facing a firm i in the symmetric 
industry will be identical to the demand function m (3.6), i.e. 
A (J' - T/ -(J' 
Dsi=ITP s Psi' The profit function of a firm i, for Dsi=Qsi' however 
s 
will be 
(3.54) 
where, because of the hypothesis of identical costs amongst firms, no 
subscript i is attached to the marginal cost f3 s ' Assuming, as before, 
that the choice variable of the firm is price, the first order 
condition for profit maximization will yield the optimal price rule 
-1 
P Si=(J'( (J'-l) f3 s ' Obviously, the absence of cost differences amongst 
firms, together with the absence of asymmetries in demand, IS such 
that Psi=Psj for all j::ti. Moreover, given the definition of price 
index in equation (3.3) the following will hold 
(3.55) 
Hence, given (3.55), the demand function can be written as 
A -T/ 
= IT Ps 
s 
(3.56) 
which implies that all firms face the same equilibrium demand and 
will sell the same quantities. Substituting (3.56) into (3.54) yields 
the equilibrium profit, that is 
ITsl = : f3!-T/( (J'-l) T/-1 (J' -T) - K 
s 
(3.57 ) 
Clearly, no inter-firm differences in profits will exist. Finally, 
entry into the industry will continue until the elimination of 
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supernormal profit occurs. The zero-profit condition can then be 
imposed on equation (3.57) to determine the steady-state number of 
firms for any given (3s' that is 
(3.58) 
Proposition 3.4: As in the heterogeneous firms case, the tougher 
IS price competition the higher is the steady-state 
concentration (i.e. the smaller is the number of firms in the 
industry). 
Note that in this case pnce competition is only determined by 0'. By 
** differentiating N s with respect to 0' we get 
[
y/-l - '!l] 
0'-1 0' (3.59) 
which suggests that for any given value of the marginal cost (35' 
** dNs 
-->0 if and only if y/>O' which we have ruled by plausibility dO' 
** 
assumption. 
dNs It follows that for all O'>y/, ~<o. The elasticity of 
substitution between varieties (0') determines, other things equal, 
the intensity of the competitive pressure on price. If, ceteris 
paribus, 0' increases, and varieties become better substitutes for one 
another, the equilibrium price falls (and with it a firm's market 
power) and the number of brands in the free-entry equilibrium becomes 
smaller, given that the incentive to enter is lower. However, the 
relationship between concentration and efficiency is not the same as 
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In the heterogeneous case. 
Proposition 3.5: When firms produce the differentiated varieties 
with identical costs, an increase in market efficiency mayor 
may not increase market concentration. 
As we saw, in the heterogeneous case industry there exists a positive 
relationship between steady-state efficiency and concentration. When 
firms have homogeneous technologies, given the absence of any other 
source of asymmetry, concentration will be determined solely by the 
** number of firms. By differentiating N s with respect to {3 we obtain 
(3.60) 
** dN s First, note that for 1)=1, d{3s =0. This case IS of particular interest 
because it corresponds to the typical Dixit-Stiglitz model 
specification. The latter is based on a Cobb-Douglas utility function 
which generates a first-stage solution to the consumer's maximization 
problem that consists of a demand function for the differentiated 
good as a whole which is unit elastic with respect to price. Clearly, 
from equation (2.19), (dLnD/dLnP )=-1, and for 1)=1, equation (3.58) 
becomes 
** A -1 
Ns = K (J' ( 3.61) 
which indicates the absence of a link between market efficiency (as 
measured by the marginal cost) and concentration. Instead, the zero-
profit equilibrium number of firms only depends on the total 
expenditure on the good (note that for 1)=1, :i=PD) relative to the 
per-firm fixed cost and on the elasticity of substitution between 
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varieties. 
More generally, for 1]:t:1, a relationship between concentration 
and efficiency will exist, but will not always be consistent with 
that stemming from the heterogeneous firms model. From equation 
(3.60) 
** dNs IS clear that IS positive for 1]<1 and negative for 1]>1. d{3s 
In other words, an Increase in market efficiency (i.e. a fall in (3s) 
i) increases concentration if the demand for the differentiated good 
as a whole is inelastic and ii) reduces concentration if the demand 
for the differentiated good as a whole is elastic. Thus, the 
relationship between efficiency and concentration identified for the 
heterogeneous firms case only holds here for 1]<1. If 1]>1, higher 
efficiency leads to a larger number of firms operating in the 
industry. 
The negative relationship between efficiency and concentration 
found for 1]>1 is not consistent with the empirical regularity which 
often emerges between efficiency (and profits) and concentration21 
Therefore this result for 1]>1 may represent another of the 
(predictive) costs involved in adopting the simplifying assumption of 
identical firms. This is particularly relevant considering that this 
relationship occurs in circumstances (i.e. 1]>1) which are likely to 
be associated with a differentiated product. Whilst this issue 
remains one for a case-by-case empirical assessment, it can 
intuitively be argued that product differentiation is a phenomenon 
more likely to characterize markets for goods whose demand is price 
elastic rather than necessary goods with low price elasticity of 
21 See Schmalensee (1989). 
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demand. 
The origin of the difference of the steady-state 
eff iciency / concentra tion relationship, in the heterogeneous and 
homogeneous firms cases, stems from the fact that whilst in the 
former efficiency is linked to the parameters which determine the 
fierceness of price competition, in the latter it is exogenously 
given. As was previously stressed, the acknowledgment of the 
existence of technical differences amongst firms allows to endogenize 
the efficiency of the surviving firms in steady-state by directly 
relating it to the parameters which determine the toughness of price 
competition. Hence, efficiency is an endogenous product of 
competition between firms. As a result, not only does the toughness 
of price competition affect market structure directly, but also 
indirectly via the efficiency of those firms which manage to survive. 
In the homogeneous model there is no endogenous link between 
efficiency and the toughness of price competition and no endogenous 
determination of the marginal firms' efficiency. 
This analysis strengthens the importance of the hypothesis of 
technical heterogeneity amongst firms whose relevance is clearly not 
merely due to its realism. The fact that in the real world firms are 
different makes this hypothesis valuable per se. However, its full 
relevance lies in its implications for market structure analysis, by 
allowing to endogenize the link between efficiency, toughness of 
price competition and concentration. 
•• 
As a minor point, note that the relationship between N s and the 
price elasticity of the demand for the good as a whole (Tj) is 
analogous to that found in the heterogeneous case. From equation 
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(3.58) we have 
(3.62) 
** 
Clearly, dN s >0 if 0"-1>1 which will hold for O">l_l(3s' Let us assume _ 
dTj (3 sO" 
for simplicity as well as for comparability purposes - that (3s is, as 
** (3a ' smaller than unity. In this case, from equation (3.55), when 
> 1 
0" l-(3s' Ps<l. But, as we saw from equation (3.5), if Ps<l, (dD/dn»O. 
Consistently with what we found in the heterogeneous costs case, if a 
change m Tj leads to an increase m aggregate demand, it will 
generate an increase in the number of firms sustained by the market22 . 
Obviously, there is no reason why P s should be smaller than one. For 
sufficiently large values of (3s and for sufficiently small values of 
0", P s may turn out to be greater than unity. As in the heterogeneous 
cost industry, in this event an increase in n will lead to a fall in 
D and in the number of firms the market can sustain. For any given 
(3s' the larger is 0" and the better substitutes are varieties for one 
*-
another, the lower will be P s and the more likely will D and N s 
increase as Tj rises. 
3.9. HETEROGENEOUS VERSUS HOMOGENEOUS FIRMS: SOME WELFARE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
This section extends the comparison between the homogeneous and 
heterogeneous costs models. Without aiming at an exhaustive analysis, 
22 Note that, even in the homogeneous cost industry, industry price 
(which here corresponds to the firm price) and the marginal cost 
(here exogenously given) are unaffected by n· 
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some of the differences between the welfare implications of the two 
models will be highlighted. Clearly, given the different steady-state 
efficiencies and market structures of the two models, their welfare 
implications will also be different. 
3.9.1. Consumer welfare 
We shall start by comparing the levels of welfare consumers 
achieve in the two hypothetical situations. In this setting, assuming 
that all other things remain equal, two factors affect consumers' 
welfare, namely the industry price index and the number of varieties. 
Assuming that the two industries are characterized by the same 
•• price elasticities 0' and 11, let us begin by examining (3s=(3a as a 
benchmark case. The determination of the relationship between the two 
industries' price levels is straightforward. Notice that if the 
homogeneous firms industry's marginal cost equals the heterogeneous 
firms industry's efficiency cut-off point, the average industry 
efficiency will be higher in the latter (where all but the marginal 
•• firms have (3ai<(3s=(3a ) than in the former. Hence, for all values of (5 
•• 
and 0', P a <P s' As far as the relative number of firms is concerned, 
using equation (3.24) in (3.58), we obtain the ratio 
(3.63) 
which can be shown to be smaller than unity for all values of the 
relevant parameters within the intervals under consideration. The 
number of firms in the homogeneous firms industry is always larger 
than in the heterogeneous one. Hence, when the homogeneous industry 
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is on average less efficient than the heterogeneous one it provides 
the market with a larger number of varieties. Price competition is 
tougher in the heterogeneous industry because the average industry 
efficiency is higher than in the homogeneous one. As a result, given 
the (monotonic) positive relationship between efficiency and 
concentration in the former, the market shows a smaller number of 
firms than in the other industry. 
Hence, whilst consumers are better off in the homogeneous firms 
industry as far as the number of varieties is concerned, the price 
element favours consumers in the heterogeneous industry, where it is 
lower due to the existence of firms with different efficiencies. We 
can now turn to determine the net welfare position of the two sets of 
consumers by looking at their indirect utility function. This will be 
given by 
(3.64) 
where j=a,s. The indirect utility functions in (3.64) are obtained by 
substituting the optimal price for each variety i into the utility 
function in equation (3.1) and writing it m terms of P j (j=a,s), 
** where P a and P s are given by equations (3.23) and (3.55) 
respectively. From (3.64) we obtain the ratio 
1/(0'-1) 
( 3.65) 
which, given (3.63) becomes 
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= (3.66) 
•• •• Considering that P a' P sand (3a are independent of 1/, by 
differentiating (3.66) with respect to 1/ we get 
-1 (CJ"-l) Ln (3.67 ) 
Given that Ps>P:*. a sufficient condition of d [::) Idl»O IS that 
•• 
CJ"(3a (J' •• •• 
---.-.>1 which can be written as (J'-ia >P a' Note that the left-
(CJ"-l)P a 
hand-side of this inequality IS the price of the marginal firms, 
•• hence this condition is always satisfied, P a being an average of 
prices of which those of the marginal firms are the highest. As a 
result, 
Wa 
the ratio increases in 1/. 
Ws 
Furthermore, it IS clear from 
equation (3.66) that : a {~~ for 1/ {~~. Hence, if the demand for the 
s <1 <1 
differentiated product as a whole is price inelastic, the variety 
effect dominates the price effect, which means that consumers are 
better off in the homogeneous industry. Instead, if demand is price 
elastic, the price effect dominates the variety effect which means 
that consumers are better off in the more efficient heterogeneous 
industry. 
For completeness, two other circumstances have been considered. 
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One in which all firms in the homogeneous industry are more efficient 
•• than in the heterogeneous one, Le. (3s<(3a . The other where all firms 
In the former are •• less efficient than in the latter, that is (3s>(3a . 
As an example of these two situations we have looked at the two 
limiting cases where (3s=1-0 and (3s=1+0. 
When (3s=1-0, the ratio in equation (3.66) becomes 
= 
1/(0'-1) (1+0) 2-0'_ (1-0) 2-0' 
(3.68) 
20(2-0' )(1-0/-11 
and when (3s=1+0 the relative welfare measure will be 
= 
1/(0'-1) (1+0) 2-0'_ (1-0) 2-0' 
(3.69) 
20(2-0' )(1+0/-11 
The results of the numerical evaluations we carried out will not be 
illustrated in any detail. We shall limit ourselves to report that -
as one would expect - when the homogeneous industry IS more efficient 
than the heterogeneous one the former yields a higher consumer 
welfare than the latter for all values of the relevant parameters 
intervals. The case described by equation (3.69) is not so clear-cut. 
The outcome can be shown to depend on the size of the price 
elasticities which determine which of the pnce and varieties effects 
on consumers' welfare prevails. 
This section has highlighted that not only does the allowance 
for cost heterogeneity affect market structure, but also consumer 
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welfare. 
3.9.2. Total industry welfare 
Whilst in a homogeneous firm context entry, via the imposition 
of the zero profit condition, leads to the elimination of long-run 
profits this does not happen, as our analysis shows, In the 
heterogeneous technology case whose steady-state is characterized by 
a spectrum of positive profit rates. Hence, any welfare comparison 
between the two industries needs to take the existence of such 
profits into account. In this section, we assess whether the 
persistence of profits generates changes in the welfare results 
obtained with reference to the consumer welfare analysis alone. 
To this end, we proceed to the construction of the following 
total industry welfare function 
W~ 
J 
** = aW j + (l-a)R j (3.70) 
where the superscript .0. indicates "social" welfare23 , ** and R j is the 
expected surplus profit in steady state; O<a<l is the weight given by 
- say - a social planner to the two welfare components24 . The second 
term on the right-hand side· of the equation represents the total 
•• •• 
expected profit of the steady-state industry (R j N j ) "deflated" by 
the industry price index. Hence, it measures the value of the total 
23 Given the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis, in what 
follows social and industry welfare will be used interchangeably. 
24 We use the strong inequality in order to rule out the possibility 
of either producers or consumer welfare being of no value to the 
social planner. 
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industry profits in terms of the amount of the differentiated good 
which this profit can command25 . 
Obviously, given the imposition of the zero profit condition, 
the expected profit in the homogeneous industry steady-state is zero. 
Hence, for the latter, total industry welfare will coincide to 
consumer welfare. Finally, note that as far as the heterogeneous 
industry is concerned, the total welfare measure above suffers from a 
limitation in that it does not take into account the welfare loss 
represented by the entry cost foregone by those firms whose entry 
attempt fails. This is due to the impossibility within this framework 
of determining the number of firms who do not manage to enter 
successfully. However, the consequences of this shortcoming are 
limited by the partial equilibrium nature of the analysis which 
allows one to focus only on the surviving industry. And, by virtue of 
the assumption that non-successful entrants will not re-attempt 
entry, the surviving industry does not bear the economic burden of 
the foregone sunk cost of failed attempts. 
We have computed the ratio 
w.o. 
s 
w.o. 
a 
= 
w.o. 
a for three different values of 
Ws 
ex (=0.5, 0.3, 0.7) so as to allow for different social planner 
preferences. For each of these three systems of social welfare 
•• 
weights, we have analyzed in turn the cases where (3s=(3a' (3s=(1-o) 
and (3s=(1+o). The results are quite intuitive and can thus be 
summarized. 
25 Note that this proxi for producer welfare can be added to the 
indirect utility function Wj in view of the fact that the utility 
function in (3.1) from which the latter is derived can be seen as 
a quantity index. From this it follows that the two welfare 
measures are expressed in the same unit of measurement. 
1) 
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For (3s=(3a' if profits weigh less than consumers' indirect 
utility In the total welfare function (e.g. 0::=0.7), then no 
significant change in the outcome of the consumer welfare 
comparison IS observable by taking profits into account. 
However, for 0::=0.5 (and even more so for 0::=0.3) the interval of 
the parameters within which firms heterogeneity makes consumers 
better off is larger than when profits are not taken into 
account. For instance, for 0=0.90, 
W ~>1 for 1»1 and for all 
Ws 
W-C-
values of 1.5:5.(j:5.5.3, while for 4.5:5.(j:5.5.3, _a >1 for 1)~0.9. 
Ws 
2) The case where (3s=(1+o) is similar in nature to the previous 
one, with the interval of the parameters (1) and 0') within which 
the heterogeneous industry increases welfare being larger once 
profits are taken into account. 
3) For (3s=(1-o), that is when the homogeneous industry is more 
efficient than the heterogeneous one, the inclusion of profits 
in the welfare function is not sufficient to yield W:>W s' 
What our (preliminary) analysis suggests is that - as one would 
expect - the different welfare scenarios we have identified open a 
new direction for research, in particular towards the analysis (which 
is beyond the aim of this work) of a possible government role in 
trying to affect, for instance, the state of technology. Even though 
in the model there are no endogenous circumstances which may lead the 
industry from one state of technology to the other, it is possible to 
envisage a government policy aiming at reducing inter-firm 
differences in efficiency, by reducing the level of heterogeneity 
between firms (0). This analysis suggests that the desirability of 
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such policies at least from the industry welfare point view -
depends on the size of the relevant price elasticities, as well as on 
the marginal cost of the -homogeneous industry relative to the 
heterogeneous industry's average efficiency. 
3.10. A NOTE ON OPTIMUM PRODUCT DIVERSITY 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the most frequently 
discussed issues in the product differentiation literature is whether 
there are two few or too many products in equilibrium with respect to 
the socially optimum number of varieties. In this section we 
highlight some of the implications of the previous analysis for this 
issue although we choose not to pursue an exhaustive treatment of 
this particular subject which lies beyond the aims of this work. 
The main point we intend to make relates to the fact that the 
existence of cost heterogeneity in this model affects the problem of 
optimum product variety. In the standard uniform costs model as new 
products enter the industry, incumbents' profits fall and the 
question then arises as to whether entry stops before or after the 
maximum total surplus is achieved. As was mentioned in the previous 
chapter, there are two conflicting forces at work which affect the 
number of varieties. On the one hand, the existence of fixed costs 
implies that revenue may not be large enough to cover the cost of a 
socially desirable product. This is to say that products, at an 
optimum, may be produced at a loss. Hence, this force may imply that 
the market produces a number of varieties which is too small with 
respect to the socially desirable one. On the other hand, the above-
marginal-cost pricing and the resulting pure profit stimulate entry 
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and thus generate a tendency towards the production of too many 
products. 
The relative strength of these two forces are likely to be 
affected by the existence of heterogeneous costs. Note that in the 
traditional version of the monopolistic competition model entry 
continues until profits are driven to zero. This does not happen in 
our model where, despite the fact that entry does reduce 
profitability, the long-run equilibrium is one where non-marginal 
firms make positive profits. Therefore, the strength of the second 
force mentioned above is bound to be smaller than when entry 
continues until profits are driven to zero. As a result, there is 
less scope for an over-production of varieties than when costs are 
homogeneous. Furthermore, as was highlighted in Section 3.6 where the 
steady-state of the heterogeneous industry was compared to that of 
the homogeneous costs one, there is an endogenously determined link 
between efficiency and concentration In the former which is lacking 
in the latter. This link was identified as being the source of the 
higher concentration of the asymmetric industry. In turn, this means 
that the first force mentioned above - which generates a tendency to 
under-produce varieties with respect to the social optimum - may 
indeed be stronger in this case than in the uniform costs situation. 
To assess these intuitive points, we proceed to carry out the 
following exercise. 
Given the heterogeneous cost technology, let us assume that the 
social planner knows that the steady-state will be characterized by a 
given efficiency cut-off point at which the marginal firms break 
even. Further, let the planner's choice variable be the number of 
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firms (N°) where the superscript "0" stands for optimum. Total 
industry welfare will then be maximized subject to an oligopolistic 
price constraint. More precisely, and similar to Spence (1976) whose 
constraint is given by the monopolistically competitive pricing, the 
constraint here will consists of the price index being equal to the 
one observable •• in the market steady-state (P ). Note that from 
equation (3.23) this amounts to imposing an efficiency constraint on 
. 0·· the social optimum, L.e. (3 =(3 , because the efficiency cut-off point 
in the constraint will be given by equation (3.24). The disadvantage 
of this approach is that the role of prices in determining the 
optimum market equilibrium is ignored. As a result, only the 
optimality of the number of varieties can be assessed. Therefore, the 
solution to this problem will tell us whether the market number of 
varieties is optimal or not, given the equality of prices in the two 
situations being compared. To state it differently, we shall examine 
the case in which the social planner determines the welfare 
maximizing number of firms gIven the (market determined) steady-state 
range of technologies observed in the market. 
The main advantage of this approach is that it allows for full 
and direct comparability between the market structure emerging from 
the working of competition and the optimal one, given the 
indenticality of prices. Thus, the social planner will choose the 
number of firms N to maximize 
we = W + N 
(30 1 f [~A ··CJ-T) l-CJ -P (3.-K ° I N 
1-0 
1 d(3 (3.71) 
•• P ° (3 -1+0 
s.t. 
° •• (3 =(3 
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where (30 is the cut-off point as perceived by the planner, (3.. is 
given by equation (3.24) and W is defined in equation (3.64)26. 
The solution to the above maximization problem is given by 
= [~ 
** 
**TJ-1 P 
]
(0'-1)/(2-0') 
( 0'-1) (3.72) 
where P is given by equation (3.23). By evaluating27 the following 
second order condition 
= 2-0' (0'-1)-1 A P •• _1) (N) [(2-0')/0'-1)]-1 
0'-1 (3.73) 
d 2W .o. 
at N° we find that <0 for 0'>2, but is positive for 0'<2. Hence, 
dN2 
N° is a maximum only for values of 0' greater than 2, which shall be 
assumed in the following analysis. 
Numerical evaluation of equation (3.72) for an illustration 
see Figure 3.20 - shows that, ceteris paribus, the optimal number of 
firms is a monotonically decreasing function of 0' and is increasing 
In o. Note that (dN° /dO' )<0 IS consistent with the relationship 
•• 
observable in the market steady-state where (dN /dO' )<0. This is 
easily explained by considering that as 0' increases the degree of 
substitutability of varieties for one another increases, reflecting a 
lower value attached to variety by consumers. Hence given a lower 
need for variety, the optimal number of varieties is smaller the 
26 For simplicity, we assume that the two welfare components enter the 
social welfare function with the same weight. Hence the absence of 
weights in equation (3.71). 
27 Evaluations have been carried out for 0=(0.01, ... ,0.99), 
0'=(1.5, ... ,11.3, 0'*2) and TJ=(0.4,.",l.3). 
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larger is cr. The relationship between N° and 8, however, is not 
•• 
consistent with (dN /d8)<O. This suggests that, other things equal, 
as (5 increases, the market under-produces varieties with respect to 
what is desirable from the welfare point of view. The positive 
relationship between the optimal number of varieties and the degree 
of technical heterogeneity between firms may perhaps be explained by 
considering that as 8 increases the average industry efficiency 
(which in the social welfare problem is the same as in the market) 
increases and the price index falls. For any given cr, the higher is 
the industry efficiency the higher is the extent of differentiation 
consumers can achieve. 
Proposition 3.6: At the optimum constrained by the heterogeneous 
industry prices 1) there are more products than in the market 
equilibrium and 2) profits are negative. 
Our comparison between the market and the optimal number of firms 
does suggest that the industry under-produces the socially optimal 
** N 
number of varieties. We have computed the ratio and it turns out 
N° 
to be smaller than unity for all values of the relevant parameters 
(see Figure 3.21). In particular, within the intervals we have 
** 
considered, there is no value of 0<8<1 for which 
N 
= 1. This 
implies that contrary to the majority of studies which suggest that 
under Chamberlinian monopolistic competition the market tends to 
overproduce varieties, this analysis suggests that market equilibrium 
is always characterized by a less than optimal number of varieties. 
This is obviously due to the relationship between efficiency and 
concentration we have highlighted ln this study. In fact, the extent 
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of sub-optimality is directly related to the size of 0, with 
[d(N:*:N°}O 
Finally, note that the optimization problem discussed above 
differs from the constrained optimization in the usual sense. In 
general, a constrained or second-best optimum IS one where the 
planner lacks the ability to carry out lump-sum transfers to 
compensate for the losses associated to a firs-best optimum in a 
situation characterized, as this one, by decreasing average costs. 
Clearly, as argued by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), if there are 
increasing returns a first-best optimum may not constitute an 
appropriate strategy given that it would correspond to the equality 
between the individual firm price and its marginal cost; this, In 
turn, would imply that firms make losses28 . Hence, the plausibility of 
this scenario would rest on the ability of the planner to make lump-
sum transfers to firms to cover losses. If this ability is lacking, 
then the planner has' no choice but to maximize social welfare subject 
to a break-even constraint, in which case the social optimum 
represents a second-best solution. However, the efficiency constraint 
imposed above does not ensure that the optimum number of varieties 
can be produced at non-negative profits. Indeed, by evaluating the 
expected surplus profit of equation (3.26) at N° it can be shown that 
E (IT'( N°)) <0 for all values of the relevant parameters29 . 
28 Note that within our framework, where there exists a distribution 
of firms' marginal costs, there would be a dispersion of the size 
of the losses incurred by firms. 
29 An alternative exercise would be to determine the number of firms 
so as to maximize the social welfare function' subject to the 
marginal firms making non-negative profits. This would clearly 
involve greater computational difficulties. 
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3.11. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has analyzed the implications of technical 
heterogeneity amongst firms for the market structure of a 
monopolistically competitive industry. By allowing for efficiency 
differences amongst firms, the model has provided a formal treatment 
of elements contained in Chamberlin's original work. The analysis of 
a horizontally differentiated product market has been carried out 
within a partial equilibrium framework where the dispersion of firms' 
efficiencies within the industry is generated by an exogenously given 
random process. Market structure has been determined endogenously and 
the existence of efficiency gaps and the uncertainty faced by 
potential entrants have been identified as the factors limiting 
rational entry. The analysis suggests that the resulting long-run 
equilibrium is not characterized by the elimination of long-run 
profits, and finds a relationship between concentration and 
profitability which is consistent with empirical findings. It is 
shown that the standard monopolistic competition model based on 
identical firms does not yield this result. 
The steady-state implications of entry have been discussed and 
compared to those stemming from the traditional assumption of 
homogeneous firms. Some comparative welfare analysis of the two 
models has also been carried out. Whether or not the existence of a 
state of technology characterized by a high variability in firms' 
levels of efficiency can lead to a higher consumers' welfare than a 
situation characterized by a higher degree of homogeneity, depends on 
the relative efficiency in the two industries. This implies that, for 
instance, government policies aiming at diffusing technical knowledge 
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and thus leveling out technical differences amongst firms could 
result in an increase in welfare only if the convergence to a common 
efficiency level was achieved through a general increase In 
efficiency. 
Given the increasing use of the monopolistic competition model 
in other areas of economics, with positive as well as normative 
concerns, the relevance of this analysis goes beyond the industrial 
economics literature. In the remainder of this work we shall examine 
the implications of this analysis for international trade. 
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Appendix 3.1 
THE CHOICE OF PRICE INDEX 
The specification of the price index usually adopted in the 
monopolistic competition model in the industrial organization and 
trade literatures is derived from consumer preferences because it is 
dual to a quantity index (D) which is identical to the Dixit-Stiglitz 
utility function given by equation (3.1). 
In this Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (henceforth D-S-K) literature, it 
is argued30 that consumers' love for varieties generates a divergence 
between the physical and the true levels of output, as they are 
perceived by consumers. This divergence results in the choice of a 
quantity index which takes into account the value of diversity. The 
task of representing the basket of goods purchased by the aggregate 
consumption sector so as to take into account the degree of 
diversity of available products - falls on the utility function which 
can serve this purpose by virtue of its separability property. 
The price index which 1S dual to this aggregate demand - or 
basket of goods - is given by equation (2.18). This is can easily be 
proved. By solving the following optimization problem 
N 
\' Di((J-l}/(J Max U = L 
i=l 
i=l 
30 See for instance Krugman (1982). 
( A3.1) 
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where M stands for nominal income, we obtain 
N -1 
Di = M p~(J" L p~-(J" (AJ.2) 
i=1 
Letting M = P D where P is the price index and D is the quantity 
index, and assuming D = U, equation (AJ.2) can be substituted into 
the utility function to yield 
1/(l-(J") 
P = ( AJ.J) 
i=1 
which clearly corresponds to the price index in equation (2.28). The 
D-S-K price and quantity indexes have an important implication. When 
all firms have the same costs, all varieties are sold in the same 
quantity and at the same price, that IS D.=D and P.=P for all 1 1 
i=l, ... ,N. Hence, In the homogeneous firms case, D and P can be 
respectively written as 
( AJ.4) 
A () l/(l-(J") -
P = N P ( AJ.5) 
Clearly, because of the "correction" for the value of product 
diversity, D:1; N D and P :1; P. In other words, the D-S-K quantity 
index does not merely reflect physical output and the price index 
does not merely reflect the level of cost efficiency characterizing 
the industry. Instead, for any given equilibrium price Pi' the 
"perceived" price index would be lower the larger 1S the number of 
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varieties. 
This standard specification of the price index may· be appealing 
in situations where consumers facing a wider choice - say as a result 
of trade - may be induced to change their income allocation across 
different goods. Clearly, not only does the share of expenditure on 
the differentiated good depend on prices and income, but also on the 
utility level that can be achieved from purchasing the good and this 
can be captured by the D-S-K price index. 
In the framework in which we are working in this thesis, 
however, the possibility that consumers may revise their share of 
expenditure on the differentiated good does not arise, because the 
first stage of utility maximization is omitted and an exogenously 
given expenditure function has been assumed. Furthermore, given the 
emphasis m this study on the role of competitive selection in 
determining industry efficiency, and - in the following chapters - on 
the role of trade liberalization in affecting efficiency, we prefer 
to adopt a specification of price index which merely reflects 
technical efficiency without correcting for the value of varieties. 
In other words, we choose a price index which reflects the actual and 
not perceived purchasing power of consumers, as resulting from the 
(endogenously determined) state of efficiency in the industry. 
The price index we choose is given by equation (3.3), that is 
11(1-0') 
( A3.6) 
i=l 
Clearly, equation (A3.6) implies that when Pi=P for all 1, P=P. The 
price index merely reflects the level of cost efficiency of the firms 
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In the industry. It is obvious that this price index is no longer 
dual to the D-S-K quantity index. Note that 
(AJ.7 ) 
In the D-S-K framework, ~ = D = U. Therefore, from equation (AJ.7) it 
p 
follows that 
( AJ.8) 
This clearly implies that D :f::. U, that is 
N 
D = (N) 1I(1-(J) L Di ((J-l)/(J ( AJ.9) 
i=l 
From equation (AJ.9) it is easy to see that when firms are 
homogeneous and D.=D for 1 all i, the quantity index for the 
differentiated industry simply reflects the overall physical output, 
that is D = N D. 
** R 
** (3 
145 
2.5 -r--------------------------. 
2 
1.5 
1 
0.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.4 
I 
___________________________________________ I 
--------r--
) 
-------------------------------------------------J-----
0'=2.3 / 
/ 
-----------------------------------------~------
/' 
/" 
-----------------------------~-----~ 
./ 
0'= 1.5 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.3 Firm's steady-state expected profit 
0'=1.5 
""'" - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~ - - - - - - - -
"" 
'" 
'" 0'=2.5 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~- - - - - - - -
0'=3.5 '\ 
\ 
-------------------------------------------------\----
\ 
\ 
\ 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.65 0.95 
Fig: 3.4 Steady-state efficiency cut-off point 
146 
** 
0.6 T"-------------------__ ----, 
z 
0.5 ------------------------~~2~i---------
CJ=2.9 
0.4 
CJ=3.9 
--
--- ""'-
---
----------------- -7---------------------~-----0.3 
/' "" 
0.2 
p-"/ '\ 
---- - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - ----\-
0.1 --------------------------------------------------
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
<5 
Fig. 3.5 Steady-state number of types of technologies 
0.025 -,-------------------------, 
V((3i) CJ=2. 1 
0.02 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CJ=2.9 
0.015 
0.01 
----- .~ ~ ~ ~ 
~ /' CJ=3.9 ~ 
0.005 .,/ "" - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --~ ~ 
~ ~ 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.15 0.85 0.95 
<5 
Fig. 3.6 Steady-state marginal cost variability 
141 
300000 1-----------------------. 
V(D i ) 
250000 
200000 
150000 
100000 
50000 
------------------------
-----------------------7-------
/ 
--------------------------------------------1----------
/ 
------------------------------------------/-------------
/ 
0'=3.5 0'=3.1 
---------------------------- ___________ f ______________ _ 
/ 
/ 
-----------------------------------1----
0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
Fig. 3.1 Steady-state output variability 
6E~5 ,-----------------------, 
V(Si) 
5E~5 
4E~5 
3E~5 
2E~5 
1E~5 
I 
--------------------------------------------------/----
0'=2.3 / 
------------------------ ________________________ L _____ _ 
I 
/ 
1 
10'=2.1 
------------------------------------------;;----- -----
/ 
- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - -- - --/ - - - - - - --- - - - - - --
--~ / 
---- ----- ---- --------o~~-~~~~~~~~~==~--~~ 
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.8 Steady-state market share variability 
H 
148 
1 ~----------------____________________ ~ 
** N 
** 
0.8 -----------------
----------------- -----------------
0.6 
--------------------------------------------------
0.4 
---------------------------- - - - - -- -- - -------
Fig. 3.9 Steady-state number of firms 
0.06 -.--------------------------, 
0.05 -----------------------------------------------------1-
I 
0.04 I - - ------------- - - ----- ----- ----------- - - -- -- - - - - - - - -~--
I 
0.03 
()=3.1 J 
___________________________________________________ l __ _ 
! 
/ 
0.02 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r- - - - - -
0.01 
~~ 
---
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.10 Steady-state industry concentration 
** 11 
VCIT i ) 
149 
025~------------------______________________ ~ 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
/ 
/ 
----------------------------------
-------------7-----
CJ=l 9 /' 
,/ 
---- ----- --- - - - - - - - - - - ----- - - -- - - - --- -~- - - --
../ 
,/ 
/' 
------------------------~-----
/' 
- - - - - - - - -7- --
/" 
/. 
.,/ 
../ 
/' 
/" 
CJ=1.5 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
o 
Fig. 3.11 Firm's steady-state expected profit margin 
140 
120 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
--------------------------------------------------j- ---
CJ=3.5 f 
------------------------------------------------1------
I 
-----------------------------------------------r a-;-j .-1-
f 
---------------------------------------------r--- -----
J 
I 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -) --
/ 
----------------------------------7 -----
0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 
o 
Fig. 3.12 Steady-state profit variability 
** P 
pb 
150 
1 
0.9 
O.B 
CJ'=5. 1 
0.7 
0.6 
CJ'= 1. 9 
0.5 
0.4 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.13 Industry evolution: The price index 
2 ~--------------------------------------------~ 
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
/ 
-------------------------------------------------!----
CJ'=2.3 / 
/CJ'=2.1 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ----- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~- - - - - - - - - - - -
/'" 
/ 
,/ 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -/- - - - - --
- - - - - - ---- - - - - -/- -
/' 
~ 
/" 
/" 
/'" 
/" 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.14 Industry evolution: The number of firms 
lSl 
0.25 1'"---------------------., 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
~ 
~ 
---------"--
......... 
"-
"-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----~- --
......... 
"-
......... 
---------------------------------~-----
......... 
"" 0-=3. 1 ......... 
"" 
-----------------------------------------------~-
""" 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.1S Industry evolution: Marginal cost variability 
(Steady-state over "origin" variability) 
0.25 ..,--------------------------, 
~ 
~ 
0.2 ---------"--
......... 
"-
"-
0.15 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~- --
......... 
" ......... 
0.1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -~ - - - - -
......... 
" ~ 
0.05 
"" 
-----------------------------------------------~-
0-= 3. 1 """ 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.16 Industry evolution: Price variability 
(Steady-state over "origin" variability) 
152 
0.05 ,---------------------__ --, 
0'=2.3 
0.04 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.17 Industry evolution: Market share variability 
(steady-state over "origin" variability) 
0.5 ..,---------------------------, 
" 
0'=1.9 
0.4 --~---
~ 
~ 
0.3 -----------~------ ---------------------------------
"" 0.2 -----------------~------------ ---------------------
"" """ 0'=4. 3 
'" 
0.1 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- ---~ - - - - -- - - - - --
"'-....,. 
" '-....... 
---- --
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.18 Industry evolution: Industry concentration 
153 
O.B ,---------------------_ 
0.7 ----------------------- ------------------------------
0.6 
0.5 -....::..-------------------
CJ' 2.3 
-------0.4 -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -~ ~ -------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
--
----
--......... ......... CJ'=2.7 
'---..... 
0.3 -----------------------------------------------~------
" 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.19 Industry evolution: Expected profit 
35000 ..,.---------------------------, 
30000 ------------------------------------------------------
25000 ---------------------------------------------------
CJ'=3.9 
20000 -------------------------------------------------------
15000 
CJ'=3.7 
10000 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.95 
(5 
Fig. 3.20 Optimal number of firms 
154 
•• 
025 ~--------------------------------__________ ~ 
N 
0.2 -\, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
~ 0'=6.1 
0.15 
"" 
- - - - - - - - -" - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
0'=5.1 "-
""" "-0.1 - -- - - - - -- -"" ----- - - ---- - -- ----- -- - - - - -- --- - - - - -
"-.... 
'-. 
0'=4. 1 
-.... 
-- - --~ - - - - -- -- - - - - - - - - - - - -
-.... 
0.05 
0.05 0.15 0.25 0.35 0.45 0.55 0.65 0.75 0.65 0.95 
Fig. 3.21 A sub-optimal market solution 
155 
Chapter 4 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY 
"There is no branch of economics in which there is 
a wider gap between orthodox doctrine and actuaL 
probLems than in the theory of internationaL 
trade" 
Joan Robinson, 1973 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Recent developments In the theory of international trade, 
starting with the work of Krugman (l979a, 1980, 1981), Helpman (1981) 
and several others, have provided explanations of the patterns of 
international specialization alternative to those stemming from 
comparative advantage theories of trade, according to which countries 
trade in order to take advantage of their differences~ Models based 
on imperfectly competitive market structures, utility functions that 
reward product diversity and increasing returns to scale technologies 
have established a rationale for the so called intra-industry-trade 
which accounts for a great deal of manufacturing trade, in particular 
amongst industrial economies, 
The body of literature which has emerged In the area is 
extremely vast. Our aim in this chapter is not to provide an 
exhaustive overview of this theory but only to analyze the main 
aspects of those areas which bear significant relevance to the more 
limited aims of this study. Hence, particular attention will be paid 
to the monopolistic competition strand of the theory ,focusing on the 
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part developed within the Chamberlinian framework l . 
One of the main results of the analysis developed in Chapter 3 
IS that allowing for inter-firm cost heterogeneity within the 
standard monopolistic competition model a La Dixit and Stiglitz has 
the implication of endogenizing the steady-state industry efficiency 
level. As was anticipated at the end of that chapter, our intention 
is to extend this framework to an international trade setting on the 
basis of the belief that this will indeed change the standard 
predictions of models of trade set in a monopolistically competitive 
framework. Before doing so, however, it is essential to review the 
predictions of the existing literature. 
In the course of this chapter we shall argue that the current 
literature is based on assumptions which weaken the ability of the 
resulting theoretical models to explain certain aspects of real world 
markets which are evident even on casual observation. 
Three are the main aspects on which the analysis will impinge: 
(I) trade patterns, (2) welfare effects of trade liberalization, and 
(3) the rationalizing effects of free-trade. Furthermore, our account 
of the literature will not be heavily focused on trade policy issues 
which, despite our subsequent analysis of the welfare effects of 
trade liberalization, is not amongst the main aims of this work. 
4.2. TRADITIONAL TRADE THEORY AND UNEXPLAINED FACTS 
The main concerns of the theory of international trade have not 
changed over the years and can be summarized by two related issues. 
1 Excellent surveys of the so called new trade theory are offered by 
Jones and Neary (1984), Helpman (1984b) and, more. recently, Smith 
(1994). 
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First, the determination of the patterns of trade. Second, the 
identificatiDn of the sources of gains brought about by trade and 
their distribution amongst countries. The theory of trade, although 
generating a huge body of literature, has been impressively 
consistent In terms of theoretical construction for over two 
centuries. 
4.2.1. Assumptions and predictions of the "orthodox" theory of trade 
The theoretical framework on which all the now so called 
traditional trade literature has been based is that of perfect 
competi tion. On the supply side, production technologies are 
characterized by constant returns to scale and diminishing marginal 
physical products to factors. Perfect homogeneity of goods is also 
assumed. On the demand side, consumers have homogeneous tastes 
described by identical homothetic utility functions. Hence, within 
each economy, the maximizing behaviour of price-taking agents ensures 
competitive equilibrium and market clearing in both goods and factor 
markets. Finally, no impediment IS assumed to exist to the free 
movement of goods across countries. As far as factors of production 
are concerned, perfect mobility is assumed within countries but they 
are completely immobile internationally. 
This homogeneity of hypotheses has led to homogeneity in the 
answers provided to the two main questions mentioned above. Countries 
trade in order to take advantage of their differences and the 
resulting patterns of international specialization will reflect the 
patterns of comparative advantage. In the Ricardian model, 
comparative advantages take the form of differences in the relative 
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efficiency m production, with countries specializing in those goods 
m whose production they are relatively more efficient. In the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, comparative advantages reflect differences in 
relative factor endowments. A trading country will specialize in the 
commodity whose production is intensive in the factor of which the 
country has a relative abundance. In both types of models, trade is 
explained by the existence of pre-trade differences in relative 
prices generated by either form of comparative advantage and 
generates welfare gains. These gains stem from the more general idea 
that perfect competition promotes an efficient allocation of 
resources by allowing the potential benefits of specialization to 
ripen. In essence, specialization will enable countries to consume 
outside their production sets2 . 
4.2.2. Unexplained facts and new avenues 
\...The Ricardian and the Heckscher-Ohlin models are significantly 
different. For instance, the Ricardian model, by assuming the 
existence of only one factor of production, cannot deal with the 
effects of trade on income distribution between factors. 
Distributional issues can instead be analyzed within the two factor 
Heckscher-Ohlin model where trade has effects on factor prices such 
that overall gains accruing to the country as a whole may be 
associated with real income losses of some groups within the country.) 
Nevertheless, the predictions of these models in terms of patterns of 
specialization and welfare effects of trade are very similar in 
2 For excellent surveys on traditional trade theory see Jones and 
Kenen (1984) and Falvey (1994). 
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nature. 
In particular ,- the explanation of trade by comparative advantage 
implies that trade between countries will be greater the greater are 
the differences between them. As pointed out in Chapter 1, this 
prediction is at odds with most of the evidence from the real world 
which suggests that the greatest bulk of world trade takes place 
between similar countries. Indeed, trade flows seem to be greater the 
more similar are the countries involved. Not only do Western Europe, 
North America and Japan offer location to the largest proportion of 
world economic activity, but their reciprocal trade flows account for 
the majority of world trade. Furthermore, a high proportion of trade 
occurring between industrial countries is intra-industry or two-way 
trade, that is it takes place within the same industry. Clearly, 
traditional trade theory cannot easily deal with these facts because 
it predicts that exports are generated by a comparative advantage and 
imports result from a comparative disadvantage. Intra-industry trade 
would imply the simultaneous existence of both within the same 
industry. 
Major attention to the phenomenon of intra-industry trade was 
stimulated by Verdoorn's (1960) finding that trade between the 
Benelux countries, after the formation of the customs union in 1948, 
took place within rather than between different product groups, thus 
suggesting an intra-industry rather than inter-industry pattern of 
specialization" 
Systematic research on the subject began with the work of Grubel 
and LLoyd (1975). These authors, however, stressed how the existence 
of intI'a-industry trade had been acknowledged before Verdoorn's 
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study. Frankel (1943) found that countries with a high proportion of 
international trade per capita tend to export and import the same 
commodities. His explanation was based on the existence of product 
quality differences between exports and imports. In turn, differences 
in quality were explained by differences in labour skills. Basically, 
Frankel was putting forward what later became known as a vertical 
product differentiation hypothesis as an explanation of trade 
patterns. Hirschman (1945) found that the traditional type of 
international exchange foodstuffs and raw materials against 
manufactures - did not account for more than one third of world trade 
during the years 1925-1937. Instead, about one fifth of world 
transactions was accounted for by manufactures-against-manufactures 
trade. Hirschman interpreted this as evidence of an international 
industrial division of labour. 
Amongst the first reactions to the upsurge of intra-industry 
trade was the attempt to dismiss its relevance as a spurious 
statistical phenomenon. A number of studies such as Finger (1975), 
Lipsey (1976), and Rayment (1976, 1983) suggested that the two-way 
trade was basically a trade overlap. These authors pointed at the 
aggregation level of trade data as the source of the problem. Hence 
the observed intra-industry trade was the outcome of 'categorical 
aggregation' whereby items with differences in factor endowments were 
wrongly included within the same statistical category of products. If 
the proper differences in factor contents were taken into account, 
the validity of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory would be restored. Hence, 
there was no need for new theoretical developments. 
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4.3. NEW ASSUMPTIONS 
More significant and constructive were the attempts to find 
suitable theoretical frameworks to analyze and explain intra-industry 
trade· and the large proportion of trade occurring between similar 
countries. The search for theoretical underpinnings to these 
empirical facts proceeded towards the modification and/or the 
relaxation of the assumptions underlying the traditional theories. 
The main directions of research entailed a different view of 
industries, characterized by increasing rather than constant returns 
to scale, and/or producing heterogeneous rather than homogeneous 
products. Some of the new theories represent a major swing from the 
standard perfectly competitive framework to imperfectly competitive 
ones. 
During the last two decades trade theory has generated a 
proliferation of models. To an extent, as often happens after a path 
breaking development, these have consisted of special extensions of 
few innovative contributions, each based on its own special 
assumptions "seemingLy inconsistent not onLy with traditionaL trade 
theory but with each other" (Helpman and Krugman, 1985 page 1). 
However, during the the last fifteen years our understanding of 
international trade issues has been greatly enriched by a research 
effort which has produced a large range of theoretical developments 
each focusing on different aspects of real world trade. Never before 
had trade theory better responded to the warning of Ohlin (1933) that 
the claim that one specific theory could monopolize the explanation 
of international trade was unsustainable3, 
3 Helpman and Krugman (1985) offer a superb synthesis of this 
variety of models which are treated as special cases of a unified 
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4.3.1. Increasing returns 
~ne of the main theoretical developments stimulated by the 
inability of traditional models to explain some of the main and 
increasingly important features of real world trade has been the 
incorporation of increasing returns to scale into trade theory) The 
fact that increasing returns are a feature of real world industries 
makes this development valuable per se. But its crucial importance is 
that the introduction of scale economies has indeed allowed to solve 
some of the problems of traditional theory in dealing with the 
empirical evidence on international trade. 
The type of increasing returns assumed in the analysis should be 
specified with care because it affects the behaviour of firms, the 
nature of market structure and, through them, the patterns of trade. 
The major distinction is between external and internal economies 
of scale. The rationale behind these two sources of increasing 
returns is different. The former is based on the argument that a 
large industry allows a better exploitation of the advantages of 
conglomeration as well as a better specialization of the production 
units within the industry. In this latter sense, the division of 
labour is limited by the extent of the market. More recently, a 
further justification for external economies of scale has emerged 
which is related to the incomplete appropriability of knowledge. 
Information gained by one firm either through history (experience) or 
intentional innovative activity (e.g. research and development) will 
spill-over and generate a positive externality on other firms in the 
industry and/or in competing countries. Hence, the static external 
framework. 
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effects model can be regarded as a good approximation to more complex 
situations. Instead, scale economies internal to the firm can be 
explained on the basis of specialization advantages internal to the 
organization which emerge in presence of indivisibilities or non-
convexities. 
4.3.1.1. External increasing returns 
Until the late seventies, theoretical attention had mostly been 
confined to external economies of scale. Typically, economies of 
scale external to the firms but internal to the industry can be 
represented by a production function of the form 
Qi = f (v, Q) (4.1) 
where the subscript i denotes a firm in the industry, v is a vector 
of inputs and Q is the industry's level of output. The function f(·) 
is assumed to be quasi -concave and positively linear homogeneous in 
v. As a result, for any individual firm the production process is 
characterized by constant returns to scale, that is fCAv,Q)=Af(v,Q). 
The industry as a whole, however, exhibits increasing returns to 
scale. When all firms have identical production functions and face 
the same factor prices, increasing returns to scale at the industry 
level will exits when the elasticity of the production function f(·) 
with respect to total industry output is positive, that is 
dlogf(· »0 
dlogQ . 
In principle, the term Q in equation (4.1) could represent any 
external influence on the firm's output. In particular, the external 
effect does not need to be limited to national factors, but could be 
international (e.g. the size of the world industry) or inter-industry 
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(e.g. the size of an industry producing intermediate goods used in 
the industry under consideration). The most common assumption in the 
literature is that of national increasing returns, whereby the 
productivity of firms in the industry is positively related to the 
total output produced in the domestic market. 
The great theoretical advantage of assuming economies of scale 
external to the firm is that they are compatible with perfect 
competition. This may indeed explain the popularity of this 
assumption in trade models given its ability to offer plausible 
answers to some of the unexplained facts of trade while remaining 
within the framework of the traditional trade theory. 
4.3.1.2. Internal increasing returns 
Increasing returns to scale are internal to the firm if a small 
proportional increase in all inputs used in production leads to a 
more than proportional Increase in output. Given a quasi -concave 
production function Qi=f(v), increasing returns to scale internal to 
the firm exist if f(Av »Af(v) for A>l. 
Larger firms will plausibly be better at overcommg 
indivisibilities and will thus be more efficient than smaller ones in 
the use of capacity. Given that often there are overhead costs 
independent of the scale of production, unit costs will fall with the 
level of output produced. The relevance of internal scale economies 
for international trade is obvious given the role of the latter m 
expanding the size of the market. 
The crucial feature of economies of scale internal to the firm 
is that they are not compatible with perfect competition because they 
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imply that marginal cost pricing generates losses, hence the need to 
to operate within market structures that allow prices . to be above 
marginal costs. A departure from the perfectly competitive framework 
can occur in different fashions. Depending on other features of the 
industry and on the nature of the product, a variety of market 
structures may emerge, each with different predictive implications as 
to the emerging pattern and effects of international trade. 
4.3.2. Product differentiation 
To a great extent, theoretical explanations of intra-industry 
trade have relied on product differentiation. Idiosyncratic tastes 
imply that there exists in every country demand for a wide spectrum 
of varieties. Under free-trade, consumers will purchase goods 
produced in a foreign country if these are perceived to be different 
from the domestic varieties. As was argued in Chapter 2, preference 
structures which reward product diversity need to be supplemented by 
the existence of economies of scale in order to limit the number of 
varieties produced lil the market. These two factors product 
differentiation and economies of scale will imply monopoly power 
and imperfect competition. Mainly, but not exclusively, this 
literature has been developed within monopolistically competitive 
frameworks. 
4.3.3. Imperfect competition 
Two quite separate bodies of literature can be identified in the 
new trade literature, one based on monopolistic competition and the 
other consisting of oligopolistic markets. The distinction is not 
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merely due to the different nature of the market structures involved, 
but also stems from the role plaid by imperfect competition. It could 
be argued that in monopolistically competitive models, the 
imperfectly competitive market structure is not an aim per se, but 
stems from the need to incorporate internal economies of scale and 
product differentiation. Instead, oligopolistic models in general 
focus directly on imperfect competition as a determinant of trade 
pattern and sometimes - use internal economies of scale as a 
necessary factor to generate the imperfectly competitive market 
structure. Common feature of these models is to show how market 
structure alone can explain trade patterns. 
4.4. THE PERSISTENCE OF PERFECT COMPETITION: EXTERNAL 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE 
Until recently, external economies of scale were the standard 
way to introduce increasing returns into international trade models. 
National increasing returns are the most commonly assumed. The 
cost savings that a firm experiences as a result of the domestic 
output expansion allow to explain trade occurring between identical 
countries, which would not have any incentive to trade according to 
the comparative advantage hypothesis: international specialization 
will result from the advantage of large scale production stemming 
from trade. 
The role of economies of scale in affecting trade patterns has 
long been recognized m the literature. Marshall, (1879) suggested 
that with increasing returns to scale trade may lead to terms of 
trade improvements by expanding a country's demarid for imports. 
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Graham (1923) argued that a country with a sector characterized by 
increasing and one with decreasing returns to scale may lose from 
trade if trade shifts resources from the former to the latter, given 
the ensuing reduction of the output per-man in both industries. The 
first general-equilibrium treatment of increasing returns m 
international trade was probably provided by Lerner (1932). After 
noting that with increasing returns in all sectors the transformation 
curve can be convex to the origin, Lerner concluded that at least one 
country will have an incentive to complete specialization. Ohlin 
(1933) acknowledges that economies of scale may provide an 
explanation for the patterns of trade, In the sense that their mere 
existence may generate international exchange even in the absence of 
other causes. Formally, this was subsequently proved by Matthews 
(1949) and by Melvin (1969). The latter author showed that increasing 
returns to scale external to the firm would provide the basis for 
trade between identical countries4 . 
More recently, Markusen and Melvin (1981) have demonstrated that 
not only can national economies of scale cause international trade, 
but they can also provide a link between trade patterns and relative 
country size. Within a 2x2x2 model in which only one good is produced 
with increasing returns to scale, a well defined relationships 1S 
found between country size, trade pattern and direction, and 
international factor price differences, with the large country 
exporting the good with increasing returns. Ethier (1982a) analyses 
4 Jones (1968) examines the validity of the Rybczynski and Stopler-
Samuelson theorems in the presence of economies and diseconomies 
of scale. This line of research is also pursued by Herberg and 
Kemp (1969), Mayer (1974) and Panagariya (1980), Given the mOI'e 
limited aim of this work, we shall not enter this debate here. 
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the role of national increasing returns within a Ricardian model and 
contradicts Graham's welfare result. There are two countries both 
producing two goods with identical technology and one factor of 
production. One of the two industries exhibits national external 
economies of scale while the other produces with constant returns to 
scale. The country with the larger industry in the increasing returns 
sector is shown to develop a comparative advantage in the increasing 
returns good which will lead to specialization. Indeed, increasing 
returns are the only source of trade. Note, however, that multiple 
equilibria arise in the model, some of which involving an incomplete 
specialization. 
As in Ethier (1982a), In Pangariya (1981) labour is the only 
factor used In the production of two commodities. Here however, one 
good is characterized by increasing and the other by decreasing 
returns to scale external to the firm but internal to the industry. 
In a two country setting Panagariya obtains results - similarly to 
Markusen and Melvin (1981) - which suggest a relationship between 
country size and international specialization. Assuming that both 
economies are characterized by identical tastes and technologies but 
are different in size, the small country will be a net exporter in 
the decreasing returns good and the large country will be a net 
exporter in the increasing returns one. Furthermore, while the former 
mayor may not specialize completely, the latter will never fully 
specialize5 . 
5 Panagariya also examines the case of a small open economy and 
finds that it will never fully specialize in the production of the 
increasing returns good, while this may happen In the good 
characterized by diseconomies of scale. 
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Ethier (1979) criticizes the nationally based external economies 
approach by arguing that in an internationally integrated market a 
firm experiences cost reductions when the world market for its 
products mcreases. In other words, it is the extent of the world 
market which limits the degree and the advantages of 
specialization and not the national one6 . With a model where average 
costs are decreasing in the size of the international market, the 
contrast between inter- and intra-industry trade in intermediate 
manufacturing goods emerges from a wider standard Heckscher-Ohlin 
framework. Each country produces two commodities, manufacturing (M) 
and wheat (W). The only difference between the two countries is in 
the shape of their production possibility frontiers. A concave 
production possibility frontier relates the scale of manufactures (m) 
to the output of wheat, that is m=T(W). The manufacturing good is 
subject to scale economies, the extent of which is given by k=.Mlm. 
Denoting the foreign country's variables with an asterisk, 
k=(m+m* /X-l with ex>l. Clearly, the degree of scale economies is a 
function of the scale of world manufacturing activities (m+m*). As a 
result, the relationship between Wand m follows the standard 
Heckscher-Ohlin production structure and that between M and m 
incorporates the extent of world increasing returns. Ethier argues 
that as the two countries' production possibility curves become more 
similar - say because of a transfer from the capital-abundant country 
to the other - the volume of inter-industry trade will fall and the 
size of the manufacturing sector in the two countries will converge. 
6 Ethier (1979) points out that the only other author recogmzmg 
the role of the world market for firms engaged. in international 
trade is Viner (1937). 
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Also, the volume of intra-industry trade in intermediate goods will 
increase both absolutely and relative to the volume of inter-industry 
trade. This is because a larger industry can support production of a 
wider variety of intermediate inputs at lower costs 7. 
The literature based on external economies of scale has provided 
us with new insights into the causes of trade. Despite the 
indeterminacies which have emerged with respect to the pattern of 
trade, it has had the great merit of showing how "new" elements could 
be reconciled with more traditional hypothesis. In particular, 
increasing returns and factor proportion theory interact In the 
determination of the pattern of trade, given that countries will 
specialize in the industry intensive in that factor in which they are 
abundant. This implies the existence of two potential sources of 
gains from trade. As in the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin framework, 
countries benefit from specialization which enables them to take 
advantage of their differences. In addition to this, the existence of 
scale economies implies that trade with its impact on the scale of 
production, is a source of welfare gains because it allows for a 
reduction of the resources needed to produce the good. 
Finally, note that models based on external economies of scale 
offer an explanation for the geographical conglomeration of 
industries and may therefore have a role in the emergence of the 
recent literature on economic geography8. 
7 A more explicit development of this model is proposed by Ethier 
(l982b) where finished manufactures are costlessly assembled from 
a bundle of all intermediate components. This model however, 
better fits into the monopolistic competition strand of the 
literature. We shall therefore discuss it later in the chapter. 
8 Krugman (1991a) is a seminal contribution in this area. 
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4.5. IMPERFECT COMPETITION MODELS 
The theory of industrial organization has played a crucial role 
in the recent evolution of international trade theory. Two main 
strands of the literature can be identified. One IS fundamentally 
concerned with modelling the role of economies of scale in 
determining trade patterns. In this literature the main focus is not 
on the impact of increasing returns on market structure and the 
latter is dealt with as simply as possible. The second strand of the 
literature has imperfect competition at its core and one of its 
results IS that increasing returns to scale are not necessary to 
generate trade between identical countries. In this section we shall 
concentrate on the second class of models and we shall review the 
monopolistic competition literature in Section 4.6. 
4.5.1. Oligopoly models 
Before discussing the oligopolistic models of trade, it is worth 
mentioning that monopoly has received an earlier attention in trade 
literature. A domestic monopoly facing a competitive world market has 
been introduced by Melvin and Warne (1973) in a general equilibrium 
2x2 model and in a partial equilibrium setting by Fishelson and 
Hillman (1979). Their results are consistent with the wisdom emerging 
from traditional trade theory whereby free-trade has the welfare 
benefit of limiting domestic monopoly power. A significant body of 
literature - which we shall not consider here - has emerged which 
deals with the effects of different trade policy instruments on the 
degree of domestic monopoly power9. 
9 Katrak (1977), Svedberg (1979), De Meza (1979), 
Jones and Takemori (1989) analyze trade policy 
Jones (1987) and 
issues when the 
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In the great majority, oligopolistic models have dealt with non-
cooperative behaviour of firms characterized by monopoly power. 
Typically, these models assume a homogeneous good. Under Cournot 
competition the opening up of trade will generate potential trade 
flows: each firm will become part of a larger and more competitive 
environment. As a result, the perceived elasticity of demand will 
increase and the output decision will change, with larger quantities 
being produced. As industry output expands the price will fall. Note 
that this pro-competitive effect may even occur without any actual 
trade taking place, because it results from the mere possibility of 
trade which changes the slope of the demand curve. The appeal of 
these models lies in their ability to show how industrial structure 
per se can affect trade patterns. As stressed by Krugman "the pro-
competitive effect of trade is not exactly a scale economy story. It 
goes naturally with such a story, however, precisely because 
decreasing costs are the most natural explanations of imperfect 
competition" (Krugman, 1990, p. 85). Indeed, despite its limitations, 
the Cournot approach has identified new explanations of international 
trade distinct from both comparative advantage and economies of 
scale. 
Markusen (1981) distinguishes between the effects of monopoly 
power per se and those of monopoly power cum increasing returns 
within a two industry general equilibrium model where one of the 
sectors is - under free-trade - a duopoly. Assuming a Cournot-Nash 
behaviour, he shows that imperfect competition can per se generate 
foreign producer is a monopoly. See Pomfret (1992) for a recent 
and excellent account of these models. 
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trade. Also, country size turns out to be a determinant of the 
pattern of trade with the large country importing the good produced 
In the oligopolistic sector. If the large country's output of this 
good falls sufficiently as a result of trade, the country experiences 
welfare losses. This result, however, is reversed by the introduction 
of increasing returns to scale. The large country will now have a 
cost advantage in the production of the monopolized good and this 
effect counteracts the country size effect. 
A significant body of literature has shown how imperfectly 
competitive market structures can affect trade through market 
segmentation which generates the incentive to price discriminate. As 
a result, trade may arise simply because imperfectly competitive 
firms attempt to gain incremental sales by "dumping" products in 
export markets, i.e. selling them at less than the domestic price. 
Not only do these models explain trade occurring between identical 
countries, but they also predict the emergence of intra-industry 
trade in identical products. The seminal papers in this literature 
are the duopolistic models developed by Brander (1981) and Brander 
and Krugman (1983). Trade is sustained by the fact that each firm 
perceives its export demand elasticity to be higher than the domestic 
one and consequently will sell In the foreign market at a smaller 
mark-Up. The volume of trade will be determined by the relationship 
between the difference in demand elasticity and transport cost, the 
latter embodying the firm's cost disadvantage in its export market. 
It follows that each firm will capture a larger part of its own 
domestic market than its rival. Note that - due to transport costs -
the marginal cost of actually delivering a unit of output is higher 
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for the export market than for the domestic one. Hence, an important 
implication of the analysis is that firms with differ~nt marginal 
costs can coexist m an imperfectly competitive market for a 
homogeneous product if firms with higher cost, perceiving a larger 
demand elasticity, charge a lower mark-up. Each firm will equate in 
both markets the perceived marginal revenue with marginal cost. This 
will give rise to a two-way trade. The equilibrium market shares are 
those which make exporters just willing to bear the burden of the 
transport cost. Benefits from trade will result if the increase in 
competition outweighs the waste associated with transport costs. If 
firms earn positive profits and transport costs are low, trade is 
welfare improving. The opposite will happen if transport costs are 
high. 
Differences in the degree of seller concentration have also been 
shown to determine the pattern of trade. Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
demonstrate - in a two country model - that the less concentrated 
country will be characterized by a higher industry price index in 
autarky and will therefore import the good under free-trade. However, 
if there are other factors differentiating the two industries, 
patterns of trade may emerge which are not consistent with the 
relative costs of production. In other words, seller concentration 
has an independent effect on trade which may alter the effects of 
comparative costs. Furthermore, market concentration itself is 
affected by trade. In particular, the integrated market will be less 
concentrated than either of the two autarkic industries. This will 
result in an increase in competition which will be a source of 
welfare improvement. Hence, in imperfectly competitive markets, the 
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effects of trade on competition via market structure will be an 
additional source of welfare gains. 
The effects of different trade policy instruments on the 
o ligopo listic market equilibrium are examined by Dixit (1984) within 
a two country model where each country's industry consists of an 
oligopoly where firms form Cournot conjectures. 
Other models have relaxed the hypothesis of an exogenously given 
market structure and consider the case of free-entry. Brander and 
Krugman (1983) extend their analysis to the free-entry case and show 
that firms move down their average cost curve as trade opens up, thus 
generating a source of welfare gain. In general, if firms face no 
impediments in entering a market, free-entry may lead to the 
elimination of profits m the industry. Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
develop a model of contestable markets where firms behave a La 
Bertrand and entry and exit are costlessly unrestricted. Contrary to 
the case analyzed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982), firms are 
assumed to produce only one good. The existence of economies of scale 
internal to the firm ensures that only one firm will produce the good 
and - due to market contestability - will price it at average cost. 
The implication of this for trade is that the good will be produced 
in the country which ensures the minimum price consistent with the 
zero-profit condition. Hence, the pattern of trade and the location 
of productions in the integrated market will be ultimately determined 
by comparative advantage factors. Building on Brander (1981), Brander 
and Spencer (1983) and Dixit (1984), Venables (1985) develops a 
Cournot oligopolistic model where market structure is determined 
endogenously via free-entry. After showing that intra-industry trade 
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in identical commodities will generally emerge, Venables analyses the 
effects of trade on welfare and confirms the welfare improving 
effects of trade found by Brander and Krugman (1983). 
4.6. MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND INTRA-INDUSTRY TRADE 
Product differentiation has become a matter of concern to trade 
theorist since the publication of Chamberlin's (1933) and Robinson's 
(1933) works on monopolistic competition. In the preface of the 
English edition to his book, Haberler (1936) stresses the need to 
extend the theory of international trade to incorporate the message 
of the "two outstanding books" by Chamberlin and Robinson. Some not 
very successful attempts - see for instance Anderson (1936), Beach 
(1936) and Lovasy (1941) - were made to take these insights on 
board, but one had to wait until the late seventies before witnessing 
major progress in this area. 
Product differentiation has long been regarded as a factor 
capable of explaining intra-industry trade. But horizontal product 
differentiation cannot - alone - offer a sufficient explanation for 
this phenomenon lO . A limit to the number of varieties of a 
differentiated good can only exist if there are economies of scale in 
production. Clearly, because of this, product differentiation and 
increasing returns are hardly separable at a theoretical level. As 
stressed by Ethier (1979), however, until recently trade theorists 
could not deal with this link. A breakthrough was allowed by the two 
10 See Hesse (1974), Grubel and Lloyd (1975) and Caves (1981). Note 
that Falvey (1980) proposes a model where vertical product 
differentiation is based on factor content, the latter determining 
the pattern of intra-industry trade, consistent with constant 
returns to scale and perfect competition. 
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path breaking developments in the industrial organization literature 
discussed in Chapter 2. The first is the monopolistic competition 
model by Spence (1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Dixit and 
Norman (1980) offer an early application to trade theory of the love 
for variety approach to product differentiation and discuss its 
implications for trade patterns and welfare. The second is the 
characteristic approach developed by Lancaster (1966, 1971, 1979). 
One of the strong attractions of the monopolistic competition 
literature is its ability to provide answers to the issue of intra-
industry trade in a very simple setting, where strategic interaction 
between firms are negligible and are in fact ruled out in models of 
non-localized competition. Free-entry leads to the elimination of 
equilibrium profits. Price, however, is above marginal cost, due to 
the monopoly power resulting from product differentiation. 
The horizontal product differentiation literature on trade began 
with the seminal work of Krugman (1979a) and Lancaster (1979, 1980). 
In both these models all trade is intra-industry, given the assumed 
one-sector framework. On the demand side, preferences are described 
by utility functions which reward product diversity. On the supply 
side, there are increasing returns to scale internal to the firm, 
with each firm specializing in the production of one of the 
differentiated varieties of the good. The autarkic verSlOn of these 
models relies heavily on the industrial organization literature 
discussed in Chapter 2. Their setting leads to monopolistically 
competitive market structures in the differentiated product 
industries with equilibria characterized by a finite number of 
commodities. 
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Both these models are built within the Chamberlinian framework 
of non-localized competition. Krugman (1979a) uses the representative 
consumer framework based on the Dixit-Stiglitz utility function. 
Lancaster (1979) bases his analysis on the characteristic approach he 
himself developed. In both models firms engage in price competition. 
In Krugman the product space is not specified, while in Lancaster's 
model firms also compete on the choice of variety. 
The crucial implication of these models for trade theory is that 
when different specifications of the good are produced in different 
countries, consumers' love for variety will ensure the emergence of 
intra-industry trade. Indeed, alternative formulations of preferences 
do not significantly affect the results in terms of trade patterns. 
The critical role of the preference structure is to provide brand-
specific demand functions and hence to generate trade. The great 
theoretical appeal of these models lies in their ability to explain 
trade occurring between identical countries, even m the absence of 
market segmentation. This result stems from some - rather strong -
assumptions. In what follows, given the focus of this work, we shall 
concentrate on Krugman's model. 
4.6.1. Krugman's model 
The essence of the autarkic structure of the model proposed by 
Krugman is identical to the Dixit-Stiglitz framework discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
I 
Assume that a horizontally differentiated commodity is produced 
in the economy with labour as the only factor of production. Let L be 
the given number of identical workers/consumers, each earning an 
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income w. Hence, aggregate expenditure will be given by wL. Consumers 
have identical preferences described by a constant elasticity of 
substitution utility function which - as in equation (3.1) - is given 
by 
u (4.2) 
where N is the number of varieties, di is the individual 11 consumer's 
consumption of variety i and (J>1 is the elasticity of substitution 
between varieties . As in Krugman (1980), we assume that (J is 
constant. Note that Krugman (l979a) uses a variable elasticity of 
substitution, with (J decreasing in d i . A variable elasticity has 
different implications for the effects of trade on the overall number 
of varieties available for consumption. We shall r eturn to this point 
later in the analysis. The above utility function will be maximized 
subject to the budget constraint 
(4.3) 
i=l 
where Pi is the price of variety i. The demand function for a variety 
will be given by 
(4.4) 
If we define the price index P as in equation ( 3 .3 ), equation (4.4) 
11 In this example we follow Krugman's notation and le t the 
representative consumer utility function represent individual 
preferences rather than those of the aggregate consumer sector. 
becomes 
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d
1
. = W p-CJ' pCJ'-l 
N i (4.5) 
Given that all consumers are identical, the demand facing each firm 
producing a variety i will be given by 
(4.6) 
The labour used in the production of each variety is a linear 
function of output, that is 
where Qi is the output of good i, lj is the quantity of labour used 
to produce Qi' a>O is a fixed amount of overhead labour and 0>0 is 
the reciprocal of the marginal product of labour. For a given nominal 
wage W, equation (4.7) yields the cost function Gj=wa+woQ j which is 
clearly equivalent to equation (3.9) for wa=K and w o={3. Hence, 
equation (4.7) implies decreasing average costs and constant marginal 
costs and will generate an incentive for each firms to specialize m 
the production of a single variety of the differentiated good. 
As in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz model, firms are assumed to 
have identical costs and to behave non-cooperatively. Furthermore, 
the symmetry of the utility function rules out the existence of 
• localized competition between firms. Assuming equilibrium to hold m 
the market for each variety, we have Dj=Qj. Every producer will 
maximize profits by taking the price of the others as given and 
charge a price which equates marginal revenue to marginal cost. Given 
the homogeneous cost structure of the model, In equilibrium all 
varieties are sold at the same price and in the same quantity. Hence, 
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-1 Pi = P = 0- (0--1) W'1 (4.8) 
and Di=D for all i. Note that the pricing condition in (4.8) is as 
usual independent of output12 . Under free-entry, all super-normal 
profits are eliminated and prices equal average costs. 
The market clearing condition in the labour market, together 
with the symmetry of both quantities produced and production 
technologies, implies that L=NLi' where N is the number of firms in 
the industry. It follows, given equation (4.7) that the equilibrium 
number of firms will be given by 
L N = -----::--
ex. + '1 Ld 
L (4.9) = 
ex. + '1D 
Krugman assumes that the two countries are identical in every 
respect, Le. they have the same size, preferences and technology. 
Their autarkic equilibria will therefore be identical. The wage rate 
will be the same and any two varieties i and J will be sold in the 
same quantity and at the same price regardless of where they are 
produced. The opening up of trade between the two countries has two 
mam implications. On one hand, consumers in both countries will be 
able to choose amongst the overall number of varieties available in 
the free-trade market. On the other hand, producers will face a 
larger market and will be able to sell goods to both sets of 
consumers. Each individual in each of the economies will maximize the 
utility function 
12 In Lancaster's model, the markup function depends on prices and 
the number of brands. 
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(J' /(J'-l) 
(4.10) 
* where (J'>1 is identical in the two countries and N is the number of 
varieties produced in the foreign country. The free-trade demand 
curve facing each firm will be given by 
* * 
* Di = d/L+L ) (wL+w L) -(J' (J'-1 Pi P t 
* 
( 4.1]) 
N+N 
where P t is the free-trade price index given by 
[N:N' 
* 
l/(l-(J') 
N N+N 
P t ( L Pi 1-(J' + L 1-(J') Pi 
i=1 i=N+1 
(4.12) 
Trade will take place because, given the existence of increasing 
returns in production, each variety will be supplied by only one firm 
and only in one country. The direction of trade is not determined, in 
the sense that it is not possible to establish which varieties are 
produced in which country. This stems from the fact that the product 
space is not specified. The volume of trade, however, is determined13 . 
Given the love for variety, all goods produced in the integrated 
market will be purchased. The number of goods/firms in each country 
will be determined, as in autarky, by the labour force operating in 
the country. Given that the output of each variety is now equal to 
13 Lancaster's version of the monopolistic competition model of trade 
shares the indeterminacy of the direction of trade. However, 
because product variety is somewhat structured In the model, 
Lancaster's approach allows to some extent to explore the 
implications of different patterns of specialization. 
183 
• d(L+L ), the number of variety produced in each country will be given 
by 
N L = 
• 
( 4.13) 
ex. + a d (L+L ) 
and 
* • L N = 
• 
(4.14) 
ex. + a d (L+L ) 
Note, however, that gIven that the two countries are assumed to be 
• identical with L=L , the following will hold 
• 
• N = N = 
L L 
= ( 4.15) 
ex. + aD ex. + aD 
that is the two countries will produce an identical number of 
*. * 
varieties. Moreover, given that L=L, w=w and N=N, the demand 
function in (4.11) will become 
(4.16) 
that is all varieties will be produced in the same quantity, 
regardless of their country of OrIgm. Note that in this 
specification of the model - as clearly implied by equation (4.16) -
the level of output produced by each firm is not affected by trade. 
We shall return to this briefly. 
Clearly, if the two countries are perfectly symmetric with L=L· 
the share of imports in each country expenditure will be 112. 
Clearly, this implies that the volume of trade is maximized when the 
trading partners are identical. This result is obviously important 
because it explains one of the stylized facts of real world trade, 
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namely that the volume of trade IS greater the more similar are 
countries. Hence, the prediction of Krugman's model is In sharp 
contrast to those stemming from the orthodox comparative advantage 
framework where trade flows are larger the more different the trading 
countries are. 
4.6.2. Extensions 
A number of authors - using both the Lancaster and the Dixit-
Stiglitz frameworks - have addressed the issue of the coexisting in 
the real world of intra and inter-industry trade. Essentially, this 
has been done by fitting a monopolistically competitive setting m a 
standard factor endowment framework. Krugman (1981) has extended his 
basic model to a multi-sector one. Each economy produces two 
horizontally differentiated goods, with product substitutability 
being assumed to be higher within than across groups. Labour is the 
only factor of production even though it is not homogeneous but 
industry specific. Full factor mobility exists within an industry but 
not across industries and countries. The two countries are identical 
in every respect but for their relative endowments of the two types 
of labour. Both inter and intra-industry trade will emerge. The 
former will reflect differences in factor endowments. The latter will 
be driven by consumers' love for varieties and by the existence of 
economies of scale, which limit the number of varieties produced in 
one country:) Hence, the industrial structure of a country's 
production is determined by factor endowments and each country will 
be a net exporter in those industries in which it has a comparative 
advantage. Given intra-industry specialization, however, each country 
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will also engage In two-way trade, importing some varieties in 
industries In which it is a net exporter. Clearly, the proportion of 
total trade which is intra-industry in nature depends on the 
difference In factor endowments: the higher the degree of similarity 
in factor proportions the larger the share of intra-industry trade. 
This extremely simple model IS consistent with the fact that the 
increasing significance of intra-industry trade has not been 
accompanied by the disappearance of inter-industry trade. These two 
types of international trade are here reconciled by marrying the 
Chamberlinian world to the standard Heckscher-Ohlin framework. 
Helpman (1981) proposes a two-sector model with preferences a La 
Lancaster. Contrary to Krugman (1981), however, Helpman assumes that 
only one industry is subject to increasing returns and produces a 
differentiated commodity, while the other exhibits constant returns 
to scale and produces a homogeneous commodity. Also, two factors of 
productions are used (capital and labour) which are fully mobile 
within each economy. The results of the model are similar to those 
obtained by Krugman. Inter-industry trade results from differences in 
factor endowments and intra-industry trade whose volume is 
maximized when the two countries are of equal size - is genera ted by 
idiosyncratic preferences and increasing returns. Note that in this 
type of models if factor endowment differences are eliminated, all 
trade will be intra-industry. Hence, the more similar are the 
countries the larger will be the proportion of two-way trade l4 . 
The link between comparative advantage theories and increasing 
14 Lawrence and Spiller (1983) develop a model similar to Helpman's 
(1981) but where firms in the monopolistically competitive sector 
face significant fixed costs associated with entry. 
186 
returns cum product differentiation is also used to explain the 
patterns of trade between a technologically advanced physical and 
human capital abundant North and an unskilled labour abundant South. 
Models in this tradition include Markusen (1986) who constructs a 
model which combines monopolistic competition, differences in factor 
endowments and non homothetic demands which incorporates North-South 
differences in per-capita Income. Due to the non-homotheticity 
assumption, different goods have different income elasticities of 
demand and differences in per-capita income become significant in 
explaining the pattern of trade. Hence, the labour abundant South 
turns out to be relatively specialized in the production and - due to 
its lower per-capita income m the consumption of the labour 
intensive commodity which has a lower income elasticity of demand. 
Instead, the capital abundant North specializes in the production of 
the capital intensive differentiated commodity whose income 
elasticity of demand is higher. Grossman and Helpman (1989), within a 
dynamic framework, model the creation of comparative advantage 
through research and development and the evolution of world trade 
over time. In this literature there is a strong link between 
technology and product innovation, the latter often modelled within 
Chamber linian monopolistically competitive frameworks. Krugman 
(1979b) and Dollar (1986) have models of the product cycle where the 
North is characterized by a continuous introduction of new models. In 
Feenstra and Judd (1982) firms in one country develop products and 
sell the knowledge of how to produce them to monopoliS"tically 
competitive firms m another country. Technology transfer of this 
type is also analyzed by Grossman and Helpman (199lc). Findlay and 
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Kierzkowski (1983) develop a model of international trade in human 
capitaP5. Trade in technology had not be properly dealt with in the 
perfectly competitive literature, possibly because investment in 
knowledge can plausibly be modelled as a fixed cost which 
generates increasing returns internal to the firm. An extension to 
this literature has entailed the assumption that the technology 
transfer occurs within firms. Krugman (1980), Helpman (1984) and 
Helpman and Krugman (1985) have all analyzed the role of 
multinational corporations in trade and technology transfer. Wright 
(1993) develops a model where transfer of technology occurs in a 
framework characterized by information asymmetries concerning 
technologies and the cost of operating across national borders. 
Another line of research has analyzed the effects of 
incorporating transport costs. In general the existence of transport 
costs poses significant tractability problems; as a result, they have 
frequently been assumed to be either insignificant or prohibitively 
high with a strict division emerging between tradeables and non-
tradeables industries. An interesting result emerging from this 
literature is that if there are non-tradeable goods produced under 
conditions of increasing returns, there may be an incentive to 
migrate and concentrate industries in large countries16 . Positive but 
not prohibitive transport costs are assumed in Krugman (1980) and in 
Venables (1987) who extends Krugman's model to allow for asymmetries 
15 Within a vertical product differentiation framework, these issues 
are also discussed by Flam and Helpman (1987). 
16 See, for instance, Helpman and Razin (1984). Helpman and Krugman 
(1985) suggest that there may be an incentive to relocate 
consumption rather than production. Clearly, this· type of issues 
have contributed to the recent developments in economic geography. 
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in consumers' tastes. The analysis suggests that countries will tend 
to be net exporters of goods for which they have large relative 
domestic markets. Given the existence of transport costs, in the 
presence of increasing returns production will be located only In one 
place, typically in the larger market from which it will be exported. 
The horizontal differentiation theory of intra-industry trade 
has not been limited to analyzing trade in final products. Ethier 
(1982b) suggests that scale based international trade is likely to be 
more important in intermediate than in final goods, and argues that 
the scope for product differentiation is greatest for specialized 
components and capital goods than for consumption goods. 
Manufacturing output is modeled as a constant elasticity of 
substitution function of the existing varieties of intermediate 
inputs. When the equilibrium is symmetric, all inputs are priced the 
same and output costs decline with the number of varieties of the 
intermediate good. Each variety is produced with increasing internal 
returns to scale and their number IS an endogenously determined 
function of the scale of world manufacturing production. As a result, 
the output of the final good is subject to international economies of 
scale. Ethier shows - in a more formal way than in his previous paper 
(Ethier, 1979) that intra-industry trade is complementary to 
international factor mobility to the extent that the latter reduces 
differences in endowments between countries (and with them the scope 
for inter-industry trade). An important feature of this model is that 
the international nature of economies of scale depends on the 
tradeability of the intermediate differentiated inputs. Models of 
trade of intermediate services are also proposed by Markusen (1988, 
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1989). Recently, Ishikawa (1992) analyses the case in which only the 
intermediate good is subject to increasing returns to scale. 
Finally, the work in the imperfect competition literature has 
also offered new insights into the links between international trade 
and growth, following the breakthrough in the theory of endogenous 
growth. But because this extension goes beyond the scope of this 
study, we shall not review the underlying models here. A unified 
treatment of it is provided by Grossman and Helpman (1991d)17. 
4.7. IMPERFECT COMPETITION: THREATS TO FREE-TRADE 
It is obvious that the developments in trade theory described 
above are rich of significant welfare and normative implications. 
The changing character of trade and the subsequent failure of 
comparative advantage theories to satisfactorily explain it, has led 
to a reconsideration of traditionally accepted arguments about trade 
policy. In the orthodox vision based on perfectly competitive 
markets free-trade and strictly non-interventionist policies are 
the best stance to ensure the exploitation of comparative advantage. 
This view simply reflects the fact that perfect competition - in the 
absence of market distortions ensures the most efficient 
allocations of resources, nationally and internationally. The recent 
theory has highlighted new dimensions to the problem, leading to the 
identification of circumstances In which trade barriers could 
increase national welfare and a case could be made for government 
intervention. 
17 Contributions included Grossman and Helpman (1990a, b, 1991a,c), 
Romer (1990), Young (1991), and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991a,b). 
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The main threats to the free-trade stance have come from the 
external economies of scale and from the so called "strategic trade 
policy" strands of the literature. 
The first argument against the universal desirability of free-
trade is based on the 
characterizing imperf ectly 
persistence 
competitive 
of supernormal 
equilibria. These 
profits 
excess 
profits are due to monopoly power resulting from entry barriers, or -
in a R&D intensive environment - from the application of patent laws. 
Since a country's welfare is enhanced by an increase in its firms' 
profits, a government has an incentive to increase the share of 
international profits held by the domestic firm(s) at the expense of 
the foreign competitor(s). This argument was formally developed in a 
series of articles by Brander and Spencer (1981, 1983, 1984, 1985). 
If there are oligopolistic profits, because - say - barriers to entry 
prevent them from being driven to zero at least temporarily, then 
trade patterns that may give domestic firms a greater share of this 
profit are, from a welfare point of view, superior to others. Brander 
and Spencer argue that government intervention may have a role in 
shifting international profits away from foreign competitors, despite 
the fact that this goal is clearly shared by firms themselves. In 
their basic model, Brander and Spencer examine a duopoly (one 
domestic and one foreign firm) competing on a third-country's market. 
As a result of this simplifying assumption, domestic welfare 
coincides with producer's profit, given that domestic consumption is 
nil. Assuming a Cournot behaviour, the Nash equilibrium will be 
determined by the intersection of the two firms' reaction functions. 
These will be downward sloping, given that the foreign firm's best 
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response to an increase in output by the domestic firm is to reduce 
the quantity produced. It follows that, given that the horne firm's 
profit mcreases as its competitor's output shrinks, the horne country 
would have an incentive to commit itself to produce more than the 
quantity corresponding to the Nash equilibrium. This commitment, 
however, would not be credible given the information that each 
duopolist has about the other, that is given that each firm knows 
that the other has already made its optimal choice. Brander and 
Spencer point out that the government can make this commitment 
credible, for instance by introducing an export subsidy for its 
industry. The subsidy will shift the domestic reaction function 
outwards, that is the horne firm will find it optimal to supply larger 
quantities at every level of foreign output than it would before the 
subsidy. At the new equilibrium the horne industry will hold a larger 
share of the international pool of profits. Hence, the government 
policy has altered the subsequent nature of the game. 
Eaton and Grossman (1986) extend this analysis to consider a 
wider range of oligopolistic interactions and argue that the 
particular policy recommendation put forward by Brander and Spencer 
is model-specific and is not of general validity. For example, if the 
Cournot assumption is replaced with a Bertrand behaviour the optimal 
government policy is not an export subsidy, but an export tax. 
Hence, the effects of government intervention on the horne country's 
profit share depends crucially on the behaviour of oligopolistic 
firms. Dixit (1984) extends the analysis to an oligopoly with more 
than one firm and also examines the effects of relaxing the 
assumption of zero domestic consumption. 
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Dixit and Grossman (1986) point at another weakness in the 
Brander and Spencer contribution, namely its reliance· on partial 
equilibrium. This assumption implies that the subsidized industry can 
expand by drawing resources from other sectors in the economy. As a 
result, interventionist policies may promote a particular sector at 
the expenses of others. Targeting the sector of strategic importance 
and predicting the general equilibrium effects of such a move may 
prove difficult goals given that the amount of information required 
to undertake such a policy may not be available. 
Venables (1985), in an oligopolistic model with endogenous 
market structure, shows that an interventionist policy may be 
desirable even when the profit shifting motive is absent because all 
supernormal profits are eliminated by entry. By increasing the 
profits of domestic firms, an export subsidy induces entry in the 
home industry. The resulting increase In competition reduces the 
domestic price and hence increases consumer welfare. In other words, 
the desirability of government intervention rests on its effects on 
the wedge between price and marginal cost. Note that in Venables 
(1985) firms can price discriminate between domestic and foreign 
markets. Horstman and Markusen (1986) relax this assumption and 
obtain a somewhat opposite result and show that free-entry restores 
the argument against an export subsidy. Trade liberalization allows 
firms to expand output and to move downward along their average cost 
curve. Dixit and Kyle (1985) study the use of trade policy in 
promoting and deterring entry and analyze the possibility of 
reactions of foreign governments. 
The message which emerges from these models is that the 
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desirability of policy intervention depends on industry structure, on 
the strategic behaviour of firms in the industry and· on whether 
markets are segmented or not. Markusen and Venables (1988) attempt to 
provide a unifying framework within which to reconcile the apparently 
conflicting results stemming from this literature and to highlight 
the role played by the different assumptions in determining them18 . 
Krugman (1984) provides another theoretical justification for 
government intervention. In this paper, he points out that protection 
of the domestic market can serve as export promotion. The model is a 
modification of Brander and Krugman (1983), where firms marginal 
costs are assumed to be decreasing in output rather than being 
constant. The effect of protection will then be to allow the domestic 
firm's output to expand at the expense of the foreign firm's output. 
The ensuing reduction m marginal cost will make the domestic firm 
more competitive and its sales will grow in the unprotected foreign 
market. In the same paper, Krugman examines the case of dynamic 
economies of scale arising from R&D and from a learning curve. In 
both cases the nature of the argument is unchanged. 
Clearly, despite their model specific features, the results 
which emerge from the new industrial organization literature cast 
doubt on the validity of the normative prescriptions of orthodox 
trade theories. These arguments, however, have not been sufficient to 
completely undermine the faith in free-trade. And this has not been 
merely because of the criticisms addressed to them by some of the 
contributions mentioned above. In fact the imperfect competition 
18 For a critical appraisal of the strategic trade policy literature 
see Grossman (1986). 
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literature has itself lent further support to free-trade policies. 
4.8. IMPERFECT COMPETITION: NEW ARGUMENTS FOR FREE-TRADE 
The allowance for economies of scale, product differentiation 
and strategic behaviour amongst competitors has led to new arguments 
in favour of trade liberation. 
4.8.1. Product variety and welfare gains 
The threats to free trade discussed above have mainly come from 
oligopolistic models. The emergence of the monopolistically 
competitive theories did not pose a comparable challenge to the 
proposition that trade is welfare improving. On one hand, the 
elimination of long-run profit by entry hinders the profit shifting 
argument for protection. On the other hand, the two main features of 
this model - product differentiation and internal increasing returns 
- add strength to the arguments for free-trade. The latter, while 
increasing the degree of product variety available to consumers, 
allows for specialization in the production of different goods and 
leads to the achievement of increased scale of production. 
International trade allows consumers to operate in the world 
market for each variety and thus enables them to buy goods which are 
not produced domestically. In other words, trade brings about welfare 
gains in the form of an increase in the number of varieties. 
Recall that in the version of Krugman's model discussed in the 
previous section, the free-trade number of varieties amongst which 
consumers can choose ( Nt) is given by 
* Nt = N + N = 
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* L + L 
* a + 7f d (L+L ) 
* 
= 
L + L 
a+7fD (4.17 ) 
which corresponds to the number of goods which would be produced by a 
* single economy whose labour force was equal to (L+L). Nt is always 
larger than the number of varieties produced in autarky by any of the 
two countries. 
The effects of trade on the number of varieties produced in each 
country will be different depending on the nature of the elasticity 
of substitution between varieties. In general, assuming a 
N 
representative consumer utility function of the form U= L u( Di ), the 
i=l 
own price elasticity of demand for each variety can be approximated 
by O"=u' (D)/DiuJ/(D), assuming that the marginal utility of income is 
not affected by changes in individual prices19 . In this case, 0" is a 
decreasing function of Di , in other words, as more varieties become 
available - and consumption for each individual variety falls - the 
demand curve for each product becomes more elastic. Or put 
differently, as the number of varieties increases the different goods 
will become better substitute for one another. Clearly, in the case 
we have analyzed above where the sub-utility is of the form 
u( Di)=D~-l/O" - the elasticity of demand is constant. As is evident 
from equation (4.17), the number of firms operating in each country 
* does not change as a result of free-trade. It follows that Nt=N+N . 
dDi Pi 
19 From the definition of price elasticity of demand, 0"= dP
i 
D
i
' From 
the first order conditions of utility maximization, Pj=u' (D)/A, 
where A is the Lagrangian multiplier and the marginal utility of 
income. Hence, P/Di=u' (Di)/ADi and dD/dPi="A/u" D j from which 
O"=u' (D1)/u"(Dj)D j . 
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Hence, with a constant elasticity of substitution, the opening up of 
trade between two identical economies doubles the number· of varieties 
available to consumers. When the elasticity is variable, as trade 
increases the degree of product variety, consumption of each 
commodity will fall and the elasticity of demand (j will increase. In 
this event, consumers' choice will expand but less than double. In 
both cases, but to different degrees, consumers will be made better 
off by trade, given the widening of the product range. 
Note that this positive welfare effects of trade does not imply 
- given the second best situation - that protection will necessarily 
be welfare reducing. Clearly, when price is above marginal cost, 
trade barriers may still increase national welfare if they shift 
consumption from imported to domestically produced varieties. These 
potential gains will have to be weighed against any reduction in the 
number of varieties available. In the constant elasticity of 
substitution case, for instance, a tariff will not affect the price 
elasticity of demand and hence will not increase the degree of firms' 
monopoly power. Hence the number of available varieties will not be 
affected. Its only effect will be to shift consumption from foreign 
to domestic sources: existing varieties will be consumed in larger 
quantities in the domestic market and in smaller quantities in the 
export one. However, protection would be costly even in this case if 
the tariff was at a prohibitive level, entailing the complete 
elimination of trade2o . 
In analyzing the welfare effects of importing commodities which 
20 These issues are discussed in Gros (1987). The effects of a tariff 
in a monopolistically competitive setting have also been analyzed 
by Flam and Helpman (1987) and by Helpman (1990). 
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compete directly with a domestic monopolistically competitive 
industry, Venables (1987) relaxes the assumption that imported and 
domestic varieties enter the utility function symmetrically, but 
retains symmetry within each group. As a result, the price elasticity 
of demand differs between foreign and domestic varieties. In these 
circumstances, trade may lower welfare if it results in foreign 
varieties with a larger elasticity of demand displacing domestic 
varieties with a lower elasticity. Trade restrictions may then be 
welfare improving because they may result m the provision of 
varieties which - due to their lower elasticity of demand - are more 
socially desirable. 
Lancaster (1984) shows that the degree of product 
differentiation in the home industry and the number of varieties 
available to home consumers are both affected by the existence and 
level of intra-industry trade and by protection. Tariff protection 
may increase product variety because of the imperfect 
substitutability between home and imported goods. A tariff reduces 
the competitiveness of imports and this will shift demand towards 
home products, The resulting increase m the monopoly power of 
domestic firms raises their profits. This, by attracting new entry, 
will result in an increase of the number of domestically produced 
goods. Lancaster (1991) shows that if there is product di versi ty and 
increasing returns to scale. a non-prohibitive tariff may increase 
the welfare of a small open economy by correcting the sub-optimal 
degree of product variety, the latter arising from market failure due 
to economies of scale. 
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4.8.2. The rationalizing effects of free-trade 
At the core of the earlier arguments in favour of trade 
liberalization is the concept of allocative efficiency. Trade is 
beneficial because it allows for resources to be allocated in areas 
where a country has a comparative advantage. Under imperfect 
competition it IS possible to identify other sources of efficiency 
gains. These are commonly referred to as the rationalizing effects of 
trade. 
Two are the main dimensions of trade induced rationalization. 
First, by increasing competitive pressure trade liberalization curbs 
excess market power and hence results in reduced price-cost margins. 
Second, in the presence of increasing returns, trade will result -
given the increase in the extent of the market - In larger production 
scales and in lower average costs. 
Within an oligopolistic framework 21 , the rationalizing effects of 
trade liberalization is discussed in Markusen (1981) who argues that 
decreasing cost firms confronted by foreign competition and allowed -
by trade liberalization - to take advantage of an increase in the 
extent of the market will either increase in size or disappear. Dixit 
and Norman (1980), within a two sector general equilibrium model, 
show that the move to free-trade expands the size of the market and 
is equivalent to an increase in the number of consumers. Although 
economies of scale lead to oligopolistic markets even in the absence 
of barriers to entry, the number of firms which can produce 
profitably in an industry will be larger the larger is the size of 
21 The monopoly power reducing effects of trade have also been 
highlighted within models set in more standard frameworks. See for 
instance, Bhagwati (1965, 1978) and Krueger (1978). 
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the market and, in turn, the smaller will be the monopoly power 
exercised by anyone firm. Assuming perfect symmetry in· costs, Dixit 
and Norman show that as the number of consumers increases the fixed 
cost per capita falls, profits rise and entry into the industry is 
encouraged. In the reciprocal dumping model by Brander (1981) and 
Brander and Krugman (1983), the opening up of trade increases 
competition and leads to a lower price by reducing the monopoly 
distortions. This pro-competitive effect mayor may not prevail over 
the welfare waste associated to transport costs, the final outcome 
depending on the size of the latter. As a result, the sign of the net 
welfare effect is not certain22 . Fung (1992) casts doubt on the 
general validity of the pro-competitive argument. He analyses a 
domestic duopoly where firms interact repeatedly and argues that a 
tariff reduction mayor may not increase competition and thus 
discourage collusive behaviour depending on industry 
characteristics and on the size of tariff reduction. Hence, he 
concludes that free-trade cannot be generally seen as a substitute 
for antitrust policy. 
The rationalizing effects of trade are also discussed m the 
monopolistic competition literature. Note, however, that this source 
of welfare gains is not operational in the constant elasticity of 
substitution model a La Krugman where neither firm scale nor price-
cost margins are affected by market integration. Instead, the pro-
competitive effect of trade takes place in the variable elasticity of 
substitution case. When the elasticity is variable, as trade 
22 See also Helpman and Krugman (1985), Yano (1989), Krishna (1989) 
and Eldor and Levin (1990) for analyses of the effects of trade 
liberalization in the presence of quantitative restrictions. 
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increases the number of available varieties, consumption of each will 
fall and the elasticity of demand (J' will increase. This, however, 
will reduce the price mark-up and the profitability of each firm. As 
a result, a smaller number of firms will survive after trade in each 
country and the scale of production of each variety will increase. In 
this event trade has both welfare effects: it increases the degree of 
product varieties and reduces average costs and equilibrium prices by 
increasing the scale of production of each firm. 
Note that in Lancaster's version of the monopolistic competition 
model, the distance between goods decreases as the number of 
varieties increases. Hence, the proliferation of varieties resulting 
from trade always affects the elasticity of substitution between 
products, even though they are not all equally good substitute for 
each other. As a result, the opening up of trade , with the ensuing 
increase in the number of varieties, rises each firm's price 
elasticity and reduces its monopoly power. Within ea ch country, there 
will be a smaller number of firms each producing a larger quantity 
and selling at a lower price than in autarky. Consumers will gain 
from both the increased production efficiency and the lar ger number 
of av a ilable varieties which reduces the distance between ideal and 
exist ing product specifications. 
Trade liberalization, by increasing competition, ha s also been 
seen a s reducing internal slack in firms. As argued by Horn, Lang and 
Lundgren (1995), however~, this view has r eceived more attention in 
policy discussions than in theoretical trade literature. In a model 
where ownership is separated from control, these authors demonstrate 
that the exposure to international trade, by increaSIng competition, 
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may induce an increase In supply of marginal cost reducing managerial 
effort. This will lead to an increase in the joint surplus of both 
the owner and the manager. 
Thus, In general, the literature which stresses the effects of 
trade on market structure and performance has lent support to the so 
called import discipline hypothesis which suggests that the threat of 
entry by foreign competitors will induce domestic firms to contain 
their price-cost margins23 . Indeed, the role of imports in limiting 
monopoly power has been one of the arguments more often used to 
support trade liberalization policies. The vulnerability to foreign 
competition of U. S. manufacturing industries traditionally dominated 
by American firms (computers, automobiles, consumer electronics, 
etc.) during the last two decades was ascribed by many to the 
insulation from serious foreign competition which domestic firms had 
enjoyed for too long. This argument has motivated a significant body 
of empirical literature which provides - even at the firm level 
evidence of the positive relationship between trade liberalization 
and efficiency. De Melo and Urata (1986) compare price-cost margins 
for Chile for two years before and after trade liberalization (1967 
and 1979) and obtain findings supporting the import-discipline 
hypothesis. Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen (1986) use time series 
cross section data on U.S. manufacturing between 1958 and 1981 and 
find import competition to reduce margins particularly In highly 
concentrated industries. Although to a smaller extent, this result 
was confirmed for concentrated industries by De Rosa and Goldstein 
(1981) who analyzed price changes in manufacturing industries during 
23 See Jaquemin (1982). 
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the period 1973-1976. At the industry level, MacDonald (1994) uses a 
panel of 94 manufacturing industries over four three year periods to 
analyze the effects of import competition on productivity growth. He 
finds evidence that growing international rivalry by imposing 
competitive pressure on firms which were previously isolated 
generates efficiency gains. 
The presumed rationalizing effects of trade have also been 
considered at length in the context of the debate surrounding 
European integration. In addition to the standard gains based on the 
exploitation of competitive advantage, trade liberalization is 
supposed to bring about efficiency gains as a result of increased 
competition. From a theoretical perspective, the elimination of 
barriers to trade following the implementation of the Single European 
Market has been thought to lead to a more competitive environment by 
virtue of the ensuing increase of the number of competitors, and the 
reduction of the market power of domestic firms. The increase in 
competition, in turn, is expected to generate an increase in output. 
This effect, in the presence of economies of scale will lead to a 
static welfare gain as the margIn is reduced between price and 
marginal cost. Furthermore, the expansion of output may entail gains 
from economies of scale also in conjunction with the saving in fixed 
cost if a smaller number of larger firms survive in the industry as a 
result of trade liberalization, given the resulting fall in average 
costs. 
Smith and Venables (1988) carry out a numerical assessment of 
the welfare effects of trade liberalization 1ll the European Community 
based on an imperfectly competitive model with increasing returns to 
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scale. They analyse two distinct cases, one consisting of gradual 
reduction of trade costs and one where firms consider themselves as 
part of wider integrated market. The welfare gains are very small in 
the first case and larger in the second. Other authors have attempted 
to quantify the likely welfare effects of the elimination of trade 
barriers in the European Union. See for instance, Norman (1989, 
1991), Venables (1990), Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1991) and Smith 
(1989)24. Grinols (1993) estimates the magnitude of the welfare 
effects generated by a move towards greater integration with focus on 
the role played by increasing returns. A shift from a customs union 
to a common market is shown to bring about some if not large gains 
when industries characterized by increasing returns are enlarged by 
trade liberalization. It is interesting to stress that m most cases 
these studies seem to suggest that the gams from the Single European 
Market are not very significant. This is clearly at odds with the 
expectations generated by the theoretical literature25 . 
An important feature of the studies mentioned above is that they 
concentrate on the static effects of integration. A substantial 
amount of literature has recently stressed the dynamic productivity 
and growth consequences of trade liberalization. As argued by 
24 Cox and Harris (1985), Wonnacott (1987) and Schott (1988) assess 
the welfare implications of trade liberalization between the 
United States and Canada and highlight the existence of potential 
gains from increased product varieties and/or the exploitation of 
economies of scale. 
25 Note, however, that the majority of these works consist of 
calibrated models and their results are strongly dependent on the 
underlying specific assumptions. Levinsohn (1993) uses econometric 
estimates to test the "import-as-market-discipline" hypothesis for 
five Turkish industries. In all five, the hypothesis was 
supported. 
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Grossman and Helpman (1990), not only do trade policies have a once 
and for all effect on growth but they also affect its long-run rates. 
In particular, trade liberalization may permanently increase growth 
by accelerating the rate of technological change. This effect would 
result from the rise in the returns to innovation generated by the 
expansion of the extent of the market as well as from the more 
advanced technology embodied in intermediate imported inputs. Note, 
however, that the results of this literature do not uncontroversially 
oppose protection. If a country does not have a comparative advantage 
in R&D activities, free-trade may may encourage a pattern of 
international specialization which induces a shift of resources away 
from research sectors. In such cases, protection may foster growth by 
opposing the tendency towards the shrinking of research intensive 
sectors. Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1993) consider the impact of 
integration on long-run growth and show that trade liberalization can 
bring about net welfare gains through an increase in the rate of 
growth even when it does not raise the short-run level of production. 
In this particular paper, contrary to Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), 
integration is assumed to take place between asymmetric countries. 
While in the symmetric case integration is beneficial to the growth 
rates of both countries, when the two economies are characterized by 
asymmetries in either factor endowments or preference structures, 
welfare gains may not be general. In other words integration could 
generate uneven development by lowering the rate of growth of some 
countries26 . 
Krugman and Venables (990) address the issue of the possible 
26 See also Feenstra (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Xie (1992). 
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effects of market integration and geographical asymmetries. Their 
findings suggest that integration may foster industry concentration 
given the incentive to conglomerate stemming from the reduction of 
trade costs. As a result manufacturing production in peripheral 
regions may decline, and this may offset the standard gains from 
integration of imperfectly competitive industries27 . 
It is argued that the increase in competition following market 
integration may result in only the more efficient firms surviving 
while less efficient one are forced out, thus leading to a more 
concentrated industry. The competitive selection effect of market 
integration have been tested by Sleuwaegen and Yamawaki (1988) for 
several European countries. These authors find that seller 
concentration in national markets generally increase as a result of 
trade liberalization28 . 
On the whole, the majority of the theoretical studies in this 
area seems to suggest that trade liberalization has rationalizing 
effects on industries. Attempts to quantify these, however, have 
failed to support them convincingly. 
4.9. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH 
The literature discussed so far 1S extremely vast and has 
explored a great number of lines of research. There are, however, 
some aspects of the current state of the art which are cause of 
27 These issues are further explored in Krugman (1991) and In Krugman 
and Venables (1995). 
28 Concentration of the integrated market 1S also shown to be 
increasingly important in determining the price-cost margin within 
national industries. 
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concerns. 
With respect to the pattern of trade, as argued in Chapter 1, 
the degree of intra-industry trade penetration between similar 
countries is not symmetric as a great deal of the literature seems to 
suggest. This symmetry is a direct consequence of the assumptions 
underlying the standard models. More precisely, symmetry in the 
pattern of trade results from assumptions of homogeneity. 
In general, in models of horizontal product differentiation 
differences across countries, albeit not denied, have a secondary 
role in the explanation of trade patterns. The emphasis is on the 
simiLarity of demand structures and production technologies. This is 
particularly true for models of international trade built within the 
monopolistically competitive framework, where these similarities are 
pushed to the limit by assuming fully identical economies. Imperfect 
competition and product differentiation, however, while explaining 
intra-industry trade, are not sufficient per se to capture the 
different degrees of reciprocal trade penetration which show the 
extent to which specialization still exists amongst industrial 
economies. As illustrated by Porter (1990) production and export of 
certain categories of goods, while not totally concentrated in one 
country, are dominated by it. 
Note that by expressing concern about this assumption one does 
not intend to diminish the innovativeness of those international 
trade models which, based on the symmetry of countries, managed to 
explain how international trade could take place even between 
identical countries. This was clearly a major result, 1D a 
theoretical framework where trade could previoulsy only be justified 
207 
on the basis of country differences. However, it is obvious that the 
assumed symmetry in technologies and demand leads to the predictable 
outcome that the free-trade market is symmetrically shared between 
the trading partners. 
Different degrees of intra-industry trade penetration have 
indeed been obtained in the literature. For instance Krugman (1980) 
by introducing transport costs derives an equilibrium in which firms 
hold different shares in their domestic and foreign markets. Venables 
(1987) also obtains a similar result by allowing for both the 
presence of transport costs and asymmetric preferences where products 
from different countries have different weights in consumers' utility 
functions. In Krugman (1981) different market shares in the 
differentiated good markets stem, within a two-sector-two-factor 
model, from the existence of differences in factor endowments between 
countries29 . 
These asymmetric trade patterns, however, do not stem from 
differences between the two countries' horizontally differentiated 
sectors. In other words, asymmetric shares of intra-industry-trade 
result from factors which are exogenous to the horizontally 
differentiated industry itself. The thesis put forward here is that 
asymmetric market shares may reflect, and hence ought to be explained 
in terms of, differences in the relative strength of countries within 
the industry. 
The asymmetry generating factor we have in mind is technology. 
Of course, technology is only one of the possible ways of removing 
the symmetry hypothesis. The other most obvious one would be to 
29 These issues are also discussed in Helpman and Krugman (1985). 
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assume heterogeneity of firms' demand functions. This is done, for 
example, in Pasco a (1993) m a closed economy framework of 
monopolistic competition. Instead, in Venables (1994), within a model 
with identical technologies and demand functions, heterogeneity takes 
the form of only a subset of the firms' population finding it 
profitable to export, due to the existence of a fixed export cost. 
The focus on technology is motivated by the observation that 
real world industries are indeed characterized by heterogeneity 
amongst competing firms both at the national and international 
levels. Even when employing the same broadly defined technology to 
produce similar products, firms do apply different types of knowledge 
which are embodied m people and organizations m historically 
determined ways which imply that technology is both a firm-specific 
and a country-specific product of past experience. At the national 
level, firms in an industry can be seen as being spread along a ray 
reflecting different levels of technical efficiency and market 
performance. At the international level, the same technological 
factors generate persistent country-specific domains in some 
productions, as reflected by the patterns of international 
specialization (see Dosi, Pavitt and Soete, 1990). 
Also, note that the symmetry hypothesis IS not neutral with 
respect to the gains from trade3o . Models of monopolistic competition 
generally support the view that trade benefits symmetrically all 
partner countries. On one hand, the increased competition leads to a 
rationalization of the industry and generates efficiency gains. On 
30 In a different context, this is evident in the work by Rivera-Batiz 
and Xie (1993). 
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the other hand, in an environment characterized by a taste for 
variety, trade increases consumer welfare via an increase in the 
number of goods available for consumption. 
Hence, in the remaining of this work we propose to analyze the 
role of technological asymmetries amongst firms and countries as a 
determinant of different intra-industry trade performances. We shall 
also investigate the way in which the introduction of such 
asymmetries affects the assessment of the welfare implications of 
trade. 
In order to take account of the fact that in any given industry 
and country marginal cost will probably vary considerably due to 
differences in vintages of physical capital, labour productivity and 
organizational efficiency we shall build on the model developed in 
Chapter 3 which assumes firm-specific costs. In Chapter 5, we shall 
introduce another country into the picture. In order to reflect the 
fact that efficiency differences are also bound to exist between 
countries 
diversity, 
reflecting 
the two 
historical, political, and institutional 
countries's states of technology will be 
characterized by an efficiency gap. The analysis of trade within this 
new framework will be carried out in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 5 
INTER-FIRM AND INTER-COUNTRY EFFICIENCY GAPS: 
A PRE-TRADE ANALYSIS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
" ... the generaL existence of asymmetries between 
firms and between countries in technoLogicaL 
capabiLities, technicaL coefficients and product 
performance ... stems from the very nature of 
technoLogy." 
Dasi, Pavitt and Saete, 1990 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter can be seen as a transitory chapter, m that it 
bridges the analysis and the results of the model of monopolistic 
competition developed in Chapter 3 and the international trade model 
which will be analyzed in Chapter 6. The analysis of the implications 
for market structure of the existence of firm-specific costs is 
extended to an inter-industry, inter-country comparison. The result 
is a comparative statics analysis of the autarkic situations 
preliminary to the opening up of free-trade between two countries 
characterized by similar but not identical technologies. Hence, in 
this sense, this chapter represents a step towards the full 
appreciation of the effects of trade on market structure and welfare. 
More precisely, we compare two industries characterized by a 
monopolistically competitive market structure and producing 
horizontally differentiated goods. As m the model of monopolistic 
competition discussed in Chapter 3, both industries are characterized 
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by firm-specific technology. We shall assume, however, that the two 
countries' states of technology are such that a gap ex,ists between 
the average level of efficiency of the two industries. Both the 
efficiency gaps amongst firms and between countries are fixed, as if 
reflecting an element of historical accident which shapes future 
performances. As before, market structure is determined endogenously 
and the hypothesis of firms' heterogeneity together with the 
uncertainty about the level of efficiency potential entrants will 
obtain, imply that entry does not bring about the elimination of long 
run profit margins. Also, asymmetry in quantities, prices and profits 
is obtained both amongst firms and between countries, with the 
steady-state being character ized by a spectrum of firms' 
efficiencies, profit rates and market shares. 
5.2. THE MODEL 
In this section the partial equilibrium model of monopolistic 
competition developed in Chapter 3 is adapted to outline the features 
of two monopolistically competitive industries characterized by 
different levels of efficiency. The two industries belong to and 
operate in two different countries, without any trade taking place 
between them. The subscripts hand f are used to indicate the 
variables related to the two countries and are meant to signify horne 
and foreign respectively. 
In a sense, the two industries are subsets of the same, more 
broadly defined, industry. What enables us to distinguish between 
them is the geographical element their being located tn two 
different countries - together with the lack of any flow of goods 
212 
and/or factors of production between them. The economic framework in 
which firms belonging to the industries operate is assumed to be very 
similar, but not identical. As stressed in Chapter 4, the trade 
literature generally over simplifies situations of similarity by 
treating them as if the countries involved were indeed identical. 
This simplification, however, is of considerable importance given the 
fact that even countries characterized by similar economic structure 
and degrees of industrialization show significant technological 
differences. Despite the high degrees of knowledge spill-overs 
characterizing an increasingly integrated world economy, technology 
remains to a great extent country-specific, because it stems from 
past experience and is shaped by the cultural and institutional 
environment which is, itself, the product of history. 
It is not amongst the aims of this work to provide an 
analysis of the features of technology. Hence, the source of 
technological differences between countries will not be one of our 
concerns, and we shall only limit ourselves to acknowledging that 
these differences exist. In our model, two countries characterized by 
a very similar level of economIC development and by a relatively 
similar type of industrial structure show technical differences which 
we assume to be the product of a historical accident. 
The partial equilibrium framework within which the monopolistic 
competition model was constructed in Chapter 3 will be retained. 
Therefore, the economic environment in which firms operate will not 
be fully specified. Instead, the following hypotheses are meant to 
capture its main features: 
(1) The two countries will be characterized b\' identical consumer 
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sectors. Hence, no difference whatsoever IS assumed to exist 
between the two countries in either consumer tastes ot' Incomes. 
(2) Firms in the two countries will produce different varieties of 
the same horizontally differentiated good. 
(3) Firms in the two countries will produce the good according to 
the same broadly defined technology. Hence, in both countries 
decreasing average costs will generate an incentive to 
specialize In the production of a single variety of the 
differentiated good. 
(4) The state of technology, however, will only be similar, but not 
identical and an efficiency gap at the industry level will exist 
between the two countries. 
A comment may be worth at this point with respect to the coexistence 
in the model of different industry efficiencies with consumers 
endowed with the same Income. In fact, it would be plausible to 
expect lower Income in countries characterized by lower efficiency. 
However, we are here operating within a partial equilibrium framework 
and efficiency gaps are at the level of an individual industry. The 
situation we are dealing with could be thought of as one in which a 
relative advantage of one country in one industry is compensated in 
some other sector by a relative disadvantage so that, at the 
aggregate level, the overall product (and hence income available to 
consumers) are the same. This point deserves more attention and has 
been left unnoticed in the literature. Behind the strong similarity 
between countries, reflected by say virtually identical per-
capita incomes, which IS used to justify the assumption of 
identicality, lie differences In particular sectors of the economy. 
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These are the source of differences in industrial structure and 
determine directly, and via their industrial structure effects, 
pattern of international trade specialization which cannot be 
predicted by models which disregard these differences. 
5.2.1. The demand side 
Consumers in the two countries are assumed to have identical 
tastes. The representative consumer's preferences are characterized 
by the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) utility function, gIven by equation 
(3.1). The problem of the representative consumer in each country j 
(j=h, f) will then be 
MAX. 
s.t. P j Dj 
Nj 
\' D .. ((J'-1l/(J' 
L J1 
i=l 
Nj 
= L PjiD ji 
i=l 
(5.1) 
where (J'>1 IS, as before, the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties, which is assumed to be the same m both countries. Dji 
and P ji are consumption and price of variety i in country j. N j and 
Dj are the number of existing varieties and the total consumption of 
the differentiated good m country j, and the price index P j is 
defined as follows 
Nj 
1/(l-(J' ) 
P j = 1 L P ji 1-(J' (5.2) N j 
i=l 
As in Chapter 3, it 
-l} is assumed that Dj=AjP j , where Aj IS a positive 
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constant reflecting a scaled measure of nominal Income in country j 
and T)<CJ" is the price elasticity of demand. Also, in order to conform 
to the hypothesis of identical demand sides between the two 
countries, we need A·=A for J all j, i.e. (other things equal) 
nominal income spent on this good is identical in the two countries. 
the 
The solution to the above maximization problem yields the 
following demand function for variety i in country j: 
(5.3) 
5.2.2. Technological differences between countries 
Technology is regarded as the only source of difference between 
countries and amongst firms within each country. The technical 
heterogeneity amongst firms within each country takes the form of 
randomly generated firm-specific marginal costs. The efficiency gap 
between countries is modelled as an exogenously given difference in 
the mean of their marginal cost distributions. 
The total cost function of a representative firm i in country 
j is given by 
(5.4) 
where {3ji is the marginal cost, Qji is the level of output and K is 
the fixed production cost. The falling average costs will generate an 
incentive to specialization and in each country a one-to-one 
correspondence between the number of varieties available for 
consumption and the number of firms in the market will emerge. Firms 
in the two countries have production costs of the· same functional 
form. Furthermore, not only do we assume that the fixed cost is 
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identical amongst firms, but also that there are no differences in 
this respect between countries. The role of these last two 
assumptions is to ensure that the two countries are indeed similar , 
not only in their demand side, but also in their production side 
where they are characterized by the same broadly defined technology. 
However, contrary to the standard literature, the similarity is here 
preserved by allowing for differences in efficiency. 
Within each economy, the state of technology is characterized as 
follows. Each firm is paired with a value of the marginal cost ({3j) 
randomly selected from a continuous uniform distribution, with larger 
values of {3ji signifying lower efficiencies. The efficiency gap 
between the two countries' state of technology is modelled as a 
difference m the mean of their marginal cost distribution. Hence, in 
the home country the {3h distribution is assumed to be defined over 
the interval [1-0, 1+0], with 0<0<1. Note that this is the same 
distribution assumed in Chapter 3. Instead, in the foreign country, 
{3r will be distributed over the interval [1+¢-o, l+¢+oJ where 0<¢<1 
represents the efficiency gap between the two industries. It follows 
that E({3h)=l and E({3r)=l+¢. Clearly, the mean efficiency is higher in 
the home country than in the foreign one. The parameter 0 which 
defines the width of the distribution is assumed to be identical in 
the two cases. 
1 
(1-0) (1+0) 
1+¢ 
(1+¢-0) (1+¢+0) 
Figure 5.1. 
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The two distributions - which are illustrated in Figure 5.1 above _ 
overlap within the interval [1+</>-0, 1+01. Thus, at each point within 
this region firms in the two countries have the same level of 
efficiency. However, firms whose {3hl lies between (1-0) and (1+</>-0) 
are specific of country h and are more efficient than any other firm 
in country f. The opposite holds for those firms in country f whose 
{3fi lies between (1+0) and (1+</>+0), which only exist in that country 
and are less efficient than the least efficient firms in country h. 
As in Chapter 3, given the state of technology characterized by 
cost heterogeneity, the competitive selection process within the two 
countries will result in the endogenous determination of the steady-
state efficiency distribution of firms. 
5.3. DETERMINATION OF THE AUTARKIC STEADY-STATES 
In each country, entry and exit of firms into the industry 
will determine the endogenous market structure. As we have ruled out 
any movement of goods and factors of production between industries, 
entry is a country specific phenomenon. The hypotheses at the basis 
of the entry and exit process are the same as those we discussed in 
Chapter 3 which we briefly summarize here. 
Static expectations about the future structure of the domestic 
market are assumed to characterize the behaviour of incumbents, who 
take the number of firms operating in the industry as given. Given 
the cost function in (5.5) and assuming that Qji=Dji' the profits of 
a firm i in country j are given by 
= P .. D .. - (3 .. D .. - K J1 J1 J1 J1 (5.5) 
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Thus, for any given N j , the first order condition for profit 
maximization gives the usual optimal price rule for a firm i in 
country j 
(J' 
= (J' - 1 (3 ji (5.6) 
Equation (5.6) suggests that - for any given market structure - in 
each country the industry is characterized by an asymmetric 
equilibrium spectrum of prices, quantities, profits and market 
shares, distributed according to the values of (3j associated with 
firms, with lower cost firms having higher profits and larger market 
shares. Moreover, note that the technological asymmetry between the 
two countries implies that not only are there differences between 
equilibrium variables within but also between countries. 
Incumbents will stay in the market as long as their profit is 
non-negative. Using equation (5.6), this "stay In the market" 
condition for each country j is 
= <pA p~-TJ (3 .~-(J' - K ~ ° 
N. J J1 
J 
(5.7) 
(J'-l -(J' * f 
where <p=((J'-l) (J' . For any given Nj=N j , there will be a level 0 
industry's efficiency cut-off point, which determines the minimum 
level of efficiency compatible with non-negative profits for any 
* * the given N j . Those firms whose (3 j=(3 j are defined as marginal firms; 
* remaining firms, whose TTj?O, will have (3{(3j' 
Entry into the industry IS modelled as before. After paying the 
first period's production cost (K), potential entrants will learn the 
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value of their marginal cost {3ji' Therefore K represents a sunk cost 
* only for those firms whose (3l~{3 j' As before, these firms. will not re-
attempt entry. Finally, each potential entrant is assumed to think it 
will not significantly affect market structure a d n , through it, the 
magnitude of the efficiency cut-off point. 
The expected profit from entry in the two countries are 
and 
where V~ J (J=h,f) 
1+0 
V~ = J TIh({3h,N~) f({3h) d{3h 
1-0 
1+</>+0 
Vf = J TI/{3f,N;) f({3f) d{3f 
1+</>-0 
is the expected profit of 
country J defined over the range of (3 j' 
equation (5.7) and f({3 j)=1120 is the density 
variable {3 j' Firms will have an incentive 
(5.8) 
(5.9) 
the potential entrant lil 
* TI/{3yN j ) 1S given by 
function of the random 
to try to enter the 
industry as long as the expected profit from entry is positive, that 
1S VJ>O. 
In each country, as entry takes place the demand for each 
variety will ceteris paribus fall. The resulting reduction in revenue 
will force the marginal firms to exit, hence increasing the average 
efficiency of the industry and lowering the industry pnce index 
(P j ). The fall in P j will raise each firm's demand and induce entry 
through an increase in the expected profit of a potential entrant 
E (V j)' In the free-entry industry equilibrium, market structure no 
longer changes because no firm has an incentive to attempt entry and 
no incumbent is forced to leave the market. Ado·pting the same 
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** ** notation as in Chapter 3, N j and (3 j will be the number of firms and 
the efficiency cut-off point characterizing the steady-state market 
structure. At these values, the expected profit of any potential 
entrant is zero and all marginal firms in steady-state will be making 
zero profits. Hence, in the home country the two conditions defining 
the steady-state are 
1+0 [ 
- K 1 f((3h) d(3h ** gJA p(J'-1) 1-(J' V~( N h ) = J N ** h {3h = 0 
1-0 h 
(5.10) 
and 
** ** gJA (J'-1) **1-(J' TIh( Nh ,(3h ) = Ph {3h - K = 0 
** 
( 5.11) 
Nh 
Similarly, in the foreign country these will be given by 
( 5.12) 
and 
gJA (J'-1) **1-(J' 0 
** P f {3f - K = ( 5.13) 
N f 
Sol ving (5.10) yields the steady-state number of firms operating In 
the home country 
= 
1 
20 2 
1 gJA **(J'-1) 
-K Ph 
- (J' 
(5.14) 
** Substituting (5.14) into (5.11) and solving for {3h gives the steady-
state industry's cut-off-point 
l-(J' 
( 5.15) 
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The corresponding results for the foreign country are 
= 1 1 cpA **O'-l) 
20 2 - 0' If Pf ( 5.16) 
and 
(5.17 ) 
** ** ** Note that in equations (5.14) and (5.16), Ph and P f depend on (3h 
** 
and (3f respectively. In fact, from equation (5.2), the steady-state 
price index for the home country is 
1 
** 1-0' Z-O' _ (l_S:)z-O' 
** 0' (3h u 
P = - --------h 0'-1 .. (2-0') ((3h -1+0) 
Analogously, for the foreign country, 
= 
0' 
0'-1 
**Z-O' Z-O' 1-0' (3f - 0+</>-0) 
** (2-0') ((3f -1-</>+0) 
( 5.18) 
(5.19 ) 
** As shown in Chapter 3, for the home country l-o~(3h <1. Similarly, for 
** the less efficient country 1+</>-o~(3f <1+</> holds for all 0'>1, 0<0<1 and 
* 0<</><0. This suggests that entry will continue as long as £((3 j)~(3 j' 
i.e. potential entrants' expected efficiency must not be lower than 
the minimum efficiency required to be profitable given market 
conditions. 
The next two sections highlight the main features of the foreign 
country's steady-state. Given the tedious algebra involved - as In 
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Chapter 3 - we shall make use of numerical simulation to analyze the 
properties of some of the expressions. The same parameters intervals 
as in Chapter 3 have been considered for 0, 0' and 1/1. Additionally, 
several values of the efficiency gap have been analyzed, i.e. 
</>=(0.01, 0.03, ... , 0.21). 
5.4. COMPETITION, ENDOGENOUS EFFICIENCY AND CONCENTRATION 
For any given values of 0 and 0' the steady-state industry will 
be characterized by a spectrum of efficiencies defined over the 
** ** interval [1-o,{3h] in the home country and [1+cj>-o,{3f ] in the foreign 
country. 
For any given value of the efficiency gap cj>, in both countries 
the steady-state market structure will depend on the parameters 0' and 
o. It can be very easily shown that Propositions 3.1-3.3 in Chapter 3 
hold for the foreign country as well. For the sake of clarity, we 
summarize here the main results of the propositions with emphasis on 
the foreign country's variables. 
(I) Entry and exit into the industry will affect the extent of 
technical asymmetry among firms within each industry, but will 
not eliminate it. As a result, the process of competitive 
selection will neither equalize nor eliminate supernormal 
profits. The expected surplus profit of a surviving firm in the 
foreign country will be given by 
** {3f 
= J ( 5.20) 
1+</>-0 
These are 0=(0.05,,,.,0.95), 0'=(1.1, ... ,6.1) and 
1/=(0.1, ... ,1.5), with 0')1/ being always imposed. 
(2) 
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•• 
where gr({3r)=l/({3r -l-¢+o), and which is positive for all values 
of (J and o. Consequently, O:SM({3n):SM(1+¢-o) - where M({3n) is 
the steady-state profit margin of a firm i In the foreign 
country. 
The minimum efficiency required to survive In steady t t . 
-s a e IS, 
in both countries, positively related to the degree of 
heterogeneity amongst firms and to the elasticity of 
•• •• 
substitution between varieties. Hence, both {3h and {3r are 
decreasing functions of both 0 and (J. Given the role of these 
parameters in determining the toughness of price competition, we 
can conclude that the steady-state efficiency IS higher the 
fiercer is competition. 
(3) The larger is the steady-state efficiency, the higher will be 
the degree of market concentration measured by the Herfindhal's 
index, which for the foreign country will be given by 
( 5.21) 
where Sfi the market share of a firm i In the foreign country 
and 
•• (3r 
V(Sfi)= f [Sfi-E[Sr)) 2 g({3r)d{3r' 
l+¢-O 
Also, the industry 
average profitability will be positively related to the steady-
state degree of concentration and average level of efficiency. 
5.5. EFFICIENCY DISADVANTAGE AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
As stated in Section 5.4., for any given efficiency gap (¢), the 
behaviour of the two countries' steady-state variables is the same. 
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That is, the parameters determining the importance of price 
competition have the same impact on the long-run industry structure 
of the two industries. We now turn to analyze how the existence of an 
efficiency disadvantage affects the foreign country's steady-state. 
Assuming all the other parameters to be given, we shall look at how 
changes in the size of the efficiency gap2 would affect the foreign 
country's long-run equilibrium. 
5.5.1. Steady-state industry efficiency and profitability 
Ceteris paribus, the larger is ¢ the lower will be the mean 
efficiency characterizing the state of technology of the foreign 
industry, i.e. £({3fi)=1+¢ is increasing in ¢. Also, 
Proposition 5.1: The larger is its efficiency disadvantage the 
lower will be the industry's steady-state efficiency and 
profitability. 
** By direct differentiation, (3f is clearly an increasing function of 
¢, i.e the larger is the efficiency gap the lower will be the minimum 
level of efficiency required to survive in steady-state. Furthermore, 
the lower minimum efficiency associated with higher values of ¢ will 
** 
levels, that is 
d?f 
The be reflected in higher industry price -->0 d¢ . 
steady-state efficiency cut-off point and price index have been 
plotted in Figures 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. The expected surplus 
** profit of a survIvmg firm (R f ), given by equation (5.20) has been 
plotted against ¢ in Figure 5.4. For any value of CT and 0, the 
expected profit of a surviving firm is a decreasing function 'of the 
2 Note that, given the shape of the functions involved, economic 
feasibility imposes constraints on the values of ¢ relative to o. 
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size of the efficiency gap. A measure of the expected total industry 
** ** ** profit, defined as Tr =(Nr Rr ), has also been computed. It can be 
** dTr 
shown that ~<o, thus indicating that, whatever is the sign of 
** dNr (j¢' the fall in the expected profit of an individual firm will be 
reflected in the total industry profit. 
Finally, note that ceteris paribus an increase in ¢ lead to a 
steady-state increase in the variability of technologies and prices. 
The former is evident from the variance of steady-state marginal 
costs given by 
** (3r 
V({3fi) = J (3fi g/{3r) d{3r 
1+¢-0 
**3 3 {3r - (1+¢-0) 
= 
** 3 ({3r -1-¢+0) 
2 
** 
(5.22) 
**2 2 (3r - (1+¢-0) 
2 ({3r -1-¢+0) 
Numerical evaluation of equation (5.22) indicates that steady-state 
variability of technology is an increasing function of ¢ for all 
values of 0, () and T) within the intervals of interest (see Figure 
5.5). The variability of prices will be measured by 
** (3r 
J P fi gr({3r) d{3r 
1+¢-0 
(5.23) 
Clearly, V( P fi) 1S a monotonic transformation of V({3fi) and thus its 
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behaviour with respect to comparative static changes in ¢ reflects 
that of the marginal cost variability. So, as the efficiency gap 
suffered by the country increases, due to an exogenous increase in 
the mean of its marginal cost distribution, the steady-state 
dispersion of efficiencies and pnces will also increase. This, 
together with the fall III the marginal firms' efficiency, clearly 
indicates a reduction of the industry's overall efficiency. 
5.5.2. Market concentration 
A slightly more complex and less intuitive behaviour is shown by 
the foreign country's steady-state market structure with respect to 
the magnitude of the efficiency gap. 
Our analysis suggests that an increase In the size of the 
efficiency gap, whilst reducing efficiency, does not always reduce 
industry concentration. In particular, the nature of the effects of 
comparative static changes in ¢ on concentration depends on the 
toughness of price competition and on the size of the price 
elasticity of aggregate demand. 
Proposition 5.2: If price competition 1S sufficiently tough 
ceteris paribus increases in the size of the efficiency gap 
reduce industry concentration. 
Numerical evaluation of the steady-state Herfindhal's index for the 
foreign country, given by equation (5.21), shows that if () and/or (5 
** 
are sufficiently large, 
dHf CI¢<O for all values of n· This IS 
** illustrated in Figure 5.6. Recalling that {3f increases in ¢, this 
results confirms the general relationship between concentration and 
industry efficiency highlighted so far and reflects a positive 
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relationship between number of firms and magnitude of the efficiency 
gap (see Figure 5.7). 
Proposition 5.3.: When price competition is not very tough (i.e. 
for sufficiently small values of (]" and/or 0), increases in the 
size of the efficiency gap will ceteris paribus (I) reduce 
concentration if the price elasticity of demand is sufficiently 
low and (2) increase concentration if the price elasticity of 
aggregate demand is sufficiently large. 
The analysis of the Herfindhal's under conditions of low price 
** ** dHf dH f 
competition shows that --<0 for sufficiently small Y/ and -->0 d¢ d¢ 
otherwise. These results are illustrated in Figures 5.8 and 5.9 
respectively. It can be proved that V(Sfi) is a monotonically 
decreasing function of ¢ for all values of Y/. Clearly, for the second 
part of the proposition to hold, ceteris paribus increases in the 
efficiency gap must lead to a reduction in the number of firms 
sufficient to more than compensate the effects on concentration of 
dV(Sfi) 
d¢ <0. Indeed, although one would expect the number of firms in 
the industry to increase as a result of the lower efficiency 
** dNf 
associated with increasing values of ¢, d¢ becomes negative if -
with (]" and 0 sufficiently low - aggregate demand is sufficiently 
elastic. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate this point 3 . 
** 
3 
dNf Note that d¢ will change sign at lower values of ¢ the larger is 
** dN f 
1). For example, for Y/~1.3, CR)<O for all values of ¢ within the 
interval under consideration. 
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Now, whilst (J and (5 - which determine, for any given ¢, the 
level of the steady-state efficiency and price index -. embody the 
rationalizing nature of price competition and exert a force towards 
concentration, ¢ reduces the strength of this force and limits the 
extent to which competition can rationalize industry. In a sense, ¢ 
can be seen as reducing the level of economic activity at the 
industry level. If price competition is not very tough, the effect of 
** dNr ¢ on industry efficiency dominates. Recall that Ci¢<0 occurs when 
price competition is low and T/ is large: price competition does not 
exert a sufficient pressure towards industry rationalization and 
concentration and efficiency is further reduced by the comparative 
statics increases m ¢. In these circumstances, the fall in the 
number of firms simply reflects a lower level of economic activity 
which the industry generates as a result of which the market can 
simply sustain a smaller number of operating firms. Furthermore note 
that ¢ affects aggregate demand via the industry price index, with 
** 
dD <0. 
** dPr 
Hence, 
dPr given that ~>O, the higher is ¢ the lower will be 
aggregate demand. However, the impact of ¢ on D will be smaller the 
smaller is T/. As a result, the larger is T/ the larger will be the 
reduction in aggregate demand generated by a given increase in ¢ 
through a higher price index. 
It is worth noting that for any given degree of the toughness of 
price competition, the number of firms which the industry can sustain 
will be smaller the lower is aggregate demand4 . Hence, the fall in 
** 4 This can be seen by writing N r in terms of D. It will be clear 
that as D falls the steady-state number of firms also reduces. 
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the number of firms here stems from a fall in efficiency. If the 
extent of price competition is low, because varieties are not close 
substitutes for one another and/or because firms' costs are 
characterized by a high degree of homogeneity, the industry price 
index will be large; In these circumstances a high price elasticity 
of aggregate demand will imply that a small number of firms will be 
sustained by the market. The industry will look concentrated, not as 
a result of a high efficiency but as a result of a low efficiency. 
The market will simply be characterized by a smaller number of 
smaller firms. 
This analysis is confirmed by considering the expected output of 
a firm in steady-state, that is 
** {3f 
** f Y f = (5.24) 
l+¢-o 
Proposition 5.4: The larger IS the efficiency disadvantage the 
country suffers, the lower will be the expected SIze of a 
surviving firm. 
** ** Yf is plotted against ¢ in Figure 5.12. Note that Y f is invariant 
** dYf 
with respect to 1'/ and --<0 holds even for those values of (5 and CJ d¢ 
** dNf for which ~<o. In other words, even when the steady-state number 
of firms falls as ¢ increases, the expected size of the surviving 
firm falls. This confirms the fact that whilst CJ and (5 which 
determine the toughness of price competition do indeed foster 
concentration in the sense of a smaller number of larger firms, the 
increase in ¢ generates a smaller number of smaller firms in a 
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situation characterized by a lower level of economic activity5. 
5.5.3. Some policy implications: A digression 
Although it is not one of the aims of this work to deal with 
issues of industrial policy, it is worth to highlight in passing some 
of the possible policy implications of this analysis. For instance, 
it is possible to envisage situations where a government may want to 
attempt to increase the average industry efficiency by means of 
instruments such as training or research and development subsidies to 
firms. In the present context, this type of intervention could be 
directed to lower the mean of the efficiency distribution, Le. 
reduce the size of ¢. 
Clear ly, changes in the SIze of ¢ have effects on welfare. As 
far as consumers are concerned, there are two channels through which 
the magnitude of the mean of the efficiency distribution (determined 
by ¢) affects welfare, namely the industry price index and the number 
of varieties. From our previous analysis we know that the industry 
price index is monotonically increasing in ¢ which implies that 
consumer welfare is higher the smaller is ¢. As a result, an 
industrial policy aimed at increasing the average efficiency of the 
state of technology (i.e. reducing ¢) is always desirable from a 
welfare point of view given its price reducing effects. However, as 
far as the number of varieties is concerned, we saw that the sign of 
•• dNf 
d¢ 
is not unique but depends on the structural parameters of the 
model. As a result, the net effect on consumer welfare of a reduction 
5 Note that the expected output IS only meant to provide a first 
approximation of firm size. 
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** dNf in </> is definitely positive when ~<o, because both the price and 
number of varieties effects of the increased efficiency on consumer 
.* dNf 
welfare are positive. As we saw, ~<o occurs when price competition 
is not very tough e.g. if, for any given 0, there is a small 
elasticity of substitution between varieties (0') and if aggregate 
demand is price elastic. However, when the parameters of the model 
** dNf 
are such that ~>o, a reduction of </> will have a negative impact on 
welfare via a reduction of the number of varieties available for 
consumption. In this case, the change in net consumer welfare will 
depend on which of the price and number of varieties effects 
prevails. In these circumstances, the determination of the net 
consumer welfare effect of a (policy induced) reduction in </> requires 
the evaluation of the indirect utility function. As in equation 
(3.64), the latter can be obtained by substituting equilibrium demand 
and price into the utility function in (5.1). This will yield 
(5.25) 
which has been numerically evaluated within the usual parameter 
** dNf intervals. When -->0 the reduction in the number of firms brought 
d</> 
about by lower values of </> will more likely be associated with 
increases in consumer welfare the larger are, ceteris paribus, 0' 
and/or o. In other words, it is more likely that the efficiency-led 
price effect on consumer welfare will dominate the variety effect 
when price competition IS tougher. These points are illustrated in 
Figures 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15. As a result, an efficiency increasing 
industrial policy may not lead to consumers being better off if price 
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competition is not sufficiently tough. Clearly, given that 
•• dTf 
--<0 d¢ 
always holds, a reduction of ¢ will increase total industry welfare 
with certainty only if price competition is sufficiently tough. Due 
to its adverse impact on consumer welfare when price competition is 
not very tough, a fall in ¢ may not lead to an overall welfare gain6 . 
5.6. COMPARING THE TWO COUNTRIES STEADY -STATES 
In this section the two industries steady-state market 
structures are compared. The relative autarkic situation of the two 
countries will offer a useful benchmark for the assessment of the 
effects of free-trade carried out in the next chapter. 
5.6.1. Efficiency 
For positive values of the efficiency gap between countries (¢), 
other things being equal, the average industry efficiency of the home 
country will be higher than that of the foreign country. This can be 
verified by comparing the steady-state efficiency cut-off -point In 
the two countries. 
Proposition 5.5: A lower minimum efficiency 1S required to 
survive in steady-state in the country which has the efficiency 
disadvantage than in the more efficient country. 
•• •• For ¢>O, (3h <(3f holds for all values of the other relevant 
parameters and the difference between them is positively related to 
the size of ¢7. The two cut-off points are plotted in Figure 5.16. 
6 Given that this is not an essential issue in this analysis, we do 
not go any further in examining its consequences here. 
•• •• •• 7 Let tJ.=(3h -(3f' Clearly, tJ.=0 if ¢=O. Given that (3h 1S invariant 
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Consistently, the different average efficiency levels are 
reflected in the existence of a price differential between the two 
** ** industries, with Ph <P f' which increases in ¢ and holds for all 
** ** values of the relevant parameters. Ph and Pf are shown in 
Figure 5.17. 
The lower efficiency at the industry level is also reflected in 
a lower economic efficiency at the firm level. The latter can be 
approximated by the extent to which potential economies of scale 
internal to the firm are exploited. Following Helpman and Krugman 
(1985), to measure the degree of scale economies we shall use the 
inverse of the elasticity of cost with respect to output, that is the 
average cost to marginal cost ratio, Le. 8=BLogQIBLogC. Within our 
framework, this elasticity of scale for a firm i in country j will be 
given by 8 ji = 1 + KI{3jiQji' where Qji=Dji is given by equation 
(5.3)8. Given the heterogeneity of firms assumed in this model, the 
inter-country comparison of the degree of exploitation of potential 
economies of scale will be carried out, as usual, with respect to the 
expected steady-state values. For a surviving firm in country j, the 
expected elasticity of scale will be given by 
** (3j 
EC9 j) = f [1 + K/f3j;Dj/N~')) g/f3 j ) df3 j 
a j 
•• 
( 5.26) 
with respect to ¢, and given that d{3f Id¢<o, it follows that 
d/1/d¢>O. Hence, f1>O if ¢>O. 
8 A note of caution is required. Given a production function Q= f(v), 
as pointed out by Hanoch (975), the cost-based index of scale 
economies will correspond to the output-based elasticity, i.e. 
BLogf(Av)IBLogA = BlogQIBlogC(v), at every minimum cost point in 
the input space. However, their change with respect to output will 
only coincide if the production function is homothetic. 
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Proposition 5.6: The scale of production at the firm level is 
more efficient in the country which enjoys a favourable 
efficiency gap. 
We have evaluated the ratio E(8 hi)/E(8fi ) within the usual parameter 
intervals. Our results show that the degree of scale economies is 
always higher m the home than in the foreign country, with 
E(8 hi )<E(8 fi ) for all values of the relevant parameters (see 
Figure 5.18 for an illustration), Hence, due to the foreign country's 
efficiency disadvantage, a surviving firm will reach a smaller scale 
of production than in the home country. 
5.6.2. Concentration 
Despite its higher efficiency, the more efficient industry 1S 
not always characterized by a higher degree of market concentration. 
Instead, the relative degree of market concentration in the two 
countries depends on the toughness of price competition and on the 
price elasticity of aggregate demand. 
Proposition 5.7: If pnce competition is sufficiently tough 
(i.e. for sufficiently large values of (J' and 0), concentration 
is higher in the more efficient country than m the less 
efficient one. 
Proposition 5.8: If the degree of pnce competition is 
sufficiently low, 0) concentration is higher in the more 
efficient country than in the less efficient one for 
sufficiently small values of 1); (2) concentration 1S lower in 
the more efficient country for sufficiently large values of 1). 
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For all values of 0"', 0, 1) and ¢ within the relevant parameter 
intervals, size variability, measured by the variance of market 
shares in terms of value, is larger m the home country than in the 
foreign one. The number of firms, however, behaves in a less 
straightforward fashion. As explained before, when price competition 
is tough, the lower efficiency characterizing the foreign country 
translates into a larger number of firms operating there than in the 
home one. This can be seen from the numerical evaluation of the ratio 
** ** Nh IN f which - for sufficiently large 0'" and/or ° - IS smaller than 
one for all values of ¢ and 1) (see Figure 5.19). As a result, a 
** ** higher concentration in the home country will emerge with Hh >H f for 
** ** all values of ¢ and 1). The ratio Hh >Hf IS plotted in Figure 5.20. 
If, however, price competition is not very tough, the number of 
firms in the home country IS larger than m the foreign one for 
sufficiently large values of the price elasticity of aggregate 
demand. As was argued in the previous section, in these 
circumstances, the effects of a positive ¢ on the number of firms 
outweighs the impact of those parameters which, via price 
competition, embody the rationalizing effects on industry efficiency: 
the market in the foreign country can simply sustain a smaller number 
of varieties, thus accounting - in these circumstances - for a larger 
concentration index in that country. Figures 5.21 and 5.22 illustrate 
these points. 
This line of argument IS supported by our findings of Sub-
section 5.6.1., which show how the expected degree of exploitation of 
scale economies is lower in the foreign than in the home country. 
Consistently, the expected output level of a surviving firm in the 
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home country is always larger than m the foreign one, regardless of 
the relative market structure in the two industries. This can be seen 
by comparing the expected output of a surviving firm in the foreign 
•• 
country Yf in equation (5.24) to that of the home country, that is 
•• (3h 
= f (5.27 ) 
1-0 
•• •• •• 
where gh((3h)=1/((3h -1+0). The ratio (Y h /Y f) can be shown to be 
greater than one for all values of the relevant parameters9. 
To summarize, if price competition is sufficiently low the role 
of the efficiency gap m depressing the level of economic activity 
may dominate the lack of rationalizing effects of price competition 
on market structure and limit the number of firms sustainable by the 
market. In other words, if there is a ceteris paribus reduction of 
price competition (i.e. (J and/or 0 fall) both countries will 
experience a fall m the steady-state industry efficiency and this 
will result in a reduced pressure towards market concentration. In 
the home country, this pressure will always take the form of an 
increase in the number of firms. A larger number of smaller firms 
will surVive. In the foreign country, the reduction of concentration 
may occur in a different fashion, with a smaller number of smaller 
firms surviving in steady-state. If efficiency m the industry falls 
to sufficiently low levels, due to the joint action of a low price 
competition and of an efficiency disadvantage, the industry will be 
9 This relationship is unaltered when looking at the expected 
•• •• • ••• 
outputs at the industry level, (Nh Yh ) and (N f Yf ). Hence, the 
volume of goods produced in the more efficient industry is always 
larger than in the less efficient one, even when a larger number 
of varieties is produced in the latter. 
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able to sustain a smaller number of firms than in the more efficient 
country. In these circumstances, whilst the home country experiences 
an Increase in the number of firms, the foreign country will witness 
a reduction of the number of surviving firms. 
5.6.3. Profitability 
Clear ly, the lower efficiency and the resulting higher price 
index of the foreign country will have a negative impact on aggregate 
demand. The extent of this effect is directly related to the size of 
the price elasticity of demand (1}). As a result, the smaller is 1}, 
the smaller will be the depressing effect on relative market 
structure of a the higher price index. 
Proposition 5.9: The more efficient country is characterized by 
a higher steady-state profitability. 
Equations (3.26) and (5.20) have been evaluated for the usual 
** ** parameter intervals and indicate that Rh >Rf always holds. The 
higher profitability of the more efficient country is confirmed at 
the aggregate level. As a proxi for total industry profitability we 
have used the measure Regardless of whether 
** ** Nh is greater or smaller than N f' total industry profits are always 
larger in the more efficient country, with the gap increasing In ¢, 
indicating that the difference in the expected profit more than 
** -* compensates for the difference in the number of firms when Nh < N f . 
5.7. AN INTER-COUNTRY WELFARE COMPARISON 
The impact of the existence of the efficiency gap (¢) between 
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countries on their relative efficiency, market structures and 
profitabilities will clearly be a source of welfare differences as 
well. In particular, given its efficiency advantage over the foreign 
country, the home country will enjoy a relatively higher purchasing 
power of any given income. However, as we saw before, there are 
circumstances in which the latter is characterized by a larger number 
of surviving firms and hence offers a wider choice to consumers whose 
utility function rewards product variety. It follows that it is 
difficult, a priori, to establish which one of the variety and price 
effects prevails and under which circumstances this occurs. To 
analyze this the two countries' indirect utility functions, have been 
employed. These are determined by substituting the respective 
equilibrium demands and prices of the two industries into the common 
.-utility function in (5.1) and writing it in terms of P j (j=h,f )10. We 
have numerically analyzed the ratio 
--
T/ 
--
1I(<J-1l 
Wh Pf Nh 
= W f 
-- --Ph N f 
(5.28) 
for the usual parameters intervals. 
Proposition S.10: For sufficiently low levels of price 
competition and for sufficiently small values of the price 
elasticity of demand T/ consumers in the more efficient country 
are worse off than in the less efficient one. 
Our results show that in the majority of cases the higher efficiency 
of the home country generates a higher consumer welfare than in the 
10 See equation (3.64) in Chapter 3 for details. 
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foreign one. However, when the price elasticity of aggregate demand 
and the elasticity of substitution between varieties are sufficiently 
small foreign consumers are better off. The ratio in equation (5.28) 
is plotted for a high and for a low level of price competition 
(determined by the magnitUde of <5 and 0') In Figures 5.24 and 5.25 
•• •• respectively. From Section 5.4.2, we know that N f >Nh will hold for 
sufficiently low degree of price competition and for a sufficiently 
non-elastic aggregate demand. In these circumstances, foreign 
consumers are better off in terms of number of available varieties . 
•• Also, given that P j is not affected by T), the impact of given price 
differences on relative consumer welfare is smaller the smaller is T). 
It follows that for low values of the price elasticity of aggregate 
demand the favourable difference in the number of firms and 
varieties - will more than compensate the lower purchasing power of 
foreign consumers making them better off than horne consumers. As T) 
increases, however, the price disadvantage becomes more important and 
will eventually dominatell . Moreover, note that the smaller is () the 
more important IS variety in consumers' utility. This will correspond 
. Wh to a larger Impact on W of the difference in the number of firms 
f 
relative to differences in prices between the two countries, thus 
explaining the fact that for sufficiently small 0' the higher number 
of varieties of the foreign country dominates the role of its higher 
price in determining relative welfare. 
As was argued In Chapter 3, the persistence of positive profits 
11 Clearly, when T) is sufficiently large and 
unambiguously holds, given that horne consumers 
in terms of price and number of varieties. 
.* ** .* ** Nh >N f , Wh >W f 
are better off both 
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m the long-run industry equilibrium implies that any welfare 
analysis needs to take producer surplus into account. For 
completeness, the overall industry welfare measure defined in 
equation (3.70) can now be used to compare the two industries' total 
welfare. This implies examining the the ratio 
** Nh ** W h + ** Rh W~ Ph h 
= (5.29) W~ ** 
f Nf ** W f + ** Rf Pf 
Note that, as shown in the previous section, for all values of the 
relevant parameters the home country is characterized by higher 
expected firm and total industry profits, regardless of the relative 
market SIze of the two industries. Hence, given that 
** 
Nh ** holds, it follows that Rh 
** 
is always greater than 
Ph 
** P 
_f_> 1 
** Ph 
** 
always 
** N f 
** 
R f . Our 
Pf 
numerical analysis, however, suggests that in those circumstances in 
~ ~ 
which W f > W h' W f > W h also holds. This implies that when the price 
effect IS dominated by the variety effect in the determination of 
relative consumer welfare, the latter also outweighs the relative 
producer welfare. See Figures 5.26 and 5.27 for an illustration. 
5.8. CONCLUSIONS 
While setting the basis for the development of a trade model 
between two similar but not identical countries, this chapter has 
extended the market structure implications of technical heterogeneity 
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between firms to an inter-industry comparison. Some elements 
affecting market structure have been brought out more clearly. First, 
we have shown that market concentration results from the interplay of 
two factors. On one hand, there is the rationalizing effect of price 
competition which by increasing efficiency pushes towards a 
reduction of the surviving number of firms. This force implies that 
in a less efficient industry rationalization will be smaller and the 
number of firms will be larger. On the other hand, there is the 
effect on market structure which the level of industry efficiency 
exerts via aggregate demand. The higher is efficiency, the lower is 
the price index and other things equal the larger will be 
aggregate demand and the number of firms the industry can sustain. 
This force implies a tendency towards a smaller number of firms 
surviving in the less efficient market steady-state. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the role of the efficiency gap between industries has 
enabled us to explicitly highlight the role of firm size in shaping 
market concentration. Even when the low price competition and the low 
level of economic activity of the less efficient country result in it 
having a smaller number of firms than the more efficient one, the 
relationship between industry efficiency and concentration 
highlighted In Chapter 3 is not overturned; the less efficient 
industry will have a smaller number of smaller firms. 
Finally, the analysis of this chapter also opens interesting 
industrial policy issues. Clearly, our brief discussion of these 
issues is far from being exhaustive. However, the fact that our 
analysis suggests that an industrial policy aimed at increasing the 
efficiency of the industry's state of technology (by reducing the 
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mean of the marginal cost distribution) may not always have desirable 
welfare effects indicates the scope for fruitful research aimed at 
further exploration of the complexity of the forces at work. 
** {3f 
** Pf 
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Chapter 6 
INTER-FIRM AND INTER-COUNTRY EFFICIENCY GAPS: 
A MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
"TechnoLogy 
determining 
gaps 
the 
are of paramount importance 
partecipation of each country 
in 
in 
inernationaL trade fLows." 
Soete, 1990 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, recent developments in the theory 
of international trade have provided explanations of the patterns of 
international specialization alternative to those stemming from 
comparative advantage theories of trade, according to which countries 
trade in order to take advantage of their differences. Models based 
on imperfectly competitive market structures, utility functions that 
reward product diversity and increasing returns to scale technologies 
have established a rationale for the so called intra-industry-trade 
which accounts for a great deal of manufacturing trade, in particular 
amongst industrial economies. 
In general, in these models differences across countries, albeit 
not denied, have a secondary role in the explanation of trade 
patterns. The emphasis is on the similarity of demand structures and 
production technologies. This is particularly true for models of 
international trade built within the monopolistically competitive 
framework, where these similarities are pushed to the limit by 
assuming fully symmetric economies. This simplification has two 
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important consequences. 
First, whilst imperfect competition and product differentiation 
explain intra-industry trade, they are not sufficient per se to 
capture the different degrees of reciprocal trade penetration which 
show the extent to which specialization still exists amongst 
industrial economies l . Instead, due to the assumed symmetry In 
technologies and demand, this standard literature predicts the free-
trade market to be symmetrically shared between the trading partners. 
Notable exception is Krugman (1980) where the presence of transport 
costs ensures that firms hold different shares in their domestic and 
foreign markets. Venables (1987) also obtains a similar result by 
allowing for both the presence of transport costs and asymmetric 
preferences where products from different countries have different 
weights in consumers' utility functions 2 . 
Second, the symmetry hypothesis is not neutral with respect to 
the gains from trade. Models of monopolistic competition generally 
support the view that trade benefits symmetrically all partner 
countries. On one hand, the increased competition leads to a 
rationalization of the industry and generates efficiency galns. On 
the other hand, in an environment characterized by a taste for 
variety, trade increases consumer welfare via an increase in the 
1 As illustrated by Porter (1990) production 
categories of goods, while not totally 
country, are dominated by it. 
and export of certain 
concentrated in one 
2 In Krugman (1981) different market shares in the differentiated 
good market stem, within a two-sector-two-factor model, from the 
existence of differences in factor endowments between countries 
and do not result from inter-country asymmetries within the 
industry producing the differentiated good (see also Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985). 
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number of goods available for consumption. 
The two country framework introduced in the previous chapter is 
extended here to analyze the effects of trade liberalization. Three 
aspects of the problem will be discussed. First, the role of 
technological asymmetries amongst firms and countries as a 
determinant of different intra-industry trade performances. Second, 
the way in which the introduction of such asymmetries In a 
monopolistic competition model affects the welfare implications of 
trade. Third, the effect of trade liberalization on the market 
structure of the two countries. 
The results of this analysis differ from those of the standard 
monopolistic competition model of trade based on the hypothesis of 
homogeneous technology in two main respects. First, the integrated 
market is shared asymmetrically between countries, with the more 
efficient country supplying a bigger number, and larger quantities, 
of varieties than the less efficient one. Second, doubt is cast on 
the prediction that trade, via competition, leads to generalized 
efficiency gains (see for instance Smith and Venables, 1988). Our 
findings suggest that while efficiency gains at the industry level 
are experienced by the less efficient country, the more efficient one 
incurs an efficiency loss. As a result, welfare gains are not evenly 
spread between the two countries, and circumstances are identified 
where the more efficient country experiences a net welfare loss. This 
result is particularly striking because even when asymmetric welfare 
gains are found in the literature, they are generally biased ill 
favour of the country which enjoys a cost advantage. For instance, in 
Venables (1987) gains from trade occur in the country experiencing 
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cost reducing technical progress. 
Finally, note that unlike models where firms do not make 
supernormal profits, the analysis of the welfare effects of free-
trade cannot be limited here to consumers' welfare only and, given 
the effects of trade on industry profits, one needs to take account 
of producers' surplus. 
6.2. THE FREE-TRADE MODEL 
The two-country autarkic model developed in Chapter 5 is 
extended here to analyze the effects of complete trade liberalization 
between the two countries. Hence, free-trade is assumed to take place 
in a context where transport costs and all other barriers to trade 
are absent and consumers do not discriminate amongst goods produced 
in different countries as, for example, in Venables (1987, 1994). 
There are mainly two effects stemming from trade liberalization. 
First, consumers in each country will be able to choose from the 
overall number of varieties produced in the integrated market. This 
number is denoted by Nt=Nth+Ntf , where the subscript t refers to 
free-trade and hand f as in Chapter 5 denote home and foreign 
countries. Second, producers will be able to sell their product in 
both countries, thus facing an extended market. 
As before, the two countries' demand sides are assumed to be 
identical. Hence, in each country, the representative consumer 
utility function will be 
0'/(0'-1) 
U = L D~ji (0'-1)/0' (6.1) 
i=l 
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where the superscript x (=h,f) indicates the country of origin of the 
representative consumer and x D tji IS the free-trade consumption of 
variety i produced in country J (=h,f) by consumers in country x. The 
utility function in (6.1) will be maximized by each set of consumers 
x, subject to the budget constraint 
Nt 
PtD = L PtjiD~ji 
i=l 
where P t is the integrated market price index given by 
p-C 
j i=l 
1-0" 
P tji 
l/(l-a) 
(6.2) 
(6.3) 
D is the aggregate demand on the differentiated good in country x, 
given as before, by D=AP~TJ and P tji is the free-trade price of 
variety i. Note that, as in Chapter 5, we are assuming that the 
measure of nominal income A is the same in the two countries3 . The 
solution to the above optimization problems will yield the following 
demand, by consumers in country x (=h,f), for a variety i produced in 
country J 
(6.4) 
Given the symmetry of their demand sides, the demand function in 
(6.4) will be identical in the two countries. However, it is obvious 
that equation (6.4) does not correspond to the demand facing each 
firm. Instead, the aggregate demand for each variety i produced in 
3 Due to the common free-trade price and the identical value of A, 
no country subscript characterizes D. 
country j will be given by 
which implies 
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Dtji 2 
x 
= D ji 
2A p(J'-1'/ 
= N t 
t 
= 2 A p-1'/ 
t 
-(J' 
Ptji (6.5) 
(6.6) 
The hypothesis that both incumbents and potential entrants form 
static expectations about the future state of the market is retained. 
As a result, the optimal price rule for firm i in country j will not 
be affected by trade. This can be seen by maximizing the free-trade 
profit function of a firm i in country j 
= P
tj' l' (N
2A p(J't -1'/ P -(J') _ (3 .. (2A p(J'-1'/ P -(J') - K 
tji jl N t tji 
t t 
(6.7) 
with respect to P tji' The first order condition for profit 
maximization will be that is the pricing 
rule IS the same as in autarky, Le.Ptji=Pji' Also, note that given 
the absence of any factor giving rise to market segmentation, each 
variety will be sold at the same price P tji in both markets, 
regardless of where it is produced. Hence, given the optimal price, 
the profit of a firm i in country j is given by 
IT = 2rpA p(J'-1'/ (3~ ~(J' - K 
tji Nt t j 1 (6.8) 
(J'-l -(J' 
where rp=( (J'-l) (J' • 
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6.3. THE FREE-TRADE STEADY-STATE 
Each incumbent will remain in the industry as long as its profit 
IS non-negative, Le. until 
(6.9) 
The entry process in the integrated market has been modelled to 
reflect two most relevant factors. First, market integration unifies 
the conditions within which countries have to operate. A firm's 
competitive strength IS determined by its relative efficiency with 
respect to all firms in the integrated market and not only to the 
domestic ones. Within our framework, this requires a modelling 
strategy which can lead to the determination of a unique efficiency 
cut-off point, common to both countries. The second factor is related 
to the persistent nature of inter-firm and inter-country technical 
differences. Certainly, to an extent, trade flows are bound to 
generate knowledge spill-overs and thus to level out efficiency and -
more generally technological asymmetries between countries. 
However, it is a sure feature of the real world that the state of 
technology where the latter is defined in a broad sense 
encompassing institutional, cultural and organizational aspects 
remains to a great extent country-specific. Given the choice not to 
deal in this work with the dynamic diffusion aspects of knowledge 
(that In any case are not likely to eliminate inter-country 
differences) we adopt a modelling strategy which fully retains the 
country specific nature of technology. Analytically, this implies 
that the marginal costs distributions remain independent. 
These aims are achieved by means of a number of assumptions 
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which also ensure the determination of the number of firms operating 
in each country, thus allowing for the analysis of the pattern of 
trade. Potential entrants come from a common pool and no distinction 
is made amongst them with respect to their country of origin. 
Location, however, will not be the outcome of a rational choice, but 
will be seen as the product of a historical accident and will be 
assumed to be random. No relocation subsequent to entry is allowed 
for. After paying the fixed cost K, the entrant learns both the 
country where it will operate, Le. the distribution from which its (3 
is going to be drawn, and the specific value of its marginal cost. 
Note that, following the recent literature on economIC 
geography, the choice of location could have been endogenized. 
However, this would significantly complicate the analysis and would 
go beyond the aim of this paper. Two other alternatives could be 
considered. First, one could assume that trade "merges" the two 
countries' distributions into one defined over the interval [1-
0, l+¢+oJ. This would clearly violate the persistence of the country 
specific nature of technology without affecting the qualitative 
nature of the effects of trade on the two countries' relative 
efficiency4. A second and, given its consistency with our aims, more 
appealing alternative would be to assume entry to be country 
specific. In this case, given the partial equilibrium setting of this 
model, a solution could only be obtained if additional elements of 
asymmetry between the two countries (e.g. existence of transport 
costs, taste asymmetries, etc.) were introduced. In order to isolate 
4 This would also give rise to indeterminacy in the the number of 
firms operating in each country. 
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better the role of technical asymmetries, we have chosen to opt for 
the modelling strategy discussed above. 
As in autarky, potential entrants from either country will 
attempt entry into the free-trade market as long as the expected 
profit from entry, given the two countries' distributions, IS 
positive. Given the above assumptions, this condition can be defined 
as 
(6.10) 
Clearly, (6.10) implies that the two countries marginal cost 
distributions remain independent. Letting and 
Prob ((3j={3f) = 1-p, the entry condition in (6.10) can be rewritten as 
1+0 
VE(N;*) = p f TI({3h) 210 d{3h + (l-p) 
1-0 
1+¢+0 f TI( (3f) 210 d{3f>O 
1+¢-0 
( 6.11) 
The two components on the right-hand side of equation (6.11) 
correspond to expected profit when the entrant's (3j belongs to the 
home country's distribution and to the foreign one respectively. 
As in autarky, we define the steady-state as the situation where 
market structure does not change both because no firm has incentive 
to attempt entry into the industry and no incumbent is forced to 
leave it. The free-trade equilibrium will then occur when for all 
** potential entrants vEe Nt) = 0, and for the marginal incumbents 
** ** TI( Nt, (3t ) = O. Hence, given the profit function in (6.8), equation 
** (6.11) can be set equal to zero and be solved for N t=N t to yield the 
steady-state number of firms operating in the integrated free-trade 
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market. This yields 
(6.12) 
The minimum level of efficiency required to be profitable in the 
** free-trade industry ((3t ) can be obtained, given (6.7) and (6.12), by 
** (3t = ( 
2-<J 2-<J] ( 2-<J 2-<J] P (1+0) -(1-0) +(1-p) (1+¢+0) -(1+¢-0) ( 6.13) 
1-<J 
20(2-<J) 
** (3t represents the marginal cost of the marginal firms in both 
countries, i.e. it is the common efficiency cut-off -point. Under 
free-trade all firms in the integrated market will face an identical 
efficiency requirement: trade has unified the efficiency condition 
for the two industries. Note that, as illustrated in Figure 6.1, 
** other things being equal, (3t is a monotonically decreasing function 
of 0 and <J. Hence, the behaviour of the free-trade steady-state 
efficiency cut-off point is consistent with that under autarky. The 
more different are firms and the larger is the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties, the tougher is price competition and 
the higher is the minimum efficiency required to survive in steady-
state. 
In the analysis that follows we assume for simplicity - without 
affecting the qualitative nature of the results - that p=112. Hence, 
equations (6.12) and (6.13) become 
and 
** (3t = 
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((1+0/-<r -(1-0/-<r) + ((1+¢+0/-0' -(1+¢-0/-<r) 
40 (2-CJ) 
1 
l-CJ 
(6.14) 
(6.15) 
Finally, as shown in Appendix 6.1, from equation (6.3) the 
steady-state price index appearing will be given by5 
** 
( 6.16) 
(2-CJ) (2(3t -2+20-¢) 
6.4. THE FREE-TRADE MARKET STRUCTURE 
This section will analyze the integrated economy market 
structure. 
6.4.1. The overall number of firms 
From equation (5.14), (5.16) defining the autarkic steady-
state number of firms - and (6.14) it is immediately evident that 
** ** ** ** ** Nt =N th +N tf :l=N h +N f . In other words, trade does generate a change in 
the overall number of varieties produced in the world economy. This 
contrasts with the standard model a La Krugman where the overall 
number of varieties does not change when the elasticity of 
5 ** Note that the derivation of P t 
determination of the steady-state 
country, which we shall illustrate in 
in Appendix 6. I 
number of firms 
Section 6.4. 
requires the 
within each 
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substitution between them is constant, but only when it is variable 
with (J"=(J"( N t) and (d(J"/dNt»O. We shall shortly return to this issue. 
As in autarky, for any given value of <p, the free-trade total 
** 
number of firms (Nt) is smaller the more differentiated are their 
technologies and the better substitutes are the varieties they 
produce. The steady-state behaviour of the number of firms is 
analyzed by means of numerical computations which show as 
** illustrated in Figure 6.2 - that Ntis a decreasing function of both 
(J" and <5. Hence, at the aggregate level, the overall market structure 
behaves - with respect to the parameters which we identified as 
determining price competition - as the two countries' autarkic market 
structures. From equation (6.14) it is also clear that even with 
respect to the price elasticity of demand for the overall good (TJ) 
the integrated market number of firms exhibits a comparative statics 
** 
dNt> 
behaviour which mirrors that under autarky. Hence, ----cFi1<O depending 
** 
on whether P t 51 and the effects of a change in TJ on aggregate demand 
depend on the size of the price index. Clearly, from equation (6.6) 
it follows that ~~t to if P {;1. Thus, if the state of technology ~ 
and the elasticity of substitution between varieties (J" are such that 
the free-trade steady-state price level is smaller than one, then a 
ceteris paribus increase in the elasticity of aggregate demand with 
respect to price (TJ) will increase aggregate demand and, as a result, 
the integrated market will be able to sustain a larger number of 
** firms, i.e. Nt will increase. The opposite will happen if the price 
** index is larger than one. Given the relationship between (3t and <5 
and (J" highlighted above, the larger are the latter parameters (i.e. 
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the tougher is price competition), the higher will be the integrated 
economy average efficiency and the lower will be the price index. As 
a result, the tougher is price competition the more 
will hold. 
•• 
•• dN t likely -->0 
d11 
The behaviour of Nt with respect to ¢ is not monotonic. As can 
be seen from Figure 6.3, when the efficiency gap between countries is 
not very large increases in its magnitude increase the free-trade 
overall number of firms. When the gap is sufficiently large, however, 
•• its further increases will reduce Nt. Furthermore, note that the 
latter will start falling at lower values of ¢ the larger IS 11 and 
the weaker is price competition. As stressed in Chapter 5, while (J' 
and (5 play a rationalizing role on industry - Le. larger values of 
these parameters are associated with higher steady-state industry 
efficiency ¢ has an opposite effect on efficiency and market 
structure. By reducing efficiency and increasing the level of the 
industry price index, a rise in ¢ will depress aggregate demand. If 
the latter is sufficiently price elastic and the elasticity of 
substitution between varieties is small enough, the effect of ¢ on 
market structure will dominate the rationalizing role of price 
competition. In these circumstances, as ¢ rises aggregate demand will 
not be sufficient to support an increase in the surviving number of 
firms. 
6.4.2. Free-trade market concentration: an inter-country comparison 
The two countries' free-trade number of firms are respectively 
given by 
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** 
•• ** (3t - 1 + (5 
Nth = Nt (6.17 ) *. 
2(3t - 2 + 20 - </> 
and 
** 
•• *. (3t - 1 -</> + (5 
Ntf = Nt ( 6.18) 
** 2(3t - 2 + 2(5 - </> 
where the terms in brackets give the proportions of the integrated 
economy overall number of types of technology in the respective 
** country. Clearly, for any value of Nt, the number of firms in the 
** ** home country is larger than in the foreign one, i.e. N th>N tf holds 
for all values of 0', 0, 1), and </>. Furthermore, the difference between 
** ** Nth and N tf is determined by, and positively related to, </>. 
Taken in isolation, this result would seem to suggest that in 
the integrated market equilibrium the more efficient country is 
characterized by a lower concentration than the less efficient one. 
However, for a more precise picture a comparison of the two 
industries' Herfindhal's indexes in steady-state is required. If we 
define the free-trade market share (in terms of value) of a firm i in 
country j as 
be measured by 
then free-trade size variability 
** (3t 
V(Stj) = f (Stji - E(Stji))2gt/(3)d(3j' 
a j 
** 
will 
where 
a h = 1-0, a f = 1+</>-0 and gt/(3) = lI((3t -a j ). Hence, the free-trade 
Herfindhal's concentration index for the two countries (j=h,f) IS 
given by 
(6.19) 
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Proposition 6.1: In the free-trade equilibrium, industry 
concentration 1S (1) higher in the more efficient country if 
price competition is sufficiently tough (Le. (J" and/or (5 large) 
(2) higher in the less efficient country is price competition is 
sufficiently low (Le. (J" and/or (5 small). 
Numerical evaluation of equation (6.19) for the two countries shows 
that free-trade concentration is higher in the foreign than in the 
home country only for sufficiently low degrees of price competition 
(see Figure 6.4). It is easy to show that in each country size 
variability is an increasing function of both (5 and (J". Clearly, this 
must mean that if (J" and/or (5 are sufficiently small the number of 
firms effect on the concentration index dominates the size 
variability effect. The opposite will happen when price competition 
is fierce, with the size variability effect dominating the number of 
firms effect. Intuitively, the tougher 1S price competition because, 
say, of a high degree of substitutability between varieties, the more 
strongly will demand be biased towards the more efficient firms and 
the more efficient country and, as a result, the more significant 
will be the difference between market shares held by firms with 
different costs. This will lead, for large (5 and/or (J", to a higher 
concentration in the home than in the foreign country. 
This analysis has interesting implications for the pattern of 
trade which we now turn to highlight. 
6.5. TRADE PATTERN 
Given the assumed demand structure, all firms in this model 
engage In trade, and this gives rise to intra-industry trade In the 
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differentiated commodity. As in Krugman (1979) the direction of trade 
is not determined, but the volume of trade IS. 
However, contrary to the predictions stemming from the standard 
framework and due to the technical asymmetries postulated in this 
model, the degree of reciprocal intra-industry trade penetration is 
not symmetric. Instead, both the number of varieties and the output 
levels supplied by the two countries differ. As was shown in the 
** ** previous section N th>N tf always holds. Hence, 
Proposition 6.2: The more efficient country provides the world 
market with more varieties than its trading partner. 
Furthermore, 
Proposition 6.3: The more efficient country provides the world 
market with larger quantities than its trading partner. 
Proposition 6.3 can be illustrated by computing and comparing the 
free-trade steady-state expected size of a firm in the two countries, 
** 
approximated by the expected output levels Y j given by 
** (3t 
(6.20) 
** 
where gt/(3) = l/((3t -a) and Dtji is given by equation (6.5). This 
will yield 
and 
** Y th = 
(3*t*1-0' _ (1_0)1-0' 2cpA **0'- T) 
------------- --- Pt 
** ** (1-0' )((3t -1+0) Nt 
** 
Ytf 
(3:*1-0' - (1+c/>-0/-0' 2cpA 
= 
** ** (1-O')((3t -1-c/>+0) Nt 
( 6.21) 
(6.22) 
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** ** As illustrated in Figure 6.5, it is easy to show that (Y th/Y tf) 1S 
greater than unity for all values of the relevant parameters. This 
can plausibly be explained by arguing that home firms, by enjoying a 
favourable efficiency gap, sell more - on average - than foreign 
** ** ones. Furthermore, given that N th>N tf' it follows that even the total 
output6 of the home country will be larger than that of the foreign 
** ** ** ** one, that is NthYth>NtfYtf. 
This conclusion is supported by the examination of the market 
share in terms of value held by each country. From the definition of 
market share, the overall market share of each country will be given 
by 
** (3t 
Stj = N tj J Stji gt/(3 j) d(3 j 
a j 
(6.23) 
** where a h =l-c5, a f =l+cf>-c5 and gt/(3j) = l/((3t -aj). Given equations 
(6.5), (6.6), (6.17) and (6.18), this yields 
= [~) 1-(J P **(J-l 
Stj (J-1 t 
**2-(J 2-(J (3t - a j (6.24) 
** (2-(J )(2(3t -2+2c5-cf» 
Clearly, the ratio 
6 This measure of total output provides an estimate of the physical 
output produced by each industry and not of what in the 
monopolistic competition literature is referred to as the true or 
effective output. The latter is derived from the utility function 
and takes into account the value of product diversity to 
consumers. See for instance Krugman (1982) and Krugman and Helpman 
(1985). 
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Sth f3:*2-(J - (l-ol-O' 
= 
Stf f3:*2-(J _ (l+¢-ol-O' (6.25) 
is greater than unity for all parameter values, thus indicating that 
the more efficient country holds a larger share of the integrated 
market. 
Thus, the acknowledgement of the existence of efficiency 
differences amongst firms and between countries lead to different 
predictions as to the pattern of trade stemming from the monopolistic 
competition model, with the more efficient country holding a larger 
share of the integrated market. But we can go further and add that 
Proposition 6.4: The tougher is price competition (Le. the 
larger is 0' and/or 0) the larger will be the share of the 
integrated market held by the more efficient country. 
Indeed, the market share bias In favour of the horne country will be 
greater the larger are the elasticity of substitution amongst 
varieties and the degree of heterogeneity amongst firms. This is 
evident given that the larger are these parameters the larger is the 
gap between the countries' number of firms and their expected size. 
This result is particularly relevant in this framework because 
it highlights the importance of the hypothesis of firms' 
heterogeneity for trade pattern. Clearly, for any given value of 0', 
the more one departs from the homogeneous firms setting, the larger 
will ceteris paribus be the degree of asymmetry in the shares of the 
integrated market held by the two countries. 
Corollary 6.1: For sufficiently tough levels of price 
competition, all the free-trade market is held by the more 
efficient country. 
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•• •• •• 
From equation (6.18) we obtain 
a(N IN ) 
tf t 
= 
¢( a(3 I aa-) 
t 
which is 
•• 2 (2(3 -2+2o-¢) 
t 
•• •• •• negative given that a(3 la(J'<o. Hence - for any given 0 - N IN is 
t tf t 
monotonically decreasing in (J' and becomes zero for sufficiently large 
values of the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The ratio 
•• •• 
N IN is plotted against (J' in Figure 6.6. This result stems from 
tf t 
the fact that the tougher is price competition the less competitive 
is the foreign country as a result of its efficiency disadvantage 7. 
Obviously, as can be seen from Figure 6.7, the disappearance of its 
industry will occur at lower levels of price competition the larger 
is ¢. Clearly, this outcome will be reflected in the relative degree 
of concentration of the two countries. As can be seen from Figure 
•• •• 6.8, when price competition is very tough, the ratio H IH starts 
th tf 
falling and eventually becomes negative. Hence, when pnce 
competition is very fierce, the higher concentration of the foreign 
country reflects a competitive weakness and not a higher industry 
efficiency. 
It is worth noting the potential normative implications of this 
outcome. If the industry is of "strategic" importance and/or is a 
source of positive spill-overs to other sectors of the economy, the 
possibility of its disappearance may justify calls for protectionist 
trade policies. Clearly, a proper analysis of these issues is beyond 
the partial equilibrium framework of this model. 
7 The reduction of the less efficient country's number of firms under 
free-trade to very small numbers does not affect the plausibility 
of the assumed conjectural variations, given that under free-trade 
each firms competes with all the other firms in the integrated 
market. 
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6.6. ON THE RATIONALIZING EFFECTS OF FREE-TRADE 
As was discussed in Chapter 4, there is a widespread consensus 
on the so called rationalizing effects of free trade. In this section 
the implications of allowing for inter-firm and inter-country 
technical heterogeneity for the effects of trade on efficiency are 
discussed. 
6.6.1. The effects of free-trade on industry efficiency 
By unifying the competitive conditions in which firms from 
different countries operate, trade affects the competitive selection 
process and modifies firms' relative efficiency. 
Proposition 6.5: Trade liberalization makes the efficiency 
requirement more stringent for the less efficient country and 
less severe for the more efficient one. 
** ** From equation (6.13) it is clear that for p=l {3t ={3h and for p=O 
** ** ** ** ** {3t ={3f . Thus, for O<p<l, {3h <{3t <{3f holds for all values of CT, 0, 
and ¢. As a result, the efficiency requirement becomes tougher for 
the foreign country and less severe for the home one. Hence, home 
firms which were not capable of surviving in autarky are sufficiently 
efficient under trade because they face less efficient foreign 
competitors. In this sense, trade can be seen as reducing the 
toughness of the competitive selection process for the home country 
and increasing it for the foreign one. Consequently, more types of 
technology survive in the home country under trade than in autarky. 
The opposite happens in the foreign country, where the free-trade 
steady-state shows a smaller number of surviving types of technology. 
Hence, the average industry efficiency falls in the home country and 
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increases in the foreign one. This is clearly reflected in a higher 
marginal cost variability in the former than in the latter. It can 
therefore be concluded that whilst trade liberalization acts as a 
rationalizing force on the less efficient country's industry 
efficiency, it has de-rationalizing effects on the more efficient 
industry. 
From equation (6.13) it is also easy to verify that ceteris 
** paribus (3t IS increasing in ¢ which means that the larger is the 
efficiency gap (¢) between the two countries the larger will be the 
common efficiency cut-off point (see Figure 6.9). Hence, higher 
values of ¢ will correspond to lower levels of average efficiency in 
the integrated market. 
Proposition 6.6: The relative efficiency effects of free-trade 
are more enhanced the larger is the efficiency gap between 
countries (¢). 
Clearly, the larger is the efficiency gap between countries, the 
lower will be the efficiency of the survlvmg types of technology in 
the foreign industry. This, in turn, implies that the larger is ¢ the 
lower is the pressure to be efficient in the home country. It also 
follows that ceteris paribus increases of ¢ will correspond to larger 
differences between the two countries' autarkic minimum efficiency 
requirements and the common free-trade one. 
An important result has thus been established which casts doubt 
on the general validity of the widely spread belief that trade 
rationalizes industries via competition. Instead, given its opposite 
effects on the industry efficiency composition of the two countries 
industries, trade brings about efficiency gains only if a country is 
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competing with a more efficient partner. 
6.6.2. The efficiency effects of trade at the firm level 
In presence of economies of scale internal to the firm, trade 
liberalization, by increasing the extent of the market, may result in 
larger scales and lower unit costs. Hence, trade acts as a 
rationalizing force at the firm level. In order to assess the 
relevance of this efficiency increasing mechanism in this model, we 
shall analyze the effects of the move from autarky to free-trade on 
the degree of scale economies. As in Chapter 5, the latter will be 
measured by the average cost to marginal cost ratio. Under autarky, 
the elasticity of scale is given by equation (5.26). The 
corresponding measure under trade is 
(6.26) 
** where a h=l-o, a f =l+¢-o, gt/(3) = lI(f3 t -a j ) and Dtji is given by 
equation (6.5). 
The ratio E(8ji)/E(8tji)' j=h,f, has been numerically evaluated 
within the usual parameter intervals. 
Proposition 6.7: Trade liberalization increases the expected 
degree of exploitation of internal economies of scale in the 
more efficient country and reduces it in the less efficient one. 
As illustrated in Figure 6.10, our results show that for all values 
of the relevant parameters, E(8h »E(8 th ) and E(8 fi )<E(8tf )· Thus, 
trade reduces the expected degree of exploitation of potential 
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economies of scale In the less efficient country and increases it in 
the more efficient one8 . The rationale of this result is that - due 
to its efficiency advantage - the more efficient country holds a 
larger share of the integrated market and thus benefits relatively 
more from the increase in the extent of the market brought about by 
trade. 
6.6.3. Summary on the efficiency effects of trade 
The analysis carried out in this section shows trade 
liberalization to affect efficiency on two levels. 
First, by unifying the efficiency conditions within which firms 
operate, trade affects the competitive selection process in the two 
countries. At the industry level, the competitive pressure falls In 
the more efficient country and increases in the less efficient one. 
As a result, some types of technology which would not have been 
competitively successful under autarky manage to survive under trade 
in the country which enjoys a favourable efficiency gap. The opposite 
will happen in its less efficient trading partner, where a smaller 
number of types of technologies survive under trade. Note that this 
efficiency effect of trade is not present In the standard 
monopolistic competition literature where, due to the assumed 
technical homogeneity between firms, competitive selection processes 
are absent. 
Second, trade has an effect on the degree of exploitation of 
potential economies of scale at the firm level. The expected scale of 
8 It can be proved that - as In autarky - even under free-trade the 
degree exploitation of scale economies is always higher in the home 
than in the foreign country. 
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production increases in the more efficient country and falls in the 
less efficient one, reflecting the fact that the former - due to its 
efficiency advantage benefits more than the latter from the 
Increase in the size of the market associated with trade 
liberalization. 
The role of trade In changing output scales when production 
processes exhibit increasing returns to scale internal to the firm is 
typically acknowledged in the monopolistic competition literature. 
Note, however, that in the standard model a La Krugman trade affects 
the degree of scale economies only in the variable elasticity of 
substitution case. When the elasticity of substitution between 
varieties is constant, trade has no effect on the scale of 
production. However, in this model - due to the assumed inter-firm 
and inter-country technical asymmetries trade affects efficiency 
within the firm even in the constant elasticity of substitution case. 
It is important to stress that In the two models the scale effect of 
trade is different in nature. In the standard variable elasticity of 
substitution case, trade affects the degree of exploitation of scale 
economies as a result of its effect on (). The increase in the latter, 
stemming from the larger number of varieties brought about by trade, 
reduces firms' monopoly power, induces exit and leads to a steady-
state characterized by a smaller number of firms which operate on a 
larger scale. In the model developed here, the crucial factor is the 
persistence of the inter-country efficiency gap. Despite the fact 
that by changing the toughness of the competitive selection process 
trade modifies the structure of efficiencies in the two countries, 
the persistent efficiency differential characterizing the two 
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marginal cost distributions allows the home country to take better 
advantage of the increase in the extent of the market brought about 
by trade. This result accounts for the change in the overall number 
of varieties produced in the world economy which was highlighted in 
Sub-section 6.4.1. However, due to the different nature of the forces 
at work in the two models, here the relationship between change in 
the scale of production and number of firms differs from that 
emerging from the variable elasticity of substitution case analyzed 
by Krugman. These issues are analyzed in the next section. 
6.7. THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON THE AUTARKIC MARKET STRUCTURES 
The aim of this section is to further extend the analysis of the 
effects of trade to encompass its implications for the steady-state 
market structure of the two trading partners. This entails tying up 
together the results obtained in the inter-country autarkic 
comparison of Chapter 5 with the steady-state analysis of the trade 
model carried out In this chapter. More specifically, we shall 
compare the free-trade steady-state of the two countries to their 
autarkic ones. 
6.7.1. The effect of trade on the number of firms 
Trade changes the number of varieties produced within each 
country. In particular: 
Proposition 6.8: Trade increases the number of firms in the more 
efficient country and reduces it in the less efficient one . 
•• 
Numerical evaluation of the ratio 
N j 
shows that for all values of 
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•••• •••• 
the relevant parameters Nh <Nth and N f >Ntf always hold. For an 
illustration see Figures 6.11 and 6.12. Hence, in the more efficient 
country not only is the number of types of technology surviving under 
trade larger than under autarky, but the number of firms is also 
larger than before trade liberalization. The opposite happens in the 
less efficient country which experiences a decline in both the number 
of types of technology and in the number of firms. 
Given the behaviour of the number of firms in the two countries 
as trade is opened up between them, it is clear that this model has 
substantially different implications from the standard one. Contrary 
to the constant elasticity of substitution version of the 
monopolistic competition model, the number of firms in each industry 
changes as a result of trade. However, this change is not consistent 
with that occurring in the variable elasticity case. In the latter, 
in both countries the number of firms falls and the scale of 
production increases as a result of trade. In this model, the 
expected degree of exploitation of economies of scale is positively 
related to the number of firms within each country: a larger 
(smaller) number of firms producing at a larger (smaller) scale 
operate in the more (less) efficient country. Clearly, the different 
predictions of the two models stem from the diverse nature of the 
mechanisms leading to the change in the scale of production discussed 
in the previous section. 
To summanze, in the more efficient country trade reduces the 
steady-state industry efficiency. By competing with a less efficient 
trading partner, the efficiency requirement on domestic firms becomes 
•• •• less stringent and this is reflected in (3t >(3h' As a result, the 
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number of firms increases with trade. However, despite the survival 
of less efficient types of technology which were not sufficiently 
competitive in autarky, the efficiency advantage of the country 
implies that its firms manage to exploit the increase in market size 
brought about by trade better than their foreign rivals. It follows 
that their expected scale of production increases: a larger number of 
- on average - larger firms survives in the home country as a result 
of trade liberalization. In the less efficient country, trade 
** ** improves average industry efficiency given that (3t <(3r . As a result, 
the number of surviving firms falls. However, the persistence of the 
efficiency disadvantage implies that the expected elasticity of scale 
of its firms increases, thus indicating a lower exploitation of 
economies of scale at the firm level. Hence, trade leads to a smaller 
number of firms producing at a smaller scale, despite the increased 
toughness of the process of competitive selection which has 
rationalized the industry in terms of types of technology. 
6.7.2. The effects of trade on concentration 
For a full assessment of the effects of trade on market 
structure, the analysis cannot be limited to the evolution of the 
number of firms as the economy moves from an autarkic to a free-trade 
situation. To this end, we compare the Herfindhal's concentration 
index under autarky (equation 3.40) to that under trade (equation 
6.19). The results of numerical evaluation of the ratio are 
summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 6.9: Trade liberalization 0) reduces concentration 
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In the more efficient country except when, for sufficiently 
small values of cp, price competition is tough and tl1e elasticity 
of aggregate demand is sufficiently large, and (2) mcreases 
concentration in the less efficient country. 
** ** Obviously, given that Nh <Nth always holds, the non-homogeneous 
behaviour of the home country's concentration with respect to the 
structural parameters of the model must be accounted for by that of 
size variability. It can be shown that the variance of firms' market 
shares IS generally larger in autarky than under free-trade, 
consistently with the general fall in concentration following trade 
liberalization. However, when price competition is sufficiently 
tough, the price elasticity of aggregate demand is sufficiently large 
and the efficiency gap is sufficiently small, size variability 
dominates the number of firms m determining the increase in the 
degree of concentration. Point (1) of the proposition is illustrated 
in Figures 6.13 and 6.14. 
Despite the worsening of the efficiency composition of the home 
country's population of firms, the industry's favourable efficiency 
gap is such that domestic firms are better at coping with a high 
price competition than foreign ones. Thus, two contrasting forces are 
at play. The first, leading towards a lower concentration, stems from 
the lower efficiency at the industry level and results in an increase 
in the number of firms. The second stems from the persistence of the 
efficiency advantage the country enjoys and results in a bias in 
favour of home country' varieties - and within the country towards 
the more efficient firms. Clearly, if the price factor is very 
important (i.e. price competition is very tough) this bias may be 
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very large and will more than compensate the negative effects on 
concentration of the increase in the number of firms. On the 
contrary, when price competition IS not very fierce, the de-
ra tionalizing effects on industry resulting from trading with a 
relatively less efficient country will lead to a reduction in 
concentration. Finally, note that a higher free-trade concentration 
only occurs for relatively small values of the efficiency gap. Recall 
that as </> increases the overall integrated market efficiency falls. 
Consequently, the larger is </> the larger will be the efficiency loss 
experienced by the home country. Hence, for sufficiently large values 
of </> the more efficient industry's relative advantage does not 
translate into an increase of concentration. 
In the less efficient country, the rationalizing effects of 
trade at the industry level generate an increase in concentration 
(see Figure 6.15 for an illustration). This also happens in those 
circumstances where the latter increases in the more efficient 
country as well. Recall, however, that the home country's industry 
becomes more concentrated when price competition is very tough, that 
is when the foreign country's share of the integrated market is very 
small. Hence, in the less efficient industry the number of firms 
effect dominates the size effect in determining the behaviour of 
concentration as the foreign country opens up trade with a more 
efficient partner. 
6.8. THE EFFECTS OF TRADE ON INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY 
Most of the recent developments in the theory of industrial 
organization which have recognized the effects of foreign trade on 
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industry profitability leads one to expect trade liberalization to 
have a negative impact on profitability. In general, this is 
explained with reference to the role of foreign competition in 
restraining the market power of domestic firms. 
In this model we have found that in autarky there is a positive 
relationship between concentration and profitability. Furthermore, we 
found that trade increases industry concentration m the less 
efficient country and, in general, reduces it in the more efficient 
one. This would generate the expectation of an increase (fall) in 
industry profitability in the less (more) efficient country. 
The expected profit under free-trade of a surviving firm IS 
given by 
** (3t 
J (6.27 ) 
** Rth =K -1 (6.28) 
and 
**2-~ 2-~ 40 ((3t -C1+¢-0) 
-1 (6.29) 
Proposition 6.10: Trade liberalization changes the relationship 
between concentration and profitability. 
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The comparison between the autarkic and free-trade expected profits 
indicates that the latter increase in the home country and fall in 
•• •• 
the foreign one. The ratios (R j /Rtj ) are plotted in Figures 6.16 and 
6.179 . 
Thus, because of trade, the relationship between average 
industry efficiency and profitability is not consistent with the 
autarkic case. Despite its efficiency loss at the industry level, the 
home country experiences a higher profitability; instead, the 
industry rationalization undergone by the foreign country is 
accompanied by a reduction of expected profitability. Once again the 
rationale for this result can be found in the persistence of the 
efficiency gap between countries, whereby the home country competes 
with a trading partner which is still characterized by an efficiency 
disadvantage. As a result, the former benefits more than the latter 
from the increased size of the market which leads to a better 
exploitation of internal economies of scale by its firms. 
Furthermore, the lower (higher) competitive pressure on home 
(foreign) firms resulting from competition with a less (more) 
efficient partner, implies that the expected downward (upward) move 
along the average cost curve will be translated into expected higher 
profits. In other words, in this model the efficiency effect of trade 
at the firm level leads to an increase (fall) of monopoly power for 
the more (less) efficient countries' producers. 
9 These results are confirmed by the behaviour of the expected profit 
margins. By computing, from equation (3.41), the expected autarkic 
profit margins for the two countries and comparing them to their 
respective values under trade it is easy to show that the expect 
price-cost margin increases for the more efficient country and 
falls for the less efficient one as a result of trade 
1 i beralization. 
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6.9. WELFARE EFFECTS OF FREE-TRADE 
In the standard monopolistic competition literature firms' 
technical homogeneity, together with the imposition of the zero 
profit condition, generates the elimination of supernormal profits 
for all firms. Thus, the analysis of the effects of trade 
liberalization can be exhausted by examining consumer welfare. 
However, as was discussed in Chapter 3, in this work the existence of 
technical heterogeneity between firms implies that the steady-state 
is characterized by a spectrum of profits. Given the results on the 
effects of trade on market structure it is likely that these profits 
are affected by trade. It IS therefore necessary to analyze the 
impact of trade on both consumer and producer welfare. 
The following analysis is based on that carried out m the 
previous chapters. Hence, the indirect utility function is used as a 
measure of consumer welfare. Producer surplus will instead be 
approximated by the total industry profit in steady-state. 
6.9.1. Consumer welfare 
Before analyzing the indirect utility function, it is worth 
distinguishing between the two main factors through which trade 
affects consumer welfare in this model. These are the number of 
varieties of the differentiated good available for consumption and 
the average price level. 
6.9.1.1. The variety effect 
Trade definitely increases the number of varieties available for 
•• •• 
consumption, given that Nt >N j . 
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Proposition 6.11: By increasing the number of varieties 
available for consumption trade has a positive effects on 
consumer welfare. 
Hence, consumers in both countries enjoy a wider choice and, given 
the utility function which rewards product diversity, they achieve, 
ceteris paribus, a higher level of welfare. In this respect, this 
model is consistent with the findings of monopolistic competition 
models of trade based on the assumption of firms characterized by 
homogeneous cost functions. However, a major qualification is 
necessary. 
Proposition 6.12: The number of variety effect on consumer 
welfare is not symmetric in the two countries . 
•• For any given Nt, the welfare gain brought about by trade is larger 
in the country whose consumers were worse off, in terms of number of 
available varieties, in autarky. It was found in Chapter 5 that for 
sufficiently large CJ' and/or 0, that is for a sufficiently tough price 
competition, the autarkic number of firms in the more efficient 
country is smaller than in the foreign and less efficient country. It 
follows that Hence, when the structural 
parameters of the model are such that price competition is 
sufficiently fierce, the home country will benefit more from the 
wider choice which results from the opening up of trade. The opposite 
will happen for sufficiently low levels of price competition, when 
.. .. ...* .* .. Nh >N f and thus (Nt -Nh )«Nt -N f ). Clearly, in this latter case 
the less efficient country will benefit more from trade 
liberalization as far as the number of variety effect on consumer 
welfare is concerned. 
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6.9.1.2. The price effect 
From equation (6.12) it IS easy to show that, for any given 
** value of (5 and 0', P t is positively related to <p. In fact, the larger 
IS the efficiency gap between countries, the lower will be the 
average efficiency level of the integrated economy which is reflected 
** in a higher price index. By comparing P t to the two countries' 
** ** ** autarkic price indexes, it is clear that Ph <P t <P f for all values 
of 0', (5 and <p. It follows that 
Proposition 6.13: In terms of purchasing power, trade makes 
consumers worse off in the more efficient country and better off 
in the less efficient one. 
These points are shown in Figure 6.18. Note that change in the 
expected scale of production as a result of trade is not reflected in 
the price eff ects of trade. As a resul t the better (worse) 
exploitation of economies of scale in the more (less) efficient 
country does not lead to an increase (reduction) of consumer 
welfare lO . 
6.9.1.3. Net effect on consumer welfare 
The above analysis clearly indicates that 
Proposi tion 6.14: In the foreign country trade will 
unambiguously generate an increase in consumer welfare. 
As was established, trade has a positive effect on the foreign 
country's consumer welfare both via the increase in the number of 
varieties it generates and via the change in the price index which 
10 As was previoulsy noted, a change 
scale will only be reflected in 
profitability. 
in the expected elasticity of 
firms' monopoly power and 
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enters consumers' demands. Thus, given that both the price and the 
variety effects are positive, foreign consumers will always be made 
better off by trade. 
In the home country, however, the price effect and the variety 
effect have opposite welfare impacts on consumers. In order to solve 
this ambiguity, we shall compare the autarkic and free-trade indirect 
utility functions for the home country. The autarkic indirect utility 
function is given by equation (3.64). Analogously, the free-trade 
indirect utility function will be given by 
(6.30) 
Note that, given the symmetry of the two countries demand sides, the 
indirect utility in (6.30) IS common to both countries. 
Proposition 6.15: Trade brings about a net welfare loss to 
consumers in the more efficient country for sufficiently large 
values of 0, 0' and 1). 
As can be seen from Figure 6.19, the ratio ceteris paribus 
increases in 0, 0' which determine the fierceness of price 
competition. For large values of 0', the loss of price efficiency 
outweighs the positive welfare effect of a larger number of 
varieties, because relative prices between variants become more 
important in determining consumer choice, as the degree of 
substitutability between them increases. Also, the larger is the gap 
between the most and the least efficient firms in the industry, 
determined by 0, the higher is the pre-trade efficiency, and the 
larger will be the (negative) impact on efficiency generated by 
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trading with a less efficient country. The role of 1) in determining 
the net effect of trade on consumer welfare is obvious considering 
that the larger is this parameter the larger will be the welfare 
impact of an increase in the price index stemming from the trade 
induced industry-wide efficiency loss. Finally, note that for any 
given level of autarkic welfare, the free-trade indirect utility 
level is smaller the larger is the efficiency gap between countries. 
This is due to the role of the latter in determining the efficiency 
loss in the home industry which occurs after trade. 
Corollary 6.2: The welfare gains of consumers in the less 
efficient country are larger the larger are ~ and o. 
This is clearly a reflection of the role of these parameters in 
determining the extent of the industry wide efficiency gains the 
country experiences. Although foreign consumers are always made 
better off by trade, the extent of the welfare gains they experience 
trade will depend on the structural parameters of the model: the 
tougher is price competition the more selective the free-trade 
competitive process on the foreign industry will be and, as a result, 
the larger will be consumers' welfare gains. 
6.9.2. Producer welfare 
We now turn our attention to the impact of trade on producers' 
surplus. Denoting the overall autarky industry surplus profit in 
•• •• •••• 
country j by T j , we have T j =NJ Rj 
•• 
where N j 
•• 
and R j are explained 
in equations (5.14), (5.16), (3.26) and (5.20) respectively. The 
•• * ••• 
corresponding measures T tJ=N tJRtj can be constructed under trade, by 
using equations (6.28) and (6.29). 
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Proposition 6.16: Trade liberalization Increases (reduces) the 
overall industry profit in the more (less) efficient country. 
This result stems from two different elements. On one hand, as we 
saw, by reducing industry efficiency In the home country and 
increasing it in the foreign one, trade increases (reduces) the 
number of firms surviving In the home (foreign) country, that is 
** ** ** ** Nh <Nth and Nf >Ntf· On the other hand, from the comparison between 
the autarkic and free-trade expected profits it emerges that expected 
profitability increases in the home country and falls in the foreign 
one as a result of free-trade. This effect is clearly related to the 
changes in the expected scale of production brought about by trade. 
Hence, it is obvious that within each country, trade has 
asymmetric effects on consumers and producers, with the nature of the 
conflict of interest between these two groups of agents being the 
opposite in the two countries. The possibility of a conflict between 
the welfare effects of trade on consumers and producers has already 
been noted in the literature, but not in symmetric monopolistically 
competitive models11 . 
Because of the opposite welfare effects on producers and 
consumers, the net welfare effects of trade at the industry level are 
ambiguous. This is particularly true for the foreign country where, 
for all values of the relevant parameters, trade makes consumers 
better off and producers worse off. The situation is less ambiguous 
11 For instance, Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) find, 
within an oligopolistic homogeneous good framework, that consumers 
always gain because of a larger overall output and lower prices. 
Producers, on the contrary, may lose if the price reduction 
dominates the output effects of trade, thus leading to a fall in 
profits. 
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as far as the horne country is concerned, given that there are 
intervals of (J" and (5 for which the consumer and the producer welfare 
eff ects of trade go in the same direction. 
6.9.3. Net industry welfare 
As was argued in Chapter 3, given the difference in the units of 
measurement between the welfare indicators used for consumers and 
producers, the assessment of the net welfare effects at the industry 
level is not straightforward and cannot consist of a simple sum of 
the two. To this end, the autarkic and free-trade total industry 
** ** profit, T j and T tj' have been "deflated" by the industry price 
** ** indexes P j and P t respectively, so as to reflect their value in 
terms of the differentiated good12 . Hence for the two countries, the 
overall industry welfare under autarky is given by the following 
welfare measure 
( 6.31) 
where j=h,f and the superscript s stands for social welfare13 (given 
the partial equilibrium framework, social and industry welfare are 
used interchangeably). Analogously, under free-trade total welfare 
12 The same limitation identified in Chapter 3 is present here, 
namely that, due to the difficulty within this framework of 
determining the number of failed entry attempts, the following 
welfare measures do not take into account the foregone entry cost 
incurred by those firms that chose not to enter the industry. 
13 Here we conform to the trade literature where it is common to 
assume that at the margin a pound's worth of gain or loss to 
producers and consumers has the same social value. 
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will be given by 
(6.32) 
Note that under free-trade consumer welfare is common to both 
countries but producer welfare is country specific, given the 
different number of firms and expected profit of the two countries. 
Proposition 6.17: Circumstances can be identified in which trade 
generates total welfare losses for either country. 
As can be seen from Figure 6.20, other things being equal, for 
sufficiently large values of T/ and (5 there is an interval of CJ' where 
.(), .(), 
the ratio (W hlW thY exceeds unity, i.e. trade generates total welfare 
losses in the more efficient country. In general, the more important 
is price competition the higher will be the welfare cost generated by 
the increase in the industry price index which results from the loss 
of efficiency brought about by trade. The larger are these parameters 
the more costly in terms of welfare will be the Increase in the 
industry price index resulting from the loss of efficiency brought 
about by trade. As we saw, on consumer side the indirect utility 
function falls as CJ' and T/ increase. Similarly, on producer side, if 
the country enjoys a favourable efficiency gap trade generates an 
increase in nominal profits, but this effect is reduced by the higher 
price index. Total welfare, however, will be improved by trade when 
price competition is very tough and the great majority (if not the 
whole) of the free-trade market is held by home producers14. 
14 In these circumstances the dominant role is played by the effects 
of trade on industry profitability. Also, the very tough price 
•• 
competition, via its effect on (3t' will limit the extent of the 
adverse effect of trade on industry's efficiency and price index. 
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In general, for the less efficient economy, trade brings about 
positive welfare effects. This is shown in Figure 6.21. Hence, given 
that as we saw producer surplus falls whereas consumers' (indirect) 
utility increases, the latter effect must dominate the former in the 
aggregate. Indeed, the negative impact on producers is alleviated by 
the fall in average price which increases the "purchasing power" of 
the total industry profit. Note, however, that for very small values 
s s 
of T}, W f/W tf becomes greater than unity for sufficiently tough levels 
of price competition (see Figure 6.22). Clearly, for a low price 
elasticity of aggregate demand the rise in purchasing power brought 
about by trade will not generate a consumer welfare increase 
sufficiently large to compensate for the fall in nominal profit 
(which is larger the tougher is pnce competition). 
A significant implication of this analysis is that - unless the 
price elasticity of aggregate demand is very small - the move to 
free-trade increases the foreign country's overall industry welfare 
even for those values of the parameters for which the whole 
integrated market is served by the more efficient country. Clearly, 
from an analytical point of view, this means that the welfare gain of 
consumers more than compensates for producers' loss. Although this 
reflects the fact that consumers are not affected by where the 
purchased varieties are produced and benefit from the wider choice 
and the lower price index, this result clearly depends on the partial 
equilibrium nature of the analysis. Thus, once again, the results 
call for an extension of the analysis to a general equilibrium 
framework, so as to allow amongst other things for an 
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endogenization of income15 . 
6.10. A BRIEF DIGRESSION ON THE EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF TRADE 
The assumption of firm cost heterogeneity was shown to allow for 
the endogenous determination of industry efficiency. The implications 
of this for market structure and trade have been extensively 
discussed. In this section we highlight another advantage which sterns 
from this hypothesis. 
It is a common feature of trade models a La Krugman to impose a 
labour market clearing condition which - by acting as an economy 
resource constraint - allows for the endogenous determination of the 
number of firms. In our model this constraint needs not to be imposed 
because, given firm's heterogeneity, market structure IS determined 
by the process of competitive selection. The analysis has thus been 
carried out in a partial equilibrium framework, with an implicit 
hypothesis of perfectly elastic factor supplies. A drawback of this 
modelling strategy is the impossibility of determining factor prices 
and how they are affected by trade. But it has the advantage of 
allowing one to identify some of the implications of trade for the 
level of industry employment, given the level of economic activity of 
the economy as a whole. 
Following the standard Krugman model, let us assume that labour 
is the only factor of production and that labour requirement for 
producing good i in country j is given by 
15 The total industry welfare analysis has been conducted for a given 
ratio AIK. Although the above measures of welfare are not very 
sensitive to the magnitude of AIK, it is worth mentioning that the 
welfare worsening effects of free-trade for the home country are 
more enhanced the larger is A relative to K. 
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(6.33) 
with a, Oji>O. For a given nominal wage w, equation (6.33) yields the 
following cost function 
(6.34) 
which is clearly equivalent to equation (5.4) for wa=K and {3ji=wOji ' 
If, by confining the analysis to a partial equilibrium setting, we 
rule out the income effects of trade, Le. we do not allow for 
changes in the wage rate and in incomes, then from our previous 
analysis we can infer the effects of trade on the employment level in 
the industry. From equation (6.33) it IS obvious that ceteris 
paribus - the higher the firm's efficiency, the lower will be its 
labour demand. Hence, the following results will hold: 
(1) In the more efficient country trade reduces average industry 
efficiency and increases both the number of firms operating in 
steady-state and their expected output scale. This will result 
in an increase in the level of employment. 
(2) On the contrary, the level of employment in the industry will 
fall in the less efficient country whose average efficiency will 
increase, the number of firms will fall and, due to the 
persistence of the country's efficiency disadvantage, their 
expected output scale becomes smaller. In the limiting case 
where the whole of the integrated market is held by the more 
efficient country, all employment in the industry will be 
eliminated. 
(3) It is obvious that the costs and gains In terms of employment In 
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the two countries are determined by the extent to which trade 
changes their relative efficiency which was shown to depend 
ceteris paribus on the size of the efficiency gap. Thus, other 
things being equal, the larger is the difference in terms of 
efficiency between the two countries the more significant will 
be the employment losses in the less efficient country and the 
employment gains in the more efficient one. 
Although in this framework the rest of the economy is kept in 
the background, this analysis suggests that trade will have effects 
on the inter-industry distribution of employment within the economy. 
The partial equilibrium analysis allows one to understand the nature 
of the changes in the employment level in the differentiated industry 
only and the economy wide implications cannot be assessed. A general 
equilibrium framework would be required to analyze the impacts of 
trade on other sectors' employment and on aggregate income. This will 
be left for future research. 
6.11. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has analyzed the implications of technical 
heterogeneity amongst firms and countries for the patterns of 
international specialization and for the welfare effects of trade. It 
is shown that the usual result according to which countries share 
symmetrically the free-trade market no longer holds. 
On the whole the recognition of technical asymmetries within and 
between countries has been shown to pose a significant challenge to 
the welfare implications of standard models. Two types of efficiency 
effects of trade have been identified. At the industry level, the 
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average competitiveness of countries is affected by the change in the 
strength of the competitive selection process within each country. As 
a result, the efficiency structure of the industry only improves in 
the country which has a cost disadvantage. By competing with a less 
efficient trading partner, 
<. 
a fall In average industry efficiency 
occurs in the more efficient country, where some types of firms which 
would have been forced to exit the industry under autarky are able to 
survive under trade. Due to the persistence of the inter-country 
efficiency gap, however, trade is shown to increase (reduce) the 
scale of production of firms in the more (less) efficient country. 
The results obtained in this chapter cast doubt on the efficacy 
of trade in generating welfare gains based on its rationalizing 
effects on industries. Indeed, depending on the magnitude of the 
price elasticities of demand and the degree of heterogeneity amongst 
firms, the fall in efficiency reflected in the price effects of 
market integration - can be sufficient to generate a net welfare loss 
in the home country. This welfare loss does not occur in the less 
efficient country. Whilst it is not possible to draw clear-cut 
normative conclusions from this partial equilibrium analysis, these 
results challenge the view emerging from the monopolistic competition 
literature that the introduction of imperfectly competitive markets 
may strengthen the case for free-trade. 
To some extent, of course, the results of this analysis depend 
on the functional forms adopted. Nevertheless, they are sufficiently 
general to support the view that the existence of technical 
heterogeneity can cause adverse welfare effects of trade. Obviously, 
the problem of losing because of trade is of great interest with 
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respect to integration processes between similar countries, like 
those forming the European Union, which are undoubtedly characterized 
by different types of specialization and sectoral developments. 
Finally, note that the partial equilibrium analysis carried out 
m this model does not allow one to examine what happens to factor 
markets and assumes that all inputs are available to the industry at 
constant prices16 . This is an obvious limitation, particularly in a 
model where the two trading countries are characterized by different 
factor productivities so that trade is likely to affect factor 
prices, together with the rate of employment of resources, and feed 
back through this into the industry structure. The departure from a 
partial equilibrium framework remains an interesting possibility for 
future research. 
16 These issues are discussed by Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1991) 
within a general equilibrium model with intermediate goods and 
several factors of production. 
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Appendix 6.1 
THE FREE-TRADE PRICE INDEX 
In this appendix we derive the free-trade price index of 
equation (6.13). From the definition of price index in equation (6.3) 
the steady-state price index for the integrated economy is given by 
1-(J 
= 1 L L 1-(J 
- p .. 
** tJ 1 
N 
t j i=1 
( A6.1) 
which can be rewritten as 
1-(J 
** ** 
1 
Nth Ntf 
** ( A6.2) P t = L 1-(J L 1-(J 
** Ptj i + Ptj i Nt 
i=1 i=1 
Note that under free-trade, the "sub-industry" price index in each 
country will be given by 
1 \' 1-(J 
** L Ptj i 
N tj i=1 
1 
1-(J 
where j=h,f. From (A6.3) we get 
i=1 
[ 
.*]1-(J 
P tj 
( A6.3) 
( A6.4) 
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which can be substituted into (A6.2) to yield 
1-0" 
** ** 
** Nth **1-0" Ntf **1-0" P t = P th + -- Ptf ( A6.5) ** *. 
Nt Nt 
Given the country-specific distribution under free-trade, equation 
(A6.3) for the two countries will yield 
** 
P th 
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1 
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1-0" 
( A6.6) 
1 
1-0" 
d(3f 
(A6.7 ) 
(A6.6) and (A6.7) can now be used to rewrite (A6.5) which, given 
equations (6.15) and (6.16) will become 
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Chapter 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1. A SUMMARY 
This thesis has developed a monopolistically competitive 
framework characterized by technical heterogeneity amongst 
competitors. The results of the analysis are relevant for both 
industrial organization and international trade theory. 
As was highlighted in Chapter 3, one of the most important 
implications of allowing for technical heterogeneity amongst firms in 
a monopolistically competitive market is the endogenization of the 
steady-state level of industry efficiency which is determined by 
competition amongst firms. In presence of cost asymmetries, free-
entry leads to a competitive selection process whereby more efficient 
entrants displace less efficient incumbents in the industry. Contrary 
to the standard model, entry will not drive profits to zero and the 
long-run equilibrium will be characterized by a dispersion of 
efficiencies, prices, market shares and profits. 
The implications of technical heterogeneity for international 
trade have been analyzed by constructing a two country model where an 
efficiency gap between the two competitors takes the form of a 
difference in the mean of their marginal cost distributions. Due to 
the assumed inter-firm and inter-country efficiency gaps, the 
emergence of asymmetries in equilibrium market shares and in the 
distribution of potential welfare gams stems from within the 
differentiated product industry. 
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It was shown that trade has two types of efficiency effects and 
that in both cases the two countries are affected asymmetrically. 
At the industry level, trade modifies the efficiency structure 
of the population of firms in the industry. Thus, by unifying the 
competitive conditions in which firms from different countries 
operate, trade liberalization reduces (increases) the competitive 
pressure in the more (less) efficient country. As a result, types of 
technology which would not be sufficiently efficient under autarky 
manage to survive under trade in the more efficient country. The 
opposite happens in the less efficient economy, where the number of 
types of technology surviving under trade is smaller than in autarky. 
Hence, at the industry level, trade acts as a rationalizing force 
only for the country which suffers the efficiency disadvantage. It 
was noted that this efficiency effect of trade does not take place In 
the standard specification of the monopolistic competition model 
where all firms are technologically identical. 
At the firm level trade affects the expected scale of production 
which increases (falls) in the more (less) efficient country. This is 
because the persistent efficiency gap between the two countries' 
technologies implies the existence of a bias In favour of the (on 
average) cheaper home country's varieties. This second effect 
resembles the one emerging from Krugman's variable elasticity case, 
where trade increases the scale of production. However, in the two 
models the change in the elasticity of scale reflects different 
factors. Apart from the asymmetric way in which it takes place in the 
two countries, in this model the change in the degree of exploitation 
of scale economies does not influence consumer welfare but only 
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producers' monopoly power and profits. 
The asymmetric nature of the efficiency effects of trade on the 
two countries is crucial in determining the pattern of trade and its 
welfare implications. With respect to the former, we showed that the 
free-trade market is not symmetrically shared by the two countries, 
with the more efficient one selling more varieties in larger 
quantities. Furthermore, for sufficiently tough levels of price 
competition, the less efficient country's industry was shown to be 
totally displaced by its more efficient competitor. 
Given some of the adverse efficiency effects emerging from 
trade, this analysis clearly casts doubt on the widespread view that 
trade, by increasing competition, is a generalized source of industry 
rationalization. These results are also not fully consistent with the 
view that - however costly for the individual industry within the 
individual country trade is nevertheless increasing overall world 
market efficiency. Although the less efficient country may be 
completely forced out of the industry, the surviving country will 
serve the world market at an average efficiency level which is lower 
than the pre-trade one and which will be reflected in a price index 
which is higher than the autarkic one. 
Finally, our analysis showed the gains from trade not to be 
symmetrically distributed across the two countries and circumstances 
were identified in which at least one country experiences a net 
welfare loss from trade. Furthermore, asymmetry also characterizes 
the welfare effects between producers and consumers within each 
country. 
A casual observation of the real world suggests that the 
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widespread assumption of identical technologies between competitors 
within and between countries is not sustainable. In this thesis we 
have shown that by moving beyond this restrictive assumption new 
insights can be gained into the working of the competitive forces in 
industries exposed to international competition and important 
features of the real world can be captured. 
7.2. FUTURE RESEARCH 
A number of possible developments can be envisaged following 
this study, some related to the issues which directly arise from this 
analysis, and some entailing the exploration of new directions of 
research. 
The analysis carried out in this thesis has significant 
normative implications. 
In the new trade theory the strategic trade policy argument for 
protection has only been analyzed within oligopolistic models. 
Clearly, the profit shifting argument cannot be applied in 
situations, as those described by the standard monopolistic 
competition model, where supernormal profits are eliminated by entry. 
But given the long-run persistence of profits in this model, it 1S 
possible to envisage the desirability of government policies aimed at 
ensuring a larger share of international profits to domestic firms. 
Hence one could address, as was recently done by Neary (1994) within 
an oligopolistic framework, the issue of whether government subsidies 
should be targeted towards weaker firms or towards more competitive 
ones. The answer to this question is not obvious, given that the 
policy - by affecting the degree of heterogeneity between firms -
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would influence the process of competitive selection1. 
The possible disappearance of the less efficient country's 
industry may provide justification for protectionist policies. These 
could be supported, for instance, by arguments pointing at the 
strategic importance of the industry. Given the partial equilibrium 
nature of the analysis carried out in this study, it was not possible 
to analyze these issues and, hence, to reach clear-cut normative 
conclusions. However, this type of analysis could be carried out, for 
instance, within a general equilibrium framework where the 
differentiated product industry generates knowledge spill-overs for 
other sectors of the economy. 
The extension of the analysis to a general equilibrium framework 
would have other advantages. For example, it would allow one to 
examine the effects of trade on factor prices and employment. As 
noted in Chapter 6, the effects of trade on the two countries 
efficiencies and market structure clearly imply some intersectoral 
reallocation of resources which could not be captured within this 
partial equilibrium framework. 
An explicit characterization of the location problem of firms in 
the integrated market is an interesting direction of research. As was 
discussed in Chapter 6, in this thesis it was assumed that location 
in the two countries is random. This must obviously be seen as a 
first step towards a more interesting and plausible modelling 
strategy which sees location as a rational choice. Clearly, as 
suggested in Chapter 6, this line of research would require the 
1 This dimension is not present in Neary (1994) in whose model there 
is no entry. 
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modification of this basic model and some other sources of 
asymmetries between the two economies may have to be introduced (such 
as transport costs, or asymmetric preferences) to rule out the 
trivial case of all firms locating in the more efficient country. 
Interesting policy issues would then emerge. For instance, one could 
analyze the role of industrial policy in affecting the location 
decisions of firms. 
The above extensions are relatively straightforward and would 
not require significant departures from the framework developed here. 
More substantial developments would be involved by the introduction 
of learning and innovation processes which here were ruled out by 
assumption. Allowing for firm-specific innovation (as an asymmetry 
generating factor) and/or diffusion and imitation between firms (as 
convergence factors) would clearly represent a stimulating line of 
research. A first step in this direction would be to assume that the 
dispersion of firms in the industry is not with respect to their 
marginal costs, but with respect to the effectiveness of R&D 
expenditure (one of firms' choice variables) in increasing 
efficiency. This could easily be extended to incorporate knowledge 
spill-overs between firms and/or firm-specific technical progress and 
learning dynamics in the research process. Interesting issues could 
then arise, concerning for instance the role of industrial and 
technology policy in affecting the dispersion of firms' efficiencies 
and through it the nature of the competitive selection process in the 
industry. Clearly, in considering these and other extensions there 
will be a trade-off between analytical tractability and the 
introduction of new features. 
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